Darknet as a Source of Cyber Threat Intelligence: Investigating Distributed and Reflection Denial of Service Attacks by Fachkha, Claude
Darknet as a Source of Cyber Threat Intelligence:






Electrical and Computer Engineering
Presented in Partial Fulﬁllment of the Requirements




c© Claude Fachkha, 2015
CONCORDIA UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES
This is to certify that the thesis prepared
By: Claude Fachkha
Entitled:
Darknet as a Source of Cyber Threat Intelligence:
Investigating Distributed and Reﬂection Denial of
Service Attacks
and submitted in partial fulﬁlment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
complies with the regulations of the University and meets the accepted standards
with respect to originality and quality.



















Cyberspace has become a massive battleﬁeld between computer criminals and com-
puter security experts. In addition, large-scale cyber attacks have enormously ma-
tured and became capable to generate, in a prompt manner, signiﬁcant interruptions
and damage to Internet resources and infrastructure. Denial of Service (DoS) attacks
are perhaps the most prominent and severe types of such large-scale cyber attacks.
Furthermore, the existence of widely available encryption and anonymity techniques
greatly increases the diﬃculty of the surveillance and investigation of cyber attacks.
In this context, the availability of relevant cyber monitoring is of paramount im-
portance. An eﬀective approach to gather DoS cyber intelligence is to collect and
analyze traﬃc destined to allocated, routable, yet unused Internet address space
known as darknet. In this thesis, we leverage big darknet data to generate insights
on various DoS events, namely, Distributed DoS (DDoS) and Distributed Reﬂection
DoS (DRDoS) activities. First, we present a comprehensive survey of darknet. We
primarily deﬁne and characterize darknet and indicate its alternative names. We
further list other trap-based monitoring systems and compare them to darknet. In
addition, we provide a taxonomy in relation to darknet technologies and identify
research gaps that are related to three main darknet categories: deployment, traﬃc
analysis, and visualization. Second, we characterize darknet data. Such informa-
tion could generate indicators of cyber threat activity as well as provide in-depth
understanding of the nature of its traﬃc. Particularly, we analyze darknet pack-
ets distribution, its used transport, network and application layer protocols and
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pinpoint its resolved domain names. Furthermore, we identify its IP classes and
destination ports as well as geo-locate its source countries. We further investigate
darknet-triggered threats. The aim is to explore darknet inferred threats and cat-
egorize their severities. Finally, we contribute by exploring the inter-correlation of
such threats, by applying association rule mining techniques, to build threat asso-
ciation rules. Speciﬁcally, we generate clusters of threats that co-occur targeting
a speciﬁc victim. Third, we propose a DDoS inference and forecasting model that
aims at providing insights to organizations, security operators and emergency re-
sponse teams during and after a DDoS attack. Speciﬁcally, this work strives to
predict, within minutes, the attacks’ features, namely, intensity/rate (packets/sec)
and size (estimated number of compromised machines/bots). The goal is to under-
stand the future short-term trend of the ongoing DDoS attacks in terms of those
features and thus provide the capability to recognize the current as well as future
similar situations and hence appropriately respond to the threat. Further, our work
aims at investigating DDoS campaigns by proposing a clustering approach to infer
various victims targeted by the same campaign and predicting related features. To
achieve our goal, our proposed approach leverages a number of time series and ﬂuc-
tuation analysis techniques, statistical methods and forecasting approaches. Fourth,
we propose a novel approach to infer and characterize Internet-scale DRDoS attacks
by leveraging the darknet space. Complementary to the pioneer work on inferring
DDoS activities using darknet, this work shows that we can extract DoS activities
without relying on backscattered analysis. The aim of this work is to extract cyber
security intelligence related to DRDoS activities such as intensity, rate and geo-
location in addition to various network-layer and ﬂow-based insights. To achieve
this task, the proposed approach exploits certain DDoS parameters to detect the
attacks and the expectation maximization and k-means clustering techniques in an
attempt to identify campaigns of DRDoS attacks. Finally, we conclude this work
by providing some discussions and pinpointing some future work.
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Today, the safety and security of our society are entirely dependent on having a
secure Information Communication Technology (ICT) infrastructure, which spans
over public and private organizations in the sectors of government, defense, en-
ergy (i.e., Nuclear and Power), telecommunications (i.e., mobiles), public health
(i.e., hospitals), emergency services (i.e., 911), agriculture, ﬁnance (i.e., banks) and
transportation (i.e., aviation). This infrastructure is controlled and operated using
the Internet (also known as cyberspace): a network of numerous inter-connected
computers.
Recent Internet events have demonstrated that corporations and governmental
organizations could be subjected, nearly instantaneously and in full anonymity, to
large-scale disrupting cyber attacks with the potential to lead to severe privacy, secu-
rity and economic consequences (i.e., cyber terrorism, denial of service, information
theft, spam, fraud, etc.). For instance, a nuclear power plant was targeted for the
ﬁrst time by Stuxnet, a complex computer virus discovered in 2010 [3]. In 2012, a
more complicated malware known as Flame [4] was found to have massive espionage
capabilities. There has been an increasing trend of cyber attacks, which have been
used to exhaust and/or deny services of large organizations (.i.e., Google, Facebook,
Government Websites) through the ﬂood of computer network traﬃc to the victim
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targeted by the attack. For example, in 2014, the Internet experienced the largest
DoS threat in history with 400 Gbps of bandwidth [5]. In addition, orchestrated
cyber campaigns, which occur when a given cyber force conducts a series of planned
and coordinated cyber attacks, leverage botnet (networks of orchestrated and in-
fected computers) to communicate and execute attacks; such threats have caused
over $110 billion in losses worldwide [6]. These events constitute a serious threat
with the potential to endanger human lives, especially when physical entities such
as smart grids [7] and nuclear power plants can be reached through cyberspace. The
existence of widely available encryption and anonymity techniques greatly increases
the diﬃculty of the surveillance and investigation of cyber attacks. In this context,
the availability of relevant cyber monitoring is of paramount importance.
One of the eﬀective ways to observe Internet activity is to employ passive
monitoring using sensors or traps such as darknet [8]. Darknet data is deﬁned as
traﬃc targeting advertised, but unused, IP addresses. Since these network addresses
are unused, they represent new hosts that have never been communicating with other
devices, neither for benign or legitimate communication. As a result, any observed
traﬃc destined to these non-interactive hosts raises suspicion and hence necessitates
investigation. These darknet-based monitoring systems are designed through these
unused IP addresses to attract or trap attackers for intelligence gathering. For
instance, darknet has been used in the past to extract insights on: 1) probes or
scanning activities [9] due to worms, bots and other automated exploit tools; 2)
DDoS attacks due to victims’ reply (backscatter) packets to spoofed IP addresses
[10]; and 3) other activities, such as misconﬁguration [1], and political events [11].
Darknet is an asset for network security. Several deployment techniques [12] were
invented, various projects (i.e., CAIDA1) were built, and numerous visualization
techniques were used in order to observe the data.
1The UCSD Network Telescope: http://www.caida.org/projects/network_telescope/
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Denial of Service is an attempt to make a computer or network resources un-
available. It consists of attacks that are deployed to temporarily or indeﬁnitely
shutdown services. The timing of such attacks can be coordinated to exploit the
availability of critical organization infrastructures by directing an enormous ﬂood of
Internet traﬃc towards targeted Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. By ﬂooding the
available bandwidth with intensive traﬃc, DDoS can eﬀectively bring down a service
with potential loss of brand name, trust, and ﬁnancial revenue. Indeed, DoS activ-
ities continue to dominate today’s attack landscape. In a recent report by Arbor
Networks [13], it was concluded that 48% of all cyber threats are DoS. Further-
more, it was stated that the top 4 perceived threats for the next 12 months will be
DDoS related, targeting customers, network and service infrastructures [14]. Some
governmental organizations, corporations as well as ICT infrastructures were also
recently deemed as DDoS victims [15–17]. Moreover, a recent event demonstrated
that one of the largest cyber security organizations, namely Spamhaus, became a
victim of a 300 Gbps Domain Name System (DNS) DDoS attack [18]. In addition
to this, in 2014, the Internet has experienced the largest reﬂection DDoS attack in
history [5]. Thus, DDoS attacks are a signiﬁcant cyber security problem, causing
momentous damage to several victims as well as negatively aﬀecting, by means of
collateral damage, the availability of services, business operations, market share,
the conﬁdence, as well as the reputation of the organization under attack. In this
thesis, we leverage darknet data to investigate DDoS and DRDoS activities, which
are special types of DoS events. In particular, we detect, analyze, predict and assess
the threat behind their activities to generate DoS insights, which can be leveraged
for situational awareness and mitigation purposes.
3
1.1 Objectives
The aim of this thesis is to generate cyber threat intelligence related to the inference
of DoS activities. In this context, the thesis’ objectives are listed below:
• Perform darknet data analysis and characterization.
• Provide inferences and insights related to DoS threats in addition to generate
global cyber intelligence related to large-scale cyber activities.
• Investigate DoS activities in an attempt to predict their events and attribute
such activities to certain campaigns as well as to certain Internet-scale mali-
cious events.
• Develop approaches that can infer and assess the impact of large-scale DoS
attacks and campaigns on the Internet.
• Design, implement and deploy a cyber security capability to infer Internet and
DoS events.
1.2 Contributions
This thesis attempts to tackle the above-mentioned objectives. To this end, our
contributions can be summarized as follows:
• Provide the ﬁrst state-of-the-art survey on darknet research and the largest
taxonomy of Internet passive monitoring.
• Leverage intrusion detection and data mining approaches on darknet for indi-
cating cyber threat activities.
• Design and implement statistical and fuzzy hashing approaches for character-
izing and inferring cyber campaigns of DoS attacks.
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• Propose a prediction model based on time series techniques with capabilities to
assess prediction, forecast and hence mitigate future DDoS threat occurrences.
• Propose a novel approach to ﬁngerprint DRDoS activities through darknet
analysis and identify the ﬁrst real traces of large DNS reﬂection attacks.
In a nutshell, our work aims at studying darknet to generate DoS cyber intel-
ligence. The latter could be adopted for immediate detection, mitigation and even
attribution of DoS attacks.
1.3 Organization
The structure of this thesis is as follows. In Chapter 2, we primarily provide a back-
ground information on darknet. As a result, we deﬁne darknet and compare it to
other trap-based monitoring systems. Furthermore, we provide some examples on
its operation online. In Chapter 3, we provide a taxonomy in relation to darknet
technologies and identify research gaps that are related to three main darknet cat-
egories: deployment, traﬃc analysis, and visualization. In Chapter 4, we elaborate
on the work related to the investigation of darknet traﬃc, namely, characterization
of its traﬃc and correlation among inferred threats. In Chapter 5, we describe the
design and implementation of our DDoS prediction model. To this end, we also
forecast DDoS cyber campaigns attempts. In Chapter 6, we elaborate on our novel
approach to ﬁngerprint DDoS reﬂection activities. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes this
thesis, summarizes its contributions and highlights some research gaps that pave the




This chapter provides an overview of darknet and highlights the focus of our survey
by: 1) Providing deﬁnitions that list the alternative names; 2) discussing the diﬀer-
ences between darknet and other trap-based monitoring systems; and 3) providing
some examples of darknet and its operation on the Internet.
2.1 Darknet Deﬁnitions
The term darknet can refer to the following:
• Any communication system that operates by stealth and conceals its users’
identity. Freenet [19] and BitTorrent [20] software are two examples that ﬁt
in this category.
• Servers and programs used to illegally distribute copyrighted material [21].
Such systems can include peer-to-peer ﬁle sharing technologies such as Napster
and Gnutella [22].
• Servers conﬁgured to trap adversaries and collect suspicious data. This type
of darknet runs in a passive mode without interacting with attackers. This is
similar to the darknet project of Team Cymru [23].
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In this work, we refer to darknet as per the last deﬁnition. Since these servers run
in passive mode and correspond to unused hosts or devices, any observed traﬃc
destined to them raises suspicion and hence necessitates investigation.
It is noteworthy to mention that the word darknet has been known under vari-
ous alternative terms, including darkspace, blackhole monitors, unused IP addresses,
network telescopes, unsolicited network traﬃc, unwanted traﬃc, non-productive or
non-responsive traﬃc, spurious traﬃc, Internet background radiation (IBR), unal-
located but reachable IP addresses and unassigned IP addresses. To harmonize the
terminology, we use the word darknet throughout this thesis.
2.2 Trap-Based Monitoring Systems
Trap-based monitoring systems aim to deploy online sensors to trick and trap ad-
versaries to collect malicious activities. Several systems leverage this approach such
as darknet [8] and greynet [24]. A thin line separates various forms of trap-based
network monitoring systems. In this subsection, several monitoring systems are
contrasted and classiﬁed based on their types, interactivity levels, complexity, data
collection and security aspects.
• Darknet: An IP address block conﬁgured in passive mode. Most of the darknet
sensors return “unreachable” errors when a request is sent to listening hosts.
This error explains that a certain host or port is not reachable. Darknet
implementation is considered simple since these sensors do not communicate
with the initiator of the communication. The captured traﬃc therefore consists
mostly of the ﬁrst request in communication.
• IP Gray Space: These addresses refer to devices that are not assigned to any
host throughout a given time period (i.e., 1 hour, 1 day). Conceptually, IP
gray space is similar to darknet; the only diﬀerence is that IP gray space
addresses are unused only for a limited time, whereas darknet addresses are
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permanently unused. Unlike darknet, IP gray space might prove more diﬃcult
to be detected by an attacker since the underlying hosts might be active and
operating as a regular machine during various periods of time. The aim is to
imitate regular hosts.
• Honeypot: This is an interactive computer system, mostly connected to the
Internet, that is conﬁgured to trap attackers. Honeypots are similar in nature
to darknet but with more speciﬁc goals. Honeypots require more resources
than darknet, since they interact during communication. As far as interaction
is concerned, there are three major types of honeypots, namely, low, medium
and highly interactive. A low-interactive honeypot is conﬁgured to interact
with the initiator of the communication by emulating basic services such as
replying to Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) ECHO request (i.e.,
Ping). A medium-interactive honeypot is similar to a low-interactive one but
with further interactions and a greater number of emulated services for more
data capturing and analysis. A highly interactive honeypot is a computer sys-
tem that does not emulate services; it instead runs a fully-ﬂedged, potentially
vulnerable, operating system, services and applications.
• Honeynet: This network is simply a group of honeypots used to deploy dis-
tributed trap-based network monitoring systems for large-scale data collection
and analysis.
• Greynet: This network is populated with active IP addresses interspersed with
darknet addresses. In other words, greynet uses both darknet (passive) and
honeypots (active) in the same monitoring IP address space. The purpose is to
make the monitored IP space appear as a more attractive trap for adversaries.
Take for example, a range of IPs that have both darknet and other active
sensors running fake services. This scenario imitates a typical organization
network that hosts both running and unused IP addresses, which may trick
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the attacker into thinking that the whole range of IPs in the monitored block
is an appropriate target.
Table 2.1 provides a comparison of trap-based network monitoring systems
based on several features: type of sensor, interactivity with the initiator, deploy-
ment complexity, data collection, and security of the monitoring IP address space.
First, as mentioned earlier, darknet and IP gray space share similar features. These
two trap-based monitoring systems are considered secure since they do not interact
with the adversary. Furthermore, since they run in passive mode (null interactivity),
their deployment diﬃculty and data gathering features are considered low compared
to other monitoring systems. Second, regarding honeypots, the interactivity, the
complexity and the data gathering features are mostly proportional to each other.
For instance, the more interaction there is with the adversary, the more complex
the implementation to setup and the greater is the amount of data that needs to be
collected. However, all honeypots with an interactive feature are potentially vulner-
able in terms of security. Finally, since greynet consists of darknet and honeypots,
it is considered a more comprehensive monitoring system and could therefore have
more possibilities in terms of interactivity, complexity, data collection and security.
Monitoring System IP Type Interactivity Complexity Data Collection Security




null low low secure
Low-Interactive
Honeypot
active low low low vulnerable
Medium-Interactive
Honeypot
active medium medium medium vulnerable
High-Interactive
Honeypot















Table 2.1: Trap-based Monitoring Systems - Comparison
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Figure 2.1: Trap-based Monitoring Systems - Address Space Distribution
First, the darknet contains only unused addresses running in passive (inactive)
mode. Second, the IP gray space (at time t + δt) is similar to darknet. However,
the same address space was already active in a previous period of time (time t).
Third, honeypots can run in various modes, either solely on a network or with other
active/passive hosts. The latter case represents the greynet address distribution.
It is worthy to mention that some monitoring systems have the capability
to run in both darknet and honeypot modes, a feature, which allows honeypots to
capture more data. Given that our aim is to investigate passive monitoring of unused
IP addresses, the scope of our work covers mainly the study of darknet, greynet,
IP gray space and few honeypots that solely target unused address space, such as
Honeyd [25] and LaBrea Tarpit [26].
2.3 Darknet Inferred Cyber Threats
Darknet is indeed an eﬀective approach to infer various Internet activities and
threats related but not limited to the following:
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Scanning/Probing or Reconnaissance Activities
Internet scanning is the task of probing enterprise networks or Internet wide ser-
vices, searching for vulnerabilities or ways to inﬁltrate IT assets. Scanning can be
initiated by computer worms, bots and other automated exploit tools. Scanning is
a signiﬁcant cyber security concern. The latter is due to the fact that probing is
commonly the primary stage of an intrusion attempt that enables an attacker to
remotely locate, target, and subsequently exploit vulnerable systems. It is basically
a core technique and a facilitating factor for cyber attacks.
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Attacks
DDoS attack is an attempt to make a computer and/or network resources unavail-
able. It consists of attacks that are deployed by one person or a group of people
to temporarily or indeﬁnitely shutdown services. The timing of such attacks can
be coordinated to exploit the availability of critical organization infrastructure by
directing enormous ﬂood of Internet traﬃc to a small set of targeted IP addresses
belonging to a target organization. By ﬂooding the available bandwidth with inten-
sive traﬃc, DDoS perpetrators can eﬀectively bring down a service with potential
loss of ﬁnancial revenue. In addition, DDoS attacks can be coordinated via a botnet,
which is a platform to orchestrate and manage cyber attacks.
Distributed Reﬂection Denial of Service (DRDoS) Attacks
DRDoS is a special type of DDoS attacks. In a typical DRDoS scenario, the attack-
ers aim to hide their identities by leveraging third parties such as web servers and
routers to redirect malicious traﬃc to the victim. In this case, all these third parties
are called reﬂectors. Any host that responds to any incoming request can become a
potential reﬂector. DRDoS threats have the ability to amplify attack traﬃc, which
makes the threat even more severe. A well known type of DRDoS attacks is the
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DNS ampliﬁcation threat. In this attack, an adversary tries to generate a ﬂood of
tiny DNS requests, but with high ampliﬁed replies, on the Internet to reach open
ampliﬁers. As a result, all ampliﬁed replies are sent back from these ampliﬁers (re-
ﬂectors) to the victim.
More details on darknet activities and threats can be found in Chapter 3.
2.4 Darknet Operation
In this section, to achieve a better understanding on how darknet operates, we pro-
vide a brief background information related to some darknet scenarios. In particular,
we show how darknet can be exploited on the Internet to generate various elements
of cyber threat intelligence, including probing, DDoS and DRDoS activities.
A darknet is indeed an eﬀective approach to infer various Internet-scale prob-
ing activities [27]. Figure 2.2 presents an illustrative example, in which a probing
machine is scanning the Internet. Such machine could have been previously infected
by a worm that is trying to propagate, or perhaps is participating in automated
Internet-scale scanning [28]. Some of these network probing packets can hit the
network telescope and thus are subsequently captured. Recall that the probing
machine, while spraying its probes across the Internet, cannot probably avoid the
network telescope as it does not have any knowledge about its existence. Further,
it has been shown in [29] that it is extremely rare if not impossible for a probing
source to have any capability dedicated to such avoidance.
Darknet traﬃc analysis is an eﬀective technique in pinpointing victims of DDoS
attacks [30]. Figure 2.3 illustrates such scenario. The attacker is directed to launch a
DDoS attack towards the victim. To hide its identity, the attacker spoofs its address
and replaces it with a random IP address. Such random address could happen to

















Figure 2.2: Probing Activities
victim will be directed towards some dark IP address. Traces that hit the darknet
are often dubbed as backscattered packets [30] and could be eﬀectively employed to
infer that the victim has been the target of a DDoS attack.
In the last scenario, a darknet is leveraged to infer DRDoS attacks [31]. In-
deed, as previously mentioned, such attacks are an emerging form of DDoS attacks
that rely on the use of publicly accessible UDP servers [32]1, which act as “open
ampliﬁers” of the attack. The bandwidth ampliﬁcation factors are function of the
instrumented protocol. The idea is to send small queries to such ampliﬁers in which
the replies, that aim at ﬂooding the victim, are orders of magnitude larger. Recall
that such approaches are behind the notorious 300 and 400 Gbps attacks that hit the
Internet in the last couple years [32]. More on ampliﬁcation attacks can be found in
Section 2.5.2. Figure 2.4 depicts this scenario. Commonly, the attacker will spray

















Figure 2.3: DDoS Activities
the Internet with such spoofed queries in a hope to reach as many open ampliﬁers
as possible in order to achieve a large ampliﬁcation factor. This case will occur in
the scenario where attackers do not know in advance the IP addresses of Internet
open ampliﬁers. We argue that such generated requests are not probes intended to
gather information, since the attackers in this case do not aim to build/manage a
list of open ampliﬁers nor do they want to jeopardize being detected (by using their
real IP addresses, which is typical in probing activities). Intuitively, some of those
requests will hit the darknet and hence will be captured. Requests that actually





















Figure 2.4: DRDoS Activities
2.5 DoS Attack Techniques
DoS attacks can be initiated in two major ways. The ﬁrst is designed to consume
host’s resources. In this scenario, the victim could be a web service or proxy con-
nected online. Obviously, any host has limited resources to process information. In
a normal network operation, if the network ﬂows exceeds this limit, the destina-
tion host starts dropping packets and informs the sender. As a result, legitimate
senders slow down their sending rates to keep the operation balanced between the
other host(s). In contrary, malicious users keep ﬂooding victims to exhaust their
resources, such as memory and CPU usage. The second way has impact on the
consumption of network bandwidth, which could be more devastating than the ﬁrst
way. In this scenario, the attacks congest victims’ network with corrupted or even
legitimate ﬂood of packets. Therefore, all benign requests of services destined to
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such victims will be partially or fully denied. To help readers gain a better under-
standing of such DDoS attacks, we list some well-known attacks in the following
sections.
2.5.1 Protocol-based Flooding Attacks
Protocol-based attacks leverage vulnerabilities in Internet protocols to ﬂood the
victims with legitimate or corrupted packets. Some of the classical examples of
these attacks are similar to SYN ﬂooding and ICMP ﬂooding. We describe the
major ﬂooding attacks below.
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) SYN Flood
A SYN ﬂood DoS attack exploits a known weakness in the TCP connection sequence,
the three-way handshake, wherein a SYN request to initiate a TCP connection with a
host must be answered by a SYN-ACK response from that host, and then conﬁrmed
by an ACK response from the requester. In a SYN ﬂood scenario, the requester
sends multiple SYN requests, but either does not respond to the host’s SYN-ACK
response, or sends the SYN requests from a spoofed IP address. Either way, the
host system continues to wait for acknowledgment for each of the requests, binding
resources until no new connections can be made, and ultimately resulting in a DoS
attack.
User Datagram Protocol (UDP) Flood
This DoS attack leverages UDP, a session-less networking protocol. This type of
attack ﬂoods random ports on a remote host with large number of UDP packets,
causing the host to frequently check for the application listening on that port, and
reply with an ICMP Destination Unreachable packet if the application is not found.
This process exhausts hosts CPU and memory resources, and can ultimately lead
to inaccessibility.
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Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) Flood
Similarly, an ICMP ﬂooding attack overwhelms the target resource with ping or
ICMP Echo Request traﬃc. Such attack can exhaust both incoming and outgoing
bandwidth capacity and can cause a delay or shutdown in services. A well known
type of ICMP ﬂooding threat is the Ping of Death (POD) attack.
Domain Name System (DNS) Flood
In a DNS ﬂood scenario, malicious users target one or more DNS servers, attempting
to bombard and turning down DNS root operations. In a typical DNS attack,
the attacker attempts to overwhelming server resources and impeding the servers
ability to direct legitimate DNS requests. DNS ﬂooding are diﬀerent than DNS
ampliﬁcation attacks. In general, DNS runs on top of UDP transport, which is
a connection-less service. As such, spooﬁng DNS ﬂooding attacks is more easily
accomplished.
Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Flood
HTTP is a well-known application layer protocol running on top of TCP port 80.
HTTP ﬂooding attacks hits web servers with a large amount of HTTP requests.
HTTP requests can be crafted by attacks to avoid detection. These attacks are
known to leverage botnet infrastructure to orchestrate attacks on one or many vic-
tims. The large usability of the web (www) services over the Internet has made HTTP
ﬂooding attacks popular and hence diﬃcult to ﬁlter and detect.
Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Flood
The recent deployment of Voice over IP (VoIP) telephony and its usability have
created the SIP services. Unfortunately, attackers can leverage this technology to
ﬂood telephony services with DoS attacks. SIP services run generally on top of UDP
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port 5060. This telephony service is designed to provide easy service and use for
legitimate services. Adversaries leverage vulnerabilities in SIP services, for example,
to ﬂood the victim with spoofed SIP invite packets.
2.5.2 Protocol-based Reﬂection Attacks
Recent events have demonstrated that ampliﬁcation or reﬂection DoS attacks are
probably the most eﬀective and devastating cyber attacks. We list below the major
ones such as DNS-based, NTP-based reﬂection attacks, among others.
Network Time Protocol (NTP) Ampliﬁcation
NTP servers support monlist requests, which most NTP server implementations
accept in their short form of only 8 bytes. Upon receiving a monlist request, an
NTP server shares its recent clients in up to 100 UDP datagrams with 440 bytes
payload each. One response datagram speciﬁes statistics for NTP clients (such as the
client’s IP address, its NTP version and the number of requests) who contacted this
NTP server. This response datagram is a useful debugging feature in the legitimate
use case. The total response length depends on the number of client statistics a
server shares upon request. An attacker can abuse this feature to amplify DoS
traﬃc to a victim.
Domain Name System (DNS) Ampliﬁcation
Name lookup (i.e., A or MX records), the traditional use case of DNS, have low
ampliﬁcation rates. Traditionally, the size of UDP replies was limited to 512 bytes
and DNS switched to TCP communication for larger replies. However, many DNS
servers adopted the DNS extensions (EDNS0) that allow for UDP responses of up
to 4096 bytes. Attackers may abuse ANY request with EDNS0, for which a server
returns all known DNS record types for a given domain. A well-known attack abuses
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DNS open resolvers to function as ampliﬁers. Attackers can enforce high ampliﬁ-
cation rates by resolving ANY requests from domains that result in large responses.
Attackers can even conﬁgure a domain they control such that its authoritative name
server responds with 4096-byte-wide responses. Another reason behind this ampliﬁ-
cation is the deployment of DNSSEC, in which each resource record is accompanied
with a typically 1024-bit-wide signature in a special RRSIG record.
Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Ampliﬁcation
Certain SNMP version (i.e., v2) supports the GetBulk operation, in which a device
returns a list of SNMP identiﬁers that can be monitored. In the legitimate use case,
this request can be used to iterate all monitoring values. An attacker can abuse this
feature to amplify DoS traﬃc to a victim. The exact response size is determined by
the number and length of identiﬁers in the returned item list.
Simple Service Discovery Protocol (SSDP) Ampliﬁcation
Upon SSDP discovery requests, UPnP-enabled hosts respond with one reply packet
per service they have conﬁgured. The response size depends on the conﬁgured
services and the length of the service name. Some ampliﬁers respond with a few
reply packets only, as they oﬀer fewer services. An attacker could thus abuse this
service by sending SSDP request packets spoofed with the victims IP address as the
source of the request.
Character Generator Protocol (CharGen) Ampliﬁcation
According to RFC 864, CharGen servers reply with random characters to incoming
UDP datagrams of any length. An attacker may leverage this service on many
servers and use small UDP packets with a spoofed victim IP address as the source
to overwhelm the target.
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Quote of the Day (QOTD) Ampliﬁcation
Similar to CharGen, Quote of the Day servers (RFC 865) also send replies to UDP
datagrams of any length. So an attacker may leverage this service on many servers
and use small UDP packets with a spoofed victim IP address as the source to
overwhelm the intended target.
Quake 3 Ampliﬁcation
Quake 3 game servers are found to have the highest ampliﬁcation when asking a
server for its current status, a 15-byte-wide request. The reply is signiﬁcantly larger
and includes, i.e., the detailed server conﬁguration and a list of current players.
Given a number of Quake 3 servers with a large number of users currently active on
the server; an attacker may leverage this service on any number of Quake 3 servers
by sending status requests to the server and replacing the source IP address with
that of the victim in order to overwhelm the target.
Network Basic Input/Output System (NetBios) Ampliﬁcation
For NetBios, an attacker may achieve DoS ampliﬁcation using a name lookup, for
which a receiving Windows system responds with its current network and host name
conﬁguration. The response sizes are inﬂuenced by the host names and network con-
ﬁgurations of the ampliﬁers. An attacker may send requests to a NetBios capable
server spooﬁng the victims IP address as the source so that the victim receives the
overwhelming reply traﬃc.
2.5.3 Summary
We have presented several DoS attacks, namely, ﬂooding and ampliﬁcation. It is
noteworthy to mention that the types of threats are not always mutually exclusive.
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In practice, an adversary might leverage several features of multiple types in only one
attack. For instance, TCP SYN ﬂooding and ICMP ﬂooding are generally initiated
simultaneously against DNS root servers. As far as our approach is concerned, based
on the aforementioned inference techniques of Section 2.4, we are able to identify all
the aforementioned types of attacks only if their traces hit our darknet sensors.
2.6 DoS Defense Mechanisms
In general, there are three defense mechanisms against DoS attacks, namely, at-
tack prevention and mitigation, attack detection, and attack attribution. Attack
prevention aims to fully/partially block the attack or successfully handle its ﬂood.
Attack detection identiﬁes the occurrence of the attack. Finally, attack attribution
identiﬁes the source of the attack. It is noteworthy to mention that a complete DoS
defense mechanism consists of prevention, detection and attribution techniques.
2.6.1 Attack Prevention and Mitigation
The aim of attack prevention and mitigation is to completely or partially block
the attack before causing any interruption of service. As shown earlier, since DoS
attacks are generally initiated from spoofed (fake) IP addresses, some of the best
techniques used to block such threats are to leverage ingress/egress ﬁltering [34].
The latter is an eﬃcient technique to control incoming and outgoing packets on
the local or Internet network. For instance, an organization can block all outgoing
packets coming from (leaving) its network if they do not have source IP addresses
registered under the name of this organization. The same technique can be imple-
mented at any Internet service provider or Internet backbone associations. One of
the protocols that operate based on the same concept is the Source Address Validity
Enforcement (SAVE) [35]. Moreover, some techniques are protocol-dependent and
are designed with security features to prevent or mitigate DDoS. For instance, the
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Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) [36] runs on the transport layer with
advanced security features to defend against TCP SYN ﬂooding attack. Although
this protocol can mitigate the threat of SYN ﬂooding, its implementation requires
more attention because it may cause other types of DDoS such as the ones using
malformed ICMP packets and INIT (initialization packet) ﬂooding attack [37]. Sim-
ilarly, the Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP) [38] has a mechanism
to allow the server to avoid holding any state of unacknowledged communication
during a handshake. Since the development of DCCP is relatively new, develop-
ers must be very careful while implementing DCCP services. For instance, one of
the DoS security concerns can happen when associating applications with service
codes2. This operation requires additional processing time to interpret information
and hence may cause a DoS attack. Last but not least, a recent implementation
of cloud-based DDoS protection mechanisms [39] leverage several servers to act on
behalf of the victim during an attack. The latter technique is more recent than the
other ones and is found to be eﬃcient, but not perfect, to mitigate the impact of
attacks [40].
2.6.2 Attack Detection
The most eﬀective way to defend against DoS attacks is attack prevention. However,
since adversaries are always discovering new techniques to attack a victim, preven-
tion may not be always successful. Therefore, attack detection is also a fundamen-
tal step to defend against DoS attacks. This technique can help in ﬁngerprinting
a malicious ﬂood and provide useful insights on several attack parameters such as
rate, attack type, signature, CPU and memory usage, among others. Attack detec-
tion techniques leverage several algorithms, namely, ﬂow-based, signature-based and
anomaly-based. Flow-based algorithms leverage the ﬂood parameters (i.e., attack
speed, nature of packets) to detect attacks. For instance, the approach proposed by
2Internet Engineering Task Force: The DCCP Service Codes
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Moore et al. [30] is a typical ﬂow-based detection algorithm that leverages backscat-
ter packets to infer DDoS activities. Signature-based algorithms leverage packet
information to match a malicious activity based on a database of signatures. This
method cannot identify zero-day (new) DoS attacks. A network-based intrusion
detection system such as snort [41] runs such algorithms. While signature-based
algorithms can identify solely known attacks, anomaly-based approaches use train-
ing models and pattern recognition techniques to identify ﬂoods of old/new DoS
threats.
2.6.3 Attack Attribution
Attack attribution aims at identifying the source of attack and aﬃliating them with
a speciﬁc IP address. Since DoS attacks are usually leveraging spoofed IP addresses,
the attribution of attacks is a diﬃcult problem. In fact, IP spooﬁng is still a funda-
mental weakness of Internet operations. Two reasons are behind this issue. First,
the availability of tools and techniques to initiate packets with forged IP addresses.
Second, the stateless nature of Internet routers, which generally store information
and forward packets to the next hop only. Some of the attack traceback techniques
that are used include active interaction, probabilistic and hash-based schemes. First,
a main feature of the active interactive approach is that on the way to the victim,
routers interact with adversaries in a certain way (i.e., forwarding requests). As
such, this technique traces the source of the attack based on the reaction of ﬂood
during the attack. Second, in general, probabilistic IP traceback models leverage
the fact that routers probabilistically insert fragmentary network path data in the
incoming packets. As such, this technique attempts to reconstruct the ﬂow path
using these inserted information. Finally, many probabilistic approaches can fail,
especially when large-scale DoS attack traﬃc is distributed over many routers in
diﬀerent locations. Consequently, a hash-based IP traceback approach is proposed
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to store information on each packet passing through routers. Regardless of the tech-
nique used in addressing DoS attribution and spooﬁng, this problem is still a major
concern for Internet users.
2.6.4 Summary
We listed above the major defense mechanisms against DoS attacks. We divided the
techniques over three categories, namely, attack prevention and mitigation, attack
detection, and attack attribution. Although darknet can be used to attribute DDoS
attacks [42], our approach falls mainly in the attack detection research area. Obvi-
ously, uncovering the type of the attack, and the techniques behind it can help in
understanding the malicious behavior and hence can solve the problem. Therefore,
our analytics and assessment of attacks can be leveraged by academia and industry




Despite the fact that the idea of monitoring unused IP addresses started in the early
90’s [9, 43], we provide a background information that mainly focuses on the study
of darknet research during the past thirteen years. The reason behind choosing this




















Figure 3.1: Trend of Publications Per Year
Figure 3.1 represents the trend of the darknet research from 2001 to 2013 in
terms of research publications. Some of the important contributions include the
discovery of the relationship between backscatter traﬃc and DDoS attacks, which
emerged in 2001 [30], the trend of worms propagation and analysis between 2003 and
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2005 [44–46], the use of time series and data mining techniques on darknet traﬃc
raised in 2008 [47], and ﬁnally the monitoring of large-scale cyber events [11], which
began in the past few years.
Our taxonomy classiﬁes current darknet research into three major areas, namely,
darknet deployment and setup, analysis and measurement of darknet data through
deployed sensors, and tools and techniques for the visualization and representation





Figure 3.2: Darknet Research Taxonomy
3.1 Darknet Deployment
The ﬁrst step in darknet monitoring is the deployment of sensors, which aims to
capture network traﬃc. This exercise requires an understanding of the network ar-
chitecture and a careful conﬁguration of the dynamic host server or the upstream
router to forward unreachable packets to darknet sensors. A basic darknet deploy-
ment architecture is shown in Figure 3.3.
This section provides insights on the elements of darknet deployment, namely,
darknet variants, as well as techniques such as sensor placement/identiﬁcation and
data handling, and projects. Figure 3.4 provides a taxonomy of deployment research

































IP Gray Space [48, 49]
Greynet [24]
Figure 3.4: Deployment Research Taxonomy - Overview
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3.1.1 Darknet Variants
Recalling Section 2.2, darknet variants are the deployment mechanisms of trap-
based monitoring systems using techniques similar to those of a darknet. This part
thus includes deployment of IP gray address space and greynet monitors. Table 3.1
summarizes the papers on darknet variants.
Publications Approach/Technique Contribution Tool/Project
[24] Deﬁning and Characterizing Greynet Development Custom
[48] Heuristic Algorithm IP Gray Space Development Custom
[49] Heuristic Algorithm IP Gray Space Development Custom
[50] Statistics Gray Phone Space Development Greystar
Table 3.1: Darknet Variants Research Papers - Summary
Harrop et al. [24] deﬁne and assess the concept of a greynet, a network address
space that is populated with darknet addresses mixed with active IP addresses.
Using data collected from a university network, the authors evaluate their concept
and show how a small number of dark IP addresses can increase the eﬃciency of
network scanning detection. Furthermore, Jin et al. [48,49] are among the pioneers
to use IP gray space in passive monitoring. This work applies a heuristic algorithm to
identify IP gray space addresses. The authors investigate the behavior of such traﬃc.
This study tackles patterns such as dominant and random behaviors. The approach
identiﬁes the usefulness of IP gray space to uncover insights on the behavior of
malicious activities as well as their intentions. The result identiﬁed several malicious
activities such as scanning, worm propagation as well as spam. Finally, in a unique
work, Jiang et al. [50] investigate passive monitoring in mobile communication. This
work presents a novel approach to detect SMS spammers on a cellular network. The
approach is based on greystar technology and employs a statistical model to infer
spam size through ﬁngerprinting. The proposed approach also has the capability
to reduce the spam traﬃc by 75% during peak periods. The authors analyzed




In this section, we discuss the research works that mainly target the techniques of
deploying passive monitoring systems. Table 3.2 summarizes these contributions.
In this category, research works are mainly leveraging Intrusion Detection Systems
(IDS) and hybrid techniques.
Publications Approach/Technique Tool/Project
[51] IDS honeyd/DShield/DOMINO
[52] Sink - IDS iSink
[53] Sink - IDS honeyd/iSink
[54] Statistics - IDS Custom




[58] Comparative Study honeyd
[57] Hybrid IMS
Table 3.2: Deployment Techniques Research Papers - Summary
Yegneswaran et al. [51] introduce a scalable, heterogeneous, and robust Dis-
tributed Overlay for Monitoring InterNet Outbreaks (DOMINO). The proposed ap-
proach provides an architecture for collaboration of distributed IDS data on diﬀer-
ent nodes on an overlay network. In an overlay design, a network is built on top
of another one. One of DOMINO’s components is the use of active nodes, which
measure connections targeting unused IP addresses. The authors emphasize the
importance of the approach in detecting sources of IP spooﬁng, classifying cyber
attacks, generating updated blacklists and reducing false positives. Moreover, Yeg-
neswaran et al. [52] introduce iSink and elaborate on a darknet case study to analyze
attack traces. The study is composed of various components such as the analysis
of backscatter packets and the investigation of unique periodic probes. iSink de-
ployment proved its relevancy in detecting worms such as Sasser. Through iSink,
the authors managed to observe diﬀerent worm variants and malware. Furthermore,
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Yegneswaran et al. [53] explore ways to integrate trap-based monitoring informa-
tion, including darknet data, into daily network security monitoring with the goal
of suﬃciently classifying and summarizing the data to provide ongoing situational
awareness. To this end, the authors develop a system based on honeynets, analyzers
that leverage Network-based Intrusion Detection System (NIDS), and a back-end
database to facilitate the analysis of honeynet data. The system is able to capture
and identify numerous malicious activities including botnet and worms.
Choi et al. [54] propose a framework to monitor and respond to security events.
The approach aims to trace potential attackers using darknet. The approach was
evaluated using a /24 darknet IP address block and other alert logs. Several attack
trends and patterns were identiﬁed. In addition, the approach showed capabilities
to detect zero-day attacks. Furthermore, Krishnamurthy et al. [55] propose a mobile
darknet-based mechanism that allows unwanted traﬃc to be detected signiﬁcantly
closer to the origin source of attack. The scheme is based on two pieces of infor-
mation: the additional data that is made accessible to the upstream autonomous
systems (AS) and the changes in the advertised darknet. Such shared data among
ASes can identify and minimize unwanted traﬃc between these entities.
Bailey et al. [56] propose a hybrid monitoring architecture that uses low-
interaction honeypots (honeyd) as front-end ﬁlters and high-interaction honeypots
as a back-end for further investigation. In order to reduce loads on back-ends, a
ﬁltering mechanism is used coupled with a novel hand-oﬀ mechanism. The authors
use ﬁve months of data to demonstrate the eﬃciency, scalability and robustness of
their work. In addition, Bailey et al. [1] discuss the major elements of darknet de-
ployment setup, namely, the storage and network requirements and the deployment
techniques. They further review the methods to collect darknet data and list the
most suitable formats. They propose three major darknet deployment approaches
to build darknet sensors. Moreover, Bailey et al. [57] examine the singular and
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distributed passive monitoring sensors to eﬀectively build a scalable hybrid moni-
toring system. The authors demonstrated that the majority of the threats coming
to darknet were based on a limited number of source hosts, and proposed a new
source-distribution approach to reduce the number of events found while investigat-
ing darknet data. The analysis listed several threats including worms and scanning
activities.
Pouget et al. [58] provide a thorough comparison between honeypots based on
their level of interaction. Using honeyd as a low-interactive honeypot, this qualita-
tive and quantitative comparison uncover interesting classiﬁcation and correlation
among detected threats. Finally, Komisarczuk et al. [61] discuss the opportuni-
ties and research directions in the Internet sensor grid for detecting and analyzing
malicious behaviors online. The authors review the developments of monitoring
sensors in active and passive modes. They further share their experiences in sensor
deployments.
3.1.3 Sensor Placement Techniques
This category includes techniques that are used to improve sensor placement and
setup. Table 3.3 lists the relevant research works.
Publications Approach/Technique Tool/Project
[62] Hybrid IMS
[63] Comparative Study honeyd/Leurre.com
[66] Multiscale Density Estimation iSink/DShield
[65] Comparative Study DShield
[64] Empirical Analysis Netﬂow
[67] Sampling Custom
[12] Comparative Study IMS
Table 3.3: Sensor Placement Research Papers - Summary
Several techniques have been used to improve darknet monitors placements.
For example, Cooke et al. [12] examine variations observed on diﬀerent network
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blocks. The authors showed evidence that distributed address blocks exhibit signif-
icant changes in traﬃc patterns. They further demonstrated changes over protocols
(services) and speciﬁc worm signatures. Moreover, Bailey et al. [62] examine the
properties of individual and distributed darknet sensors to test the eﬀectiveness
of deploying hybrid systems (darknet with honeypots). The authors used source-
based techniques to reduce redundant actions generated by individual darknet and
hence lowered the evaluated connections by over 90%. They also expanded source-
distribution based techniques to detect a variety of global attacks. Furthermore,
Chen et al. [63] demonstrate the importance of deploying multiple sensors in diﬀerent
locations. The authors deployed two identical sensors, having the same conﬁgura-
tions, in two diﬀerent locations and compared various parameters. While analyzing
data from a six-month period, the analysis revealed diﬀerent anomalies. Likewise,
Berthier et al. [64] focus on the size and the location of darknet sensors to perform an
empirical analysis and increase the eﬃciency of darknet monitors. In addition, Abu
Rajab et al. [65] quantify the importance behind the design of a distributed monitor-
ing system and evaluate the applicability of this approach. In order to achieve their
goals, the authors propose a worm propagation model to evaluate the locations of
monitors, the size of the monitored IP addresses, and the impact of worm detection
time. Over 1.5 billion suspicious connection attempts were observed through many
detection systems across the Internet. The results showed that distributed moni-
toring systems were better than centralized ones. In terms of speed, a distributed
monitor system was found to act four times faster than a centralized one. Further-
more, the authors mentioned that monitor placement can be improved by having
partial knowledge of the vulnerable population density. In some cases, exploiting
information related to vulnerable host locations can help decrease the detection
time by seven times compared to random monitoring deployment. Furthermore,
Barford et al. [66] present a study of source locations of hosts that send unwanted
traﬃc through dark addresses. The researchers use a multi-scale density estimation
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method which allowed them to see a small number of tight clusters that are formed
by darknet source addresses. The authors propose a multiplicative model for darknet
host locations that can be used to generate data with the same distributed property
as empirical data. Their model can be used for testing, evaluating, measuring, sim-
ulating and analyzing traﬃc for the purpose of reducing darknet pollution. Finally,
Pemberton et al. [67] outline results from a /16 darknet network by experimenting
with various sampling techniques and applying them to arrival density measures.
The authors found that current darknet deployments using continuous lists of IP
addresses were ineﬃcient in predicting threats. They further studied three other
address space allocation techniques and discovered better accuracy. The researchers
claim that business users as well as Internet Service Providers (ISPs) can use these
techniques to enhance darknet deployment in the future.






















Highlighting an Evasive Attack
that Identiﬁes Sensors
DShield
Table 3.4: Sensor Identiﬁcation Research Papers - Summary
3.1.4 Sensor Identiﬁcation Techniques
This part includes research targeting the identiﬁcation of darknet sensors. From the
adversary’s point of view, the identiﬁcation of monitoring sensor locations allows
them to avoid detection. Table 3.4 summarizes these related works. Abu Rajab
et al. [68] highlight an evasive attack that detects passive monitoring systems such
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as darknet. By sampling the IP address space in a coordinated manner, the au-
thors show that detection and evasion of monitors is possible. Using this technique,
attackers can identify active hosts on the network and hence proceed with their
attacks. The proposed methodology can overtake the entire vulnerable population
within seconds. In a similar work, Sinha et al. [69] elaborate that monitoring sensor
conﬁgurations are easy for attackers to discover. The authors discuss that man-
ually building a monitoring system is usually a large and diﬃcult task to handle.
Therefore, the authors propose an automated technique for sensor conﬁguration.
They further argue that networks with consistent nodes and proportional repre-
sentation are more eﬃcient in detecting attacks and more resistant to detection.
Using random sampling and proﬁling, the authors propose a technique for auto-
mated conﬁguration of sensors. More on identifying monitors’ locations, Shinoda
et al. [70] propose several algorithms that are designed to detect listening sensors
on the Internet. Consequently, they propose an approach to enhance the sensor
setup and deployment. In a similar work, Bethencourt et al. [71] demonstrate the
use of probing to detect sensors’ locations on systems that publicly report security
results. This probe response technique, which can target darknet sensors, shows
how to locate monitors. With limited capabilities, the simulation results of this
technique illustrate the power of determining the sensors’ identity within one week.
The authors further target the anonymized schemes used by network administrators
and discuss some potential countermeasures based on the sensors’ characteristics.
Finally, Cooke et al. [29] propose the Dark Oracle, which is an architecture that
aims to uncover dark addresses. The authors validated the eﬀectiveness of their
work, which uses internal as well as external routing and host setup information for
automatic discovery. The proposed methodology uncovered almost 80,000 unique
source IPs compared to 4,000 with a traditional /24 darknet. The authors further
demonstrated the capability of the Dark Oracle by shedding light on local attacks.
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3.1.5 Data Handling Techniques
Deploying darknet requires handling data, which includes processing, storing and
sharing its traﬃc. Darknet may receive a large amount of unsolicited network traﬃc.
Processing such information at the sensor level and sharing it with investigators and
researchers may therefore require several development steps. Table 3.5 summarizes
the data handling research papers.
Publications Approach/Technique Tool/Project
[72] Resource-Aware Multi-Format Data Storage IMS
[73] Graphical Processor Custom
Table 3.5: Data Handling Research Papers - Summary
In this category, Cooke et al. [72] propose a resource-aware multi-format data
storage of security information with the aim to simultaneously save various security
information. The proposed architecture consists of a set of algorithms for storing
various formats of data. Furthermore, a darknet-based prototype is built based on
numerous sources of data and the results show reasonable short- and long-term out-
puts. Moreover, Nottingham et al. [73] suggest graphical processors to accelerate
darknet big data analysis. They further discuss the construction, the performance
and the limitations of the packet ﬁltering approach, which employs multi-match ca-
pabilities to diﬀerentiate between packets. The aim is to build a fully programmable
virtual machine with massive parallel classiﬁcation, data mining and data transfor-
mation capabilities to provide complex security ﬁltering, indexing and manipulation
functions.
3.1.6 Projects
The outcome of deploying darknet sensors is to build a functional platform, an
operational project or center to monitor the cyberspace. We list below the publicly
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Table 3.6: Large-Scale Darknet Projects - Summary
known centers and projects that use darknet as a source of their data. Table 3.6
summarizes large-scale darknet monitoring projects. Our classiﬁcation is based on
three groups, namely, large-scale, small-scale and unclassiﬁed projects.
The ﬁrst group in this area lists large-scale darknet projects. For instance,
the network telescopes project [76, 94] is a system proposed by researchers at the
Center for Applied Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA). The intent of this project is to
monitor pandemic and epidemic cyber incidents through the unused address space.
Moore et al. [75] propose the network telescope as an eﬃcient and eﬀective dark-
net traﬃc monitoring system by using sensors and virtual machines. The network
telescope project can monitor large chunks of unused address space. The Univer-
sity of California, a main contributor to this data, deploys network telescopes to
36




of the overall IPv4 address space of the Internet. Collected data in-
cludes Domain Name System (DNS) data, topology traces, round-trip time, and
routing data. This passive information contains insights about large-scale security
events such as malware (mostly Internet worms) and DDoS. Another project is the
Active Threat Level Analysis System (ATLAS) [14], the Internet’s ﬁrst globally
scoped threat analysis network. Under the direction of Arbor Networks, this net-
work monitoring system collectively analyzes the data traversing disparate darknet
to visualize malicious activities on the Internet. Arbor is among the unique opera-
tors positioned to provide enterprise and service provider-speciﬁc intelligence related
to malicious activities such as exploits, phishing, malware and botnet. In addition,
the Darknet Project [23] is deployed by the Team Cymru Community as a passive
Internet threat monitoring system. Its main purpose is to set a platform to collect
packets susceptible to be sent by malware. This darknet is deployed to host ﬂow
collectors, backscatter detectors, packet sniﬀers and IDSs. Team Cymru aims to
increase awareness about threats and enhance mitigation against malware. In ad-
dition to monitoring darknet, the authors provide a guideline to set up a darknet.
Another large-scale project is the Internet Motion Sensor (IMS) [62], a distributed
globally scoped Internet threat monitoring system. The IMS project has the ability
to monitor dark IP space. It uses 28 unused IP blocks, ranging in size from /25 to
/8 network address blocks. The IMS is based on a distributed blackhole network
with a lightweight responder, a payload signature and a caching mechanism. These
capabilities are used to generate new insights about worms, DDoS, and scan activ-
ities [84]. Furthermore, the Protected Repository for the Defense of Infrastructure
against Cyber Threats (PREDICT) project [93] investigates spatial and longitudi-
nal darknet data. The authors aim to describe some of the large-scale spatial and
longitudinal darknet information. Another large-scale project is the Network In-
cident analysis Center for Tactical Emergency Response (NICTER) [77, 78], which
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is a large-scale network incident analysis system that mainly monitors darknet. It
represents a system that is capable of capturing and analyzing malware executable.
The identiﬁcation of malware propagation is the primary purpose of this project.
The NICTER project is composed of four components: macro analysis system, micro
analysis system, network and malware enchaining system, and the incident handling
system. Additionally, the Worldwide Observatory on Malicious Behavior and Attack
Threats (WOMBAT) [59, 74] center aims at providing new artifacts to understand
emerging threats. The project WOMBAT is used to collect raw data and analyze it
in order to identify diﬀerent threat phenomena. The authors claim that the latter
can discover trends of attacks by understanding the behavior of threats. With this
in mind, the designers develops mechanisms for automatically collecting and ana-
lyzing malware [95]. WOMBAT has a number of features. Its main feature is to
improve data acquisition technologies. The project further shares information with
its partners, including SGNET [96], Leurre.com [79], Argos [97], Nepenthes [98],
NoAH project [87], and SANS Internet Storm Center (ISC) [83, 99] which uses the
DShield as ﬁrewall [100]. Moreover, The Leurre.com Project [60, 80], a part of the
WOMBAT project, has a purpose of collecting Internet threats using worldwide
distributed sensors [79]. The terms used in the context of this project include plat-
form architecture, logs collection, data uploading mechanism and data enrichment
mechanism. Furthermore, the Billy Goat project [81] is a specialized darknet traf-
ﬁc monitoring system deployed by IBM and its customer networks. It is used for
worm detection. This project diﬀers from other monitoring systems as it focuses
on speciﬁc attacks and dynamic characteristics of worms. By taking advantage of
worm propagation strategies, Billy Goat monitors unused IP address spaces that
are randomly scanned by worms. Finally, the Honeynet project [82] is a dedicated
system to investigate cyber attacks and develop open source security techniques to
mitigate Internet threats. This project provides tools to build darknet sensors.
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The second group in this category are small-scale projects. For example, An-
tonatos et al. [88] propose HoneyHome, a part of the NoAH project [87], a platform
for monitoring unused IP addresses and ports for large-scale security events extrac-
tion. This low-cost system is based on installing sensors on regular users to monitor
these unused IP addresses and ports. Since regular users come and go, it is diﬃcult
for attackers to detect these unstable sensors. Moreover, ARAKIS [86], one of the
initial data sources for WOMBAT, is developed by NASK and operated by CERT
Polska. The latter project is a nationwide near real-time NIDS that generates early
notiﬁcations and warnings about security events. The system consists of a central
database in addition to distributed monitors, which collect and correlate security
information through low-interaction honeypots and other detection systems includ-
ing darknet. Finally, Daedalus [101], which is based on the NICTER project, is
designed to capture cyber attacks in near real time fashion.
Last but not least, it is worthy to mention some other unclassiﬁed projects
that use passive monitoring such as SWITCH [89], the National Police Agency of
Japan [90], the Internet Scan Data Acquisition System (ISDAS) runs by Japan
CERT Coordination Center [91], the Research and Education Networking Infor-
mation Sharing and Analysis Center (REN-ISAC) [102], the IUCC/IDC Internet
Telescope [92] in Israel, the Simwood Darknet [103] and many other academic sys-
tems such as the Darknet Mesh Project [104] at Oxford University as well as Rhodes
University Network Telescope [105].
3.1.7 Summary
We have discussed several key elements in the darknet deployment section, namely,
architecture, darknet variants, online placement and identiﬁcation of sensors, data
handling, and projects. From what has been discussed in the deployment part of
Section 3.1, we can conclude the following points:
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• In order to deploy darknet, several elements must be taken into consideration,
such as the study of exact storage and network requirements, the knowledge
of deployment techniques, as well as sensor placement and identiﬁcation.
• Compared with other trap-based monitoring systems, darknet is considered as
a practical and easy-to-implement tool in passive monitoring the cyber space.
Darknet setup can be developed using basic routing techniques and monitored
through IDSs.
• IDSs are the most used systems in darknet development and Honeyd is prob-
ably the most practical tool to implement darknet sensors.
• One of the major challenges in deploying darknet is to avoid the adversary’s
discovery of the sensor location. Several techniques are used to identify the
location of sensors such as the sampling of IP addresses.
• Mobile darknet is a new trend that has a promising future in passive monitor-
ing research. The future deployment will include mobile-based VoIP darknet.
• Darknet variants are not commonly used in literature. These variants can be
more eﬃcient than darknet to monitor cyber attacks; however, their imple-
mentation could be more complex.
• Darknet projects monitor various cyber threat activities and are distributed
in one third of the global Internet.
• Various types of darknet projects exist. Some large-scale projects are coupled
with interactive trap-based monitors to enhance network monitoring.
• CAIDA is one of the few Internet monitoring research groups, which provides
darknet-based backscatter data for researchers.
• Despite the existence of some collaborative darknet projects (i.e., PREDICT),
more darknet resources and information sharing must emerge to infer and
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attribute large-scale cyber activities. Dealing with a worldwide darknet infor-
mation exchange is a capability that requires collaboration and trust; however,
this collaboration raises security policies and privacy concerns.
In the next section, we provide a taxonomy of darknet data analysis.
3.2 Darknet Analysis
This section provides an overview of the contributions in the area of darknet data
analysis and measurement. These topics are divided into three main areas: analyzing
and measuring darknet data, threats, and worldwide events. Figure 3.5 depicts the
taxonomy of research eﬀorts in the analysis and measurement of passive monitoring
systems.
3.2.1 Data Analysis
In this section, we provide a taxonomy of the research works related to darknet data.
This includes proﬁling darknet traﬃc, ﬁltering and classiﬁcation of its data as well
as reviewing its backscatter and misconﬁguration traﬃc.
Data Proﬁling
Data Proﬁling encompasses the research works that focus on the characterization
of darknet data to generate statistics and insights. Table 3.7 provides an overview
of the summarized research works. These contributions leverage several techniques
such as packet ﬁltering, routing, and time series.
For instance, Irwin [106] explores data across ﬁve diﬀerent darknet sensors.
The author discusses the diﬀerences as well as the similarities among the analy-
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Figure 3.5: Analysis Research Taxonomy - Overview
on Microsoft Windows systems. Furthermore, Pang et al. [108] present a study of
the broad characteristics of darknet. The authors develop ﬁltering techniques and
active responders to use in their monitoring process. They analyze both the charac-
teristics of completely unsolicited traﬃc (passive analysis) and the details of traﬃc
elicited by their active responses (activities analysis). Moreover, Shimoda et al. [109]
propose a system to improve passive darknet monitoring. The proposed approach
leverages active hosts with no eﬀect on legitimate connections. This light-weight
multi-dimensional IP/port analysis system enables TCP ports monitoring. In this
context, Ford et al. [107] create the ﬁrst IPv6 darknet. The aim of this work is to
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Table 3.7: Proﬁling Research Papers - Summary
compare between IPv6 and IPv4 darknet. The results showed that traﬃc targeting
IPv6 darknet is minimal. Furthermore, Dainotti et al. [110] infer the evolution of
Internet infrastructure. Instead of using active probing techniques, this technique
leverages darknet traﬃc monitoring to provide some insights on the utilization of
the Internet. The investigation touches the limited visibility of a unique observation
point as well as the existence of IP spoofed addresses in data that can fake anal-
ysis results. The authors propose new techniques to remove spoofed packets and
compare their results with methods that use active scans. Oberheide et al. [113]
introduce the concept of dark DNS, which is based on the analysis of DNS queries
found on darknet addresses. They also proﬁle the DNS dark data collected from their
sensor and discuss the implications of evading sensor through DNS reconnaissance.
They further stress on the defense aspect using proactive measures when deploying
darknet sensors through delegating reverse DNS authority in a proper manner. At
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the end, they introduce honeydns, which complements low-interactive and darknet
sensors by providing DNS trap services. Finally, Czyz et al. [114] report a large
study of IPv6 darknet data. Through the analysis of ﬁve large /12 network address
space, the authors highlight the nature of the traﬃc and compare it with IPv4 data.
The researchers also provide various case studies to show notable properties while
analyzing darknet IPv4 and IPv6 data.
Furthermore, time series analysis techniques are also used to proﬁle passive
monitoring data. For example, Fukuda et al. [111] discuss the temporal and spatial
correlations among piecewise unwanted traﬃc. The aim of their techniques is to
determine whether they can estimate statistical properties of global unwanted traf-
ﬁc behavior from smaller darknet address blocks. They found that the ﬂuctuation
of darknet traﬃc was close to random compared to normal traﬃc. Moreover, the
authors demonstrated that the TCP SYN traﬃc time series had a strong spatial cor-
relation. On the contrary, for TCP SYNACK and UDP traﬃc time series, Fukuda
et al. [112] conﬁrmed that in this case they were less correlated. The authors stress
the need for a more sophisticated classiﬁcation of the UDP unwanted traﬃc. They
further investigated the macroscopic behavior of unwanted traﬃc collected using a
/18 darknet over one year period. In order to measure the complexity in network
traﬃc, Riihijarvi et al. [200] study diﬀerent entropy metrics. The generated metrics
provide a better understanding of the traﬃc and help ﬁnding a new way to charac-
terize the data. Moreover, the proposed technique uncovered structures on diﬀerent
traﬃc measurements and timescales. These authors extend their work to propose
the use of multi-scale entropy analysis to characterize network traﬃc and spectrum
usage. They showed that this technique can quantify complexity and predictability
of analyzed traﬃc in widely various timescales. The results further showed that
diﬀerent entropy structures exist for diﬀerent traﬃc traces such as time series and
commonly-used traﬃc [201]. Last but not least, Wustrow et al. [2] discuss topics
related to darknet. They pinpointed the rapid growth of Internet pollution that
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was out spacing the growth of productive network traﬃc. Furthermore, they no-
ticed trends toward increasing SYN and decreasing SYN-ACK traﬃc. In addition,
they examine several case studies in Internet address pollution and oﬀer speciﬁc
suggestions for ﬁltering them.
Data Filtering & Classiﬁcation
Data ﬁltering and classiﬁcation include the classiﬁcation and ﬁltering approaches of
darknet data. These techniques are summarized in Table 3.8.
Publications Approach/Technique Contribution Tool/Project
[116] Relative Uncertainty Theory Filtering Darknet Data Custom
[115] Classiﬁcation Scheme Composition of Darknet Data Custom
[117] Hybrid
Manual Identiﬁcation and
Automated Generation of Data
Custom
Table 3.8: Filtering & Classiﬁcation Research Papers - Summary
Glatz et al. [115], for instance, analyzed a dataset that captured a signiﬁcant
amount of traﬃc to shed light on the composition of darknet towards large networks.
The approach is based on a one-way traﬃc classiﬁer. The authors found that such
traﬃc constitutes the majority of all traﬃc in terms of ﬂow and can be primarily
attributed to malicious causes; however, it has declined since 2004 due to the rela-
tive decrease of scan traﬃc. Moreover, Wang et al. [116] propose a novel approach
to ﬁlter darknet traﬃc. Their technique is based on relative uncertainty theory and
is independent of conﬁgurations or building databases. The authors assume that
data coming from regular users is relatively certain and not random. Furthermore,
Cowie and Irwin [117] discuss the diﬃculties in generating training traﬃc for Ar-
tiﬁcial Intelligence (AI) analysis. The authors mention the problem in accurately
labeling known incidents from darknet. Other factors related to this issue include
the originality of data and the time involved. To address this problem, they work
on two techniques, namely manual identiﬁcation and automated generation. The
ﬁrst counts on heuristics for ﬁnding network incidents whereas the second considers
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building simulated data sets. They were able to construct a sample of an AI system
out of this marked dataset.
Backscatter Data
Backscatter data is the reply packets sent to the darknet. Several factors can pro-
duce such scenario, such as DDoS victims replying to spoofed IP addresses and
misconﬁguration. Table 3.9 summarizes the works that leverage backscattered traf-
ﬁc to generate cyber insights. Under this category, the research contributions employ
several techniques such as mathematical models, network routing, packet ﬁltering,
and visualization.
Publications Approach/Technique Contribution Tool/Project














[124] Multi Connections Detecting Anomalies MCAD - CAIDA
[123] Clustering Extracting Traﬃc Signatures PISA
Table 3.9: Backscatter Research Papers - Summary
For instance, Peng et al. [118] propose a Reconstruction based on Semantically
Enhanced Counting Bloom Filter (RSECBF) algorithm to reveal the distribution of
the main elements from semantically enhanced Counting Bloom Filter’s hash space.
The proposed algorithm deploys a speciﬁc technique, which directly selects certain
bits from the primary string. The authors conﬁrm the homogeneous hash strings and
show the eﬃciency of the algorithm using real backscatter traces. Moreover, Rah-
mani et al. [119] study entropy-based anomaly detection through backscatter from
darknet data. In particular, the authors try to understand the detection strength of
46
using joint entropy analysis of many data distributions. The authors found statisti-
cal correlation between time series of IP ﬂow number and collective traﬃc size. The
approach was tested on backscattered data and led to more eﬀective and accurate
DDoS detection techniques. Moreover, Choras and Saganowski [121, 122] leverage
backscatter data to propose an anomaly detection technique for recognizing mali-
cious traﬃc. Using the correlation of parameters from diﬀerent layers, the authors
were able to detect unknown attacks with a low amount of false positives. The
authors correlated signal-based and statistical features to enhance their technique.
The proposed framework uses, for the ﬁrst time, the Matching Pursuit (MP) algo-
rithm [202] on network traﬃc. They found superior results to other IDSs that work
on discrete wavelet transform. Similarly, Fadlullah et al. [120] detected anomalies
through strategically distributed Monitoring Stubs (MSs). This work was able to
categorize encrypted protocols. The MSs are designed to extract features and build
normal behaviors. Based on deviations in traﬃc, the technique can diﬀerentiate be-
tween suspicious and benign traﬃc. After the detection process, MSs notify victims
to trace-back the source of the attack and take necessary action.
He and Parameswaran [124] leverage backscatter data to propose a novel
anomaly detection system based on multiple connections. The approach is consid-
ered faster than previous anomaly detection mechanisms. This Multiple Connection
based Anomaly Detection (MCAD) system relies on the concept that attackers use
similar connections to execute an attack. Hence, the algorithm tests for similarities
within connections, and if the value is above a certain threshold, the connections
are ﬂagged as malicious. Over one million connections of backscatter traﬃc were
tested in this work. MCAD was able to identify ﬁfteen forms of connections, in
which fourteen were fully detected while only one was detected with 66% accuracy.
In addition, in order to detect congestion online, the authors in [125] propose a
mechanism to detect congestion in network traﬃc by analyzing passive and aggre-
gation links. The technique is based on delays in TCP data. The approach was
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tested on backscatter data and proved to be eﬃcient. This technique is consid-
ered dynamic with fast detection capability. In an attempt to ﬁngerprint malicious
attacks, Chhabra et al. [123] propose PISA, a packet imprint in security attacks
algorithm, for automatic extraction of traﬃc signatures. PISA has the capability
to cluster ﬂows based on similarity in packet information and generate signatures
from clusters. This tool was tested on two weeks of backscatter data encompassing
100 million packets. The results inferred about 1744 signatures related to several
malware including the Blaster worm.
Data Misconﬁguration
Data misconﬁguration is the act of incorrectly setting up a machine on a certain
network. This section lists research works that leverage darknet to infer misconﬁg-
uration, errors and data management in network communications. Relevant contri-
butions are shown in Table 3.10.
Publications Approach/Technique Contribution Tool/Project
[126] Probing - Routing Reachability Analysis Arbor Networks




Table 3.10: Misconﬁguration Research Papers - Summary
For instance, Francois et al. [127] demonstrate that darknet is a powerful
tool in analyzing malicious network activities as well as network management. The
authors present trends of network misconﬁguration using darknet analysis. In prac-
tice, the results illustrated that deployed networks suﬀer from well-known errors and
faulty conﬁguration. Furthermore, Labovitz et al. [126] present a large study on the
one-sided diﬀerences in Internet service provider reachability. The authors focus
on darknet and the range of topology reachable to some providers but unreachable
through one or more competitor networks. They present both active and passive
measurements of diﬀerences between service providers’ reachability. The goal is to
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discover the level to which commercial strategies, peering disputes, network failures,
misconﬁguration, and various malicious acts can lead to a partitioning of Internet
topology. The results showed that the Internet was indeed partitioned and that
darknet existed in a large amount (5% of Internet addresses). Moreover, the au-
thors found that some preﬁxes were reachable only to speciﬁc providers. In addition,
70% of hosts responded to reachability tests and the majority of these devices were
cable/ISDN pools and US military hosts.
3.2.2 Threat Analysis
One of the major elements in passive network monitoring is the extraction of in-
sights on suspicious activities and threats on the Internet. Recall Figure 3.5, this
section includes the research contributions in the following areas: threat proﬁling,
anomalies, threats’ variants and malicious activities.
Threat Proﬁling
Threat proﬁling includes the characterization (proﬁling) of darknet threats. Table
3.11 lists the threat proﬁling papers. Several techniques are used to proﬁle darknet
threats such as time series, statistics, and network routing.
Various researchers utilize time series and statistical methods to proﬁle dark-
net threats. For instance, Harder et al. [128] study the statistical properties of class
C darknet addresses for over three months. The authors found that the majority
of the traﬃc is based on few IP sources and destination addresses. The study in-
cluded a demonstration using many visualization techniques to represent darknet
data and showed severe attacks such as DDoS and scanning activities. Using diﬀer-
ent techniques, such as power spectrum, inter-arrival time of packets and detrended
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Table 3.11: Threat Proﬁling Research Papers - Summary
ﬂuctuation analysis of this data, the authors found small signs of long-range depen-
dency within the analyzed traﬃc. Francois et al. [130] leverage statistical techniques
to propose a distributed system that monitors threats using centrality of a graph
and its time evolution. Furthermore, Holz [129] presents the leurre.com project and
discusses the importance of collecting data from diﬀerent locations and generating
results based on correlation engines. The author highlights insights in terms of ﬁnd-
ing attack patterns and pinpointing root-causes of threats. Ohta et al. [131] uses
time series analysis to study the possibility of predicting anomalous packets’ behav-
iors by observing a small darknet address space. The researchers propose distributed
cooperative monitoring architecture (DCMA) technique, which aims to probe and
detect anomalous packets. The authors calculate the correlation strength of anoma-
lous packets, observe the correlation strength when changing the sub-observation’s
size, and note the dependency of the correlation strength.
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We further list contributions that utilize hybrid and custom techniques to
characterize darknet threats. For example, Bellovin et al. [43] are among the ﬁrst to
investigate trap programs that search for attacks. Their work can also be the pri-
mary motivation that triggered the idea of darknet monitoring. A variety of pokes
were found during their analysis. The authors believe that these attacks occured on
many online sites without the administrators’ knowledge. In this work, they also
provide important security information to security operators on how the attackers
were operating [9]. In addition, Inoue et al. [132] utilize NICTER to propose a novel
method to analyze suspicious behaviors. The latter technique is based on the mal-
ware’s external behavior. Their experiment is executed in a safe environment using
virtual machines. Moreover, Dacier et al. [59] leverage WOMBAT to represent the
infrastructure of data gathering. This project is based on an extended version of
honeyd with SGNET [203]. In this experiment, the authors were able to observe
the evolution an army of zombies. Their approach is found to be eﬃcient to use for
multidimensional analysis of events. The authors also shared some insights found
when collecting malware (including zero-day) and described diﬀerent stages of at-
tacks. Finally, Berthier et al. [133] present a large and comparative study to help
security operators in selecting sources of information. By comparing three diﬀerent
sources of security information including darknet dataset, the authors correlated
attacks among diﬀerent sources of data having various granularity.
Anomalies
Anomalies are deﬁned by the acts of deviation from the normal network traﬃc pat-
tern. This section provides a summary of the darknet-based research that targets
the detection and mitigation of anomalies. Table 3.12 denotes these research pub-
lications. The major techniques are based on IDS, mining, clustering, and time
series.
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Publications Approach/Technique Contribution Tool/Project
[137] Packet Filtering - Routing - Data
Mining
Proposing a Novel Application of
Large-scale Monitoring
Nicter





[147] Opportunistic Measures Uncovering Hidden Regions of the
Internet
Custom
[148] Automated Knowledge Discovery Introducing Cliques
Cliques
Leurre.com
[134] Generic IDS - Firewall Presenting an Empirical Analysis
of Internet Intrusion
Custom





[145] Cardinality Variation Analysing and Detecting Cyber
Attacks
Custom
[146] Poisson Statistical Process Detecting Malware IMS
[138] Knowledge Discovery - Data Min-
ing




[141] Context-Aware Detecting and Mitigating Online
Threats
Custom
[142] IDS - Association Rule Mining Characterizing Data and Investi-
gating Threats
Custom
[143,144] Time Series - Sliding Window Cu-
mulative Sum - Change Point
Automatic Recognizing Varia-
tions in Network Traﬃc
Custom





[140] Knowledge Discovery - Fuzzy De-
cision Making




[135] IDS - Hidden Markov Describing an Adaptive NIDS
with a Two-stage Architecture
Custom
[149] Messaging Framework Proposing a Framework for Real-
time Analysis
Custom
[150] Selective Pulling - Ratio-Based
Algorithm
Proposing a System for Timely
Business Intelligence and Deci-
sion Making
RTQ
[136] IDS - Statistics Exploring New Techniques to
Leverage Darknet Monitoring
Honeyd
[151] Hotspots Deﬁning Hotspots for Malware
Detection
IMC
Table 3.12: Anomalies Detection and Mitigation Research Papers - Summary
First, several researchers leverage IDS systems to detect anomalies. For in-
stance, Yegneswaran et al. [134] present a broad, empirical analysis of Internet intru-
sion activity using a large set of Network-based IDS, ﬁrewall logs and darknet data.
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Their breakdown of scan types showed not only a large amount of worm propaga-
tion but also a substantial amount of scanning activities. To gain insights into the
global nature of intrusions, the authors use their data to project the activity across
the Internet. They also present a theoretic evaluation on the potential of using data
shared between networks as a foundation for a distributed intrusion detection infras-
tructure. Furthermore, Karthick et al. [135] use probability to describe an adaptive
network-based IDS with a two-stage architecture. The ﬁrst stage includes a proba-
bilistic classiﬁer whereas the second uses a Hidden Markov Model to narrow down
the attack source IPs. The proposed hybrid model was tested and showed good
performance in detecting intrusions. For the purpose of providing situational aware-
ness, Barford et al. [136] explore techniques that can be used to integrate trap-based
monitoring data into daily monitoring systems. These techniques are based on IDS
system and other statistical methods. The authors also discuss techniques that can
detect whether an attack is purposely or incidentally targeting a victim as part of a
larger attack. The analysis showed prevalence of diﬀerent scanning techniques and
useful information on trends, uniformity, coordination, and darknet-avoidance.
Second, several authors utilize mining and clustering techniques to learn about
anomalies. For example, Inoue et al. [137] leverage resources from Nicter to propose
a novel application of large-scale darknet monitoring in live networks. The technique
investigates packets transmitted from inside networks instead of outside. In addi-
tion, Thonnard and Dacier [138] aim to generate insights on the method of operation
of new emerging attack phenomena. To accomplish this goal, they have presented
a multi-dimensional knowledge discovery and data (KDD) mining method. This
technique extracts meaningful nuggets of knowledge and synthesizes those pieces
of knowledge at diﬀerent dimensional levels to create a concept that can best de-
scribe real-world phenomena. Furthermore, Thonnard et al. [139] present an analysis
framework for discovering groups of attack traces having similar patterns. The au-
thors extract knowledge of darknet data by discovering attack patterns via attack
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trace similarity, rather than a rigid signature. The results of their clustering method
enabled the identiﬁcation of activities of several worms and botnet in the collected
traﬃc. In a similar work [140], the authors introduce a general analysis method
to address the complex problem related to attack attribution. Their approach is
based on a mixture of knowledge discovery and a fuzzy decision making process.
By applying their technique on darknet attack traces, the researchers showed how
to attribute and identify large-scale orchestrated cyber campaigns. Finally, in our
work [142], we have characterized darknet data and investigated darknet threats.
The aim is to study threats that are found on darknet and prioritize their severities.
We further explored the inter-correlation of these threats by conducting association
rule mining studies to generate association rules. Our technique extracts clusters of
co-occurring malicious activities targeting certain victims. This contribution proved
that some threats found on darknet are correlated. Furthermore, our technique pro-
vided intelligence about patterns within threats and allowed the interpretation of
attack scenarios.
Third, the following group of authors uses time series techniques. Limthong
et al. [47] applied Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) techniques for traﬃc signal
decomposition and observed unknown malicious acts from darknet information. In
particular, the authors focus on TCP SYNs, TCP SYN/ACKs and UDP packets
based on three time intervals. The purpose of this work is to show the importance
of time series wavelet methods in ﬁnding insights about malicious communications
on darknet. In addition, Ahmed et al. [143,144] leverage time series techniques and
the dynamic sliding window cumulative sum (CUSUM) algorithm to automatically
recognize nested changes in network traﬃc and detect any number of these changes.
This automatic detection approach can identify both the beginning and the end of
abnormal changes.
Finally, several hybrid and custom techniques are used to detect and mitigate
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anomalies. For example, Chen et al. [145] focus on the analysis and inference of cy-
ber attacks through a technique based on the changes in the cardinality of the attack
traces. The approach develops a nonparametric error-bound scheme with the capa-
bility to detect cyber attacks through a centralized data center of multi-monitoring
sensors. This scheme uses small space and constant processing time, which allow
the system to operate in near real time. In addition, a statistical approach is used
by Soltani et al. [146] to detect malware on darknet traﬃc. The authors introduce
the Piecewise Poisson process Model (PPM) and check the rate of traﬃc to detect
malware outbreaks. The researchers then implement a regression model that can be
used to characterize changes in the PPM data rates. In addition, Moore et al. [75]
leverage the analysis of darknet traﬃc to monitor large-scale security threats. They
showed a trend in cyber attacks based on a period of over two years. Moreover, these
authors study the relation between the detection ability and size of these sensors,
proﬁle precision in detecting duration and rate of an attack, and discuss good prac-
tices in darknet deployment. Furthermore, Casado et al. [147] propose opportunistic
measures from spurious network traﬃc (such as darknet) to uncover hidden regions
of the Internet. The authors identify such sources and demonstrate their possible use
in providing eﬃcient statistical data. In addition, Pouget et al. [148] introduce an
automated knowledge discovery technique called Cliques. The Cliques methodology
provides insights on how attacks occur and potentially identiﬁes the source behind
them. The authors used the proposed methodology and found useful data about
similarities in the method of operation of many potentially unrelated malicious tools.
In addition, Hunter et al. [149] propose a framework for real-time analysis of darknet
and honeypot data. The technique uncovers several malicious behaviors. In order
to collect data, the authors develop an automated reconnaissance (AR) framework
that works in both passive and active modes. The authors utilize several features
to identify malicious users such as OS name, targeted service, location and services
operating on the adversary. Gupta et al. [150] propose a ratio threshold queries
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(RTQs) system that can be used for timely business intelligence and near real time
decision making. For instance, the system can defend against malicious attacks on
the Internet such as DDoS when the ratio of queries surpasses a certain threshold.
The system further uses selective pulling techniques for inferring extra sources. In
addition, Sinha et al. [141] investigate techniques in detecting and mitigating online
threats via the context available in network, environment and host. The authors
explain the context concept which is based on three main properties: vulnerability
proﬁle, attack surface, and usage model. The authors leverage ten years of experi-
ence to prove the eﬃciency of the approach in enhancing security techniques. Last
but not least, Cooke et al. [151] deﬁne hotspots as the root cause of non-uniformity
in self-propagating malware. In this work, the authors claim that two main factors
are behind its existence, namely, the algorithmic and environmental factors. Using
eleven sensors located at diﬀerent addresses around the Internet, they measured the
impact of these factors on the propagation of worms and bots (or zombies). Based
on this idea, the authors simulated the outbreak of new threats with hotspots and
demonstrated the eﬀect of the aforementioned factors on the visibility of monitors
and hence the eﬃciency of detecting new threats.
Threats Variants
Threats variants include various threats. We list in this section the threats that can
be detected through the analysis of darknet data, namely, DDoS, worms, botnets
and DRDoS.
Distributed Denial of Service attack is one of the most severe cyber
threats. Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are characterized by an explicit attempt to
prevent the legitimate use of a service. Table 3.13 summarizes darknet-based DDoS
research papers. Below is an overview of these studies. Some techniques include
mathematical models, network routing and packet ﬁltering.
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Publications Approach/Technique Contribution Tool/Project
[204,205] Chi-Square Statistics Detection CAIDA
[152] Identiﬁer/Location Separation Prevention Custom
[206] Greedy Algorithm Detection Custom


































[162] Change Point Detection Custom
Table 3.13: DDoS Research Papers - Summary
First, the following publications leverage mathematical and statistical models
for generating DDoS insights through darknet analysis. For instance, Andrysiak
et al. [206] focus on detecting DDoS threats using greedy algorithms. More speciﬁ-
cally, the approach uses Matching Pursuit algorithms, which look into best matching
projections of multidimensional dataset. Similarly, Gupta et al. [150] focus on the
analysis of backscatter and MAWI data [207] to detect DDoS by means of greedy
algorithms. The approach is based on several matching pursuit algorithms. In
addition, Arun et al. [154] propose NFBoost, an adaptive and hybrid neuro-fuzzy
approach to detect DDoS attacks. The approach combines various classiﬁer outputs
and cost strategy minimization technique for classiﬁcation determination. The ap-
proach was tested on real DDoS traces and trained with publicly available dataset.
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Furthermore, the evaluation was based on two metrics, namely the detection ac-
curacy and cost. In our work [157, 158], we have propose an approach to predict,
within minutes, certain DDoS and their attacks features; namely, intensity/rate and
size. The aim is to forecast the future short term trend of DDoS attacks. The
analysis is based on darknet data and the attack traces are tested for predictability
using a time series approach prior to predicting. In addition, Rahmani et al. [160]
propose a two-stage DDoS detection approach based on the breaks in the connec-
tion size distribution. To achieve this goal, the authors employ a total variation
distance technique to calculate the horizontal and vertical similarity between ﬂows.
The approach detects high- and low-rate DDoS attacks. Furthermore, Abouzakhar
et al. [204] present a network-based system for anomaly detection using chi-square
statistics. This technique is a robust multivariate anomaly detection method with
minimum computation cost. The objective of this method is to reduce the limitation
of intrusion detection and network forensics. In an extended work [205], the same
authors developed patterns for intrusion detection based on data mining techniques
and Fuzzy algorithm. This Association Rule Mining-based (ARM-based) detection
technique was successfully tested on real DDoS data. They further presented an en-
hanced Fuzzy ARM matrix for mining and associating rules. This hybrid approach
can improve the eﬃciency of anomaly detection.
Second, other group of researchers tackle IP ﬁltering and network routing
techniques to investigate DDoS. For instance, Luo et al. [152] apply the identi-
ﬁer/location separation technique, a mechanism to solve the issue of routing scala-
bility on the Internet to prevent distributed DDoS attacks. The proposed approach
hardens the security to control machines (i.e., controlling infected machines through
a botnet). This approach was evaluated using real DDoS traﬃc and showed promis-
ing results. Furthermore, a change point technique coupled with an analysis of
source IP addresses are used by Ahmed et al. [162] to detect high-rate ﬂooding at-
tacks. The authors use a proof of concept development of the proposed methodology
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and show the eﬃcient representation of pre-onset IP addresses that can also be used
for threat mitigation.
Finally, other DDoS detection and mitigation techniques are used such as Chen
et al. [153] who introduce STONE, a stream-based framework designed to defend
against DDoS attacks. The STONE is a hybrid and scalable system that leverages
anomaly-based inference and mitigation. The system operates through continuous
data streaming queries to maintain data processing. The approach is also useful
in the case of ﬂash (high speed) events and operates in a priority-based fashion.
STONE is built on top of StreamCloud, which is an elastic parallel-distributed
stream processing engine. Additionally, Bhatia et al. [155, 156] propose a model
to detect and mitigate DDoS attacks. The model uses an MIB (Management In-
formation Base) server load and network traﬃc analysis to detect DDoS attacks
from various network layers. The proposed model has the capability to distinguish
DDoS from ﬂash events. Further on DDoS, Feitosa et al. [159] also propose an
approach to detect and mitigate DDoS attacks. They present the speciﬁcation of
a new orchestration-based technique to infer and mitigate threats. The proposed
approach is based on a framework that coordinates alerts and events, infers threats,
and consequently chooses the ultimate action. The authors generate rules and infer
attacks with a greater degree of certainty than simple anomaly detectors. Finally,
Liu et al. [161] examine drawbacks of existing DDoS defense schemes and propose
a credit-based defense system. This approach focuses on the diversity in size of the
attack; the less diverse the attack ﬂow, the smaller credit it gets. The DDoS attacks
were found to accumulate less credit as they naturally have low diversity in their
traﬃc. This mechanism was able to identify the characteristics of micro and macro
DDoS attackers and victims.
Worms are malicious codes known to infect and propagate in a rapid manner.
We list in this section the contributions related to computer worms via darknet data
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Publications Approach/Technique Tool/Project Worm
[163] Packet Filtering - Routing CAIDA Code Red
[44,164] Packet Filtering - Routing CAIDA Slammer/Sapphire
[165] ICMP Packet Analysis - Simula-
tion
Custom
[166] UDP Packet Analysis - Routing -
Simulation
CAIDA Slammer
[45] Routing - Time Series CAIDA Witty




[46] Packet Filtering - Routing IMS - Arbor Blaster
[168] Analytic Modeling - Simulation Custom
[169] Packet Filtering - Routing CAIDA & iSink Witty
[170] Time Series CAIDA Witty




[172] Time Series - Clustering Honeyd/Leurre.com





[78] Micro & Macro Analysis NICTER W32.Downadup
[174,175] Maximum Likelihood & Regres-
sion
Custom Code Red
[176] Packet Filtering & Source OS Custom Conﬁcker
[177] Bloom Filter - Packet Filtering Custom
Table 3.14: Worm Investigation Research Papers - Summary
analysis. Table 3.14 summarizes these contributions. The majority of techniques
are focused on packet analysis, routing, mathematical models, statistics and time
series.
Moore et al. [163] analyze the Code-Red worm. Primarily, the authors showed
the spread of this worm based on its deactivation and infection. The worm infection
rate peaked at 2000 hosts per minute. Subsequently, the authors geographically lo-
cated and measured the population of the worm and checked aﬀected ISPs and top
level domains. Additionally, Moore et al. [44,164] study the Slammer worm through
darknet analysis. In particular, they showed how this worm selects its victims and
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explained the reasons behind its fast propagation. They further discussed the pit-
falls of the worm’s author which aid in its discovery. In addition, they executed
several related measures, geographically located the worm’s victims, and listed the
geographic distribution of the worm. Finally, the authors highlighted the impact of
the Slammer worm on Internet operations. Likewise, Berk et al. [165] present a tech-
nique to identify worm spread after a short period of time. This method detected
worm spread only when 10% of the victims are infected and with a detection perfor-
mance achieved with sensor covering only 1% to 2% of the monitored space. This
automated system is based on ICMP unreachable messages. This proposed method-
ology examines worms and presents simulation results that measure the detection
speed of active hosts. Also, Staniford et al. [166] investigate UDP-based worms. The
authors simulate the Slammer worm, adjust its latency measurements and monitor
its packet delivery rates. The results showed that 95% of 1 million vulnerable hosts
can be infected in only 510 milliseconds, whereas another TCP based service can
be 95% saturated within 1.3 seconds. To avoid worm containment techniques, the
authors suggest that ﬂash worms should reduce their speed and use deeper spread
trees. Furthermore, the proposed approach includes defense mechanisms to detect
ﬂash worms. In addition, Shannon and Moore [45] study the Witty worm, which
targets a buﬀer overﬂow ﬂaw in many ﬁrewall products having Internet Security
Systems. The authors shared a general view of the worm’s spread, its victims and
features. Similarly, Kumar et al. [169] analyze the propagation of the Witty worm.
The authors exploit the structure of the code including its pseudo-random number
generation function. Using limited darknet data, the researchers were able to mine
individual packets’ rate of infection prior to loss, corrected noise generated by the
worm, and disclosed the worm’s failure to reach all potential victims. Furthermore,
these scientists explored the complete attack infection scenario tree and uncovered
a target on a US military base. Furthermore, Abu Rajab et al. [170] utilize darknet
data to infer the sequence of worms infection. The authors test the reliability and
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eﬀectiveness of their proposed technique independent of scanning rate, vulnerable
population and the sensor size. These authors measured the accuracy of this time
series-based methodology, which reaches 80% after a few hundred initial infected
machines. This technique further provided insights into the characteristics of the
hit-list. Last but not least, Zou et al. [171, 178] investigate worms in two separate
works. First, the authors propose several algorithms (i.e., Kalman ﬁlter) that ef-
fectively detect worm presence and its corresponding sensors. Second, they showed
that they can predict the overall vulnerable population size of a uniform-scan such
as Code Red. They further accurately estimated the infection size based on the
analyzed data.
Moreover, Bailey et al. [46] use a /8 darknet network from the IMS project to
describe observations of the Blaster worm since its beginning in 2003. The authors
explain how they measure its propagation, attack scenario, worm characteristics, life
cycle in 2003, and persistence in 2004. Furthermore, Richardson et al. [168] examine
how darknet aﬀected the ability of global scanning worm detectors. They propose
statistical models of darknet and combine them with random constant spread model
of worm propagation to calculate the probability that a worm detector would be able
to raise an alarm. Through their analysis, the authors concluded that global scan-
ning worm detectors are not a viable long-term strategy for detecting worms in early
stages. Additionally, Cooke et al. [167] try to understand non-uniformity in worms’
behavior. Using a large darknet data rich with Blaster, Slammer and Code Red
II infections, the authors analyzed and discovered three bias in malware behavior.
More on worms detection, Pham et al. [172] tackle the problem of discovering multi-
headed worms in the context of a larger dataset. Based on a 15 month of data, the
researchers were able to conﬁrm the existence of multi-headed worms and provided
insights on worm behaviors. Kanda et al. [173] believe that worm-infected machine
traﬃc characteristics are distinguishable from regular machines. They state that
the diﬀerence in traﬃc between benign and malicious traﬃc can be classiﬁed by
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k-means clustering. Based on the volume of data, they also found that the proposed
metric can isolate malicious traﬃc which has a small inﬂuence. Furthermore, Eto et
al. [78] proposed an approach to understand the intentions of attackers and to have a
comprehensive look of online threats. With focus on the W32.Downadup worm, the
latter researchers found that 60% of their darknet attacking hosts are related to the
above-mentioned malware. The authors also validated their ﬁndings with 86.18%
accuracy using correlation analysis. Furthermore, Wang et al. [174, 175] estimate
the temporal features of worms through simulation and analysis of darknet traﬃc.
They propose several methods to detect the time of infection in order to rebuild the
worm infection pattern. They leveraged this inference as a detection mechanism and
estimate the detection error for various estimators. In addition, Irwin [176] studied
worms in general and Conﬁcker in particular. The author discussed the analysis
of 16 million related darknet packets targeting port 445/tcp using a /24 address
block. He further provided an overview and characterization of the collected data,
including size and time to live (TTL) value analysis. This work pinpointed a ﬂaw in
the Conﬁcker scanning algorithm [176]. Finally, the author located geographically
the highly targeted victims based on region and numerical proximity. Finally, in
an attempt to identify the location of worms binaries and stop their spread, Chen
et al. [177] use the ﬂexibility and high performance of network processors. The
proposed inspection engine is built on top of an advanced network processor. The
work includes testing and evaluating procedures to improve the performance of the
proposed technique on real darknet data. The authors made the tool available for
the anti-worm research community.
Botnet is a platform for adversaries to generate large-scale and distributed
cyber attacks. We list below the research works that leverage passive monitoring
to investigate botnet activities. Table 3.15 summarizes these publications. Contri-
butions are divided into several techniques, mainly, trap-based monitors, clustering
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and correlation.
Publications Approach/Technique Contribution Tool/Project
[179] Diurnal Shaping Functions Studying Botnet Spread Dy-
namics
Honeyd
[180] Time Series Tracking Botnet Activities Honeyd/Leurre.com
[181] Hybrid Designing a Hybrid P2P Bot-
net
Custom
[182] Data Correlation Outlining the Genesis and
Structure of Zombies and Bot-
net
IMS
[183] Cross Cluster Correlation Presenting a Platform for Bot-
net Detection
BotMiner
[184] DNS-based Blackhole Fingerprinting Botnet Activ-
ities Using a Non-interactive
Approach
Custom
[185] Spam Sinkhole Studying Spammers’ Behavior Custom
[186] IDS Correlation Botnet Infection Detection BotHunter
Table 3.15: Botnet Research Papers - Summary
First, Dagon et al. [179] study how time and location aﬀect botnet spread
dynamics. They create a diurnal propagation model that uses shaping functions
to capture regional variations in online vulnerable populations. The model aims at
comparing propagation rates for diﬀerent botnets, prioritizing response and predict-
ing future botnet infections. The authors found that time zones play an important
role in botnet growth dynamics, and that factors such as time of release are impor-
tant to short term spread rates. For data collection and validation, the authors used
several tools including Tarpit [26]. The researchers demonstrated that their model is
more accurate than the previous ones and that it accurately predicts botnet popula-
tion growth. Furthermore, Ramachandran et al. [184] perform a counter-intelligence
passive monitoring of DNS trap to infer botnets’ activities without interacting with
them. The authors were able to identify scanning activities performed by botmas-
ters and suggested early bot detection techniques. Ramachandran et al. [185] further
study the behavior of spammers through the analysis of a 17 month period of traﬃc
ﬂows to spam trap.
Second, Cooke et al. [182] outline the genesis and structure of zombies and
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botnet. The authors monitor command and control (C&C) and Internet Relay Chat
(IRC) communication. By correlating security information from multiple sources,
the authors elaborate on their botnet detection strategy. Additionally, Gu et al. [186]
present a new strategy for network monitoring, which aims at inferring the infection
and the coordination dialog of a successful malware infection. Through the analysis
of a /17 unused address space, the authors introduce BotHunter as an application to
track the ﬂows between internal and external entities. Using real network traces, the
authors further evaluate the eﬀectiveness of the project in detecting a variety of real-
world botnets with low false positive rates. In a similar work, Gu et al. [183] present
a general botnet detection framework called BotMiner. The authors started their
investigation from essential botnet properties such as bots communication with C&C
servers/peers. The technique uses cross cluster correlation to identify bots that share
common malicious network patterns. This clustering methodology adopts many
ﬁlters which include one-way traﬃc extraction such as scanning activity through
uncompleted communication.
Other researchers such as Pham and Dacier [180] demonstrate how to track
botnet armies of zombies to characterize their lifetime and size. First, they propose
a time series technique to identify attack events in a large dataset of traces. Second,
they identiﬁed long-living armies of zombies. Third, they showed the importance
of selecting the observation viewpoint when trying to group such traces for analysis
purposes. Last but not least, Wang et al. [181] present the design of an advanced
hybrid P2P botnet. The system uses various features such as robust network con-
nectivity, individualized encryption and control traﬃc dispersion, etc. To defend
against such a botnet, the authors elaborate on various approaches including anal-
ysis via darknet space. In this context, the researches discover that if the darknet
can capture 200 copies of peer lists, network security defenders will be able to know
more than 95% of bots used in the peer-list updating procedure.
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Distributed Reﬂection Denial of Service attack is also known as am-
pliﬁcation threat. This is a well known practice of a DDoS, in which malicious
users abuse publically reachable servers to overwhelm a victim with ampliﬁed reply
traﬃc [208,209]. The technique consists of an invader directing a query to an open
server having the source IP spoofed to be the victim’s address. Subsequently, all
server responses will be sent to the targeted victim. In order to have a high im-
pact on the victim, the attackers leverage requests with large size replies, and hence
increase the ampliﬁcation of the attack. Moreover, in order to increase the size of
the attack with little eﬀort, attackers use botnet to synchronize an army of bots
and order them to send the requests. In recent research, DRDoS [33] activities are
found to abuse several applications running on top of TCP [210] and UDP [32]. In
our previous work [31], we have proposed a novel approach to infer and characterize
large-scale DNS-based DRDoS activities through the darknet space. Complemen-
tary to the pioneer work on inferring DDoS victims using backscattered traﬃc [30],
the proposed approach leverages DNS queries (non backscattered) that seek open
DNS resolvers to execute the attack. The approach uncovered traces from the largest
DRDoS attack of March 2013 against Spamhaus [211]. More on our DRDoS analysis
is presented in Chapter 6.
Malicious Activities
Malicious activities consist mainly of two parts, namely, scanning and spooﬁng.
Scanning or reconnaissance activities are the ﬁrst step in a cyber attack life
cycle. In a typical attack scenario, adversaries execute a scan activity to search for
vulnerabilities online before launching an attack on the vulnerable victim(s). Table
3.16 summarizes related research publications. The techniques are mainly based
on time series and statistical models, in addition to network routing and packet
analysis.
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Publications Approach/Technique Contribution Tool/Project
[187,188] Time Series - Statistics - IDS Inferring Scanning Behavior Custom
[85] Spectrum Analysis Extracting Malware Feature SPADE














Table 3.16: Scanning Research Papers - Summary
The ﬁrst group leverages time series and statistical models to investigate cyber
activities on darknet. For instance, Bou-Harb et al. [187,212] attempt to infer scan-
ning or probing activities and identify the technique used to perform such probing.
The approach, which is based on various statistical and probabilistic techniques,
tries to identify the machinery of the scan. The analysis is done on large darknet
data and shows promising results. The same authors propose an approach to de-
tect and cluster cyber attacks targeting corporate networks. They evaluated the
approach and found promising results when compared with the mostly used NIDS
(snort) [188]. Furthermore, Eto et al. [85] focus on the oscillations of the destination
IP addresses of scan packets to propose the concept of malware feature extraction.
They implemented and evaluated a distinct analysis method dubbed as SPADE.
The technique applies a spectrum analysis methodology to realize a fundamental
goal, which is to grasp the general trend of malware propagation from only scan
data. Through several evaluations, the authors show that SPADE successfully ex-
tract and distinguish malware features. Additionally, Li et al. [189] propose a general
framework to extract botnet global scanning events. Using honeyd, where half of
the sensors are dark, the authors analyze one year of data from a large research
institution to study six diﬀerent botnet scanning characteristics. Based on scanning
techniques, the researchers distinguish two botnet arrival/departure patterns. The
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authors study the scan behavior and diﬀerentiate between exponential and linear
distributions. The result was aﬀected by the randomness of scanning activities and
the high range of scans, which cross the sensor IP space. In a relevant work, the
authors investigate probing events of botnet. The discussed techniques are suitable
for users who deploy darknet. The goal is to implement techniques that can help
understand the strategy and purpose of the distributed probing events on the local
network. Moreover, through the local view of sensors, the researchers designed the
scheme of scanning activities, cross-validated their ﬁndings with DShield data and
showed promising precision [192].
The second group leverage network routing techniques. For example, Dain-
otti et al. [28] present the measurement and analysis of a 12-day world-wide cyber
scanning campaign targeting VoIP (SIP) servers. The discovery has occurred while
analyzing some large-scale probing events [190]. Their analysis is based on their
collected data using a /8 dark IP address block. The authors note that the SIP
scanning campaign involved approximately 3 million distinct source addresses (scan-
ning bots), generated around 20 million probes, and targeted roughly 14.5 million
destinations. For illustration purposes, the authors created a world map animation
of the scanning campaign. Finally, Gu et al. [191] introduce a technique to counter
scanning propagation. They propose the use of several components exploiting white
hole networks, which are systems that co-occupy populated network segments to
mislead and defeat malicious probing activities. Among these components, the au-
thors use an address mapper that actively gathers and updates the unused IP/port
segment of the network that the white hole can occupy. The white hole technique
can deter, slow down and halt the spread of critical scanning malware. The authors
demonstrate the eﬀectiveness of their approach by using analytical reasoning and
simulations using real trace and address distribution data. They further prove the
success of their work even when applied to small darknet address blocks.
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Spooﬁng is a technique to fake the identify of adversaries. Table 3.17 sum-
marizes the related works that leverage darknet data. The techniques employ packet
analysis and are divided into two categories.
Publications Approach/Technique Tool/Project
[193] TTL Fields & Statistics NICT
[194] TTL & Identiﬁcation Fields Custom
[195] ICMP Packets - Classiﬁcation Custom
[42] ICMP Packets CAIDA
Table 3.17: Spooﬁng Investigation Research Papers - Summary
The ﬁrst group of authors leverage TTL values to investigate spooﬁng activ-
ities. For instance, Eto et al. [193] propose an inspection method focusing on the
TTL ﬁeld of each packet in order to statistically extract spoofed IP packets from
traﬃc observed by darknet. They also provide an analysis engine against network
attacks. Through an empirical evaluation, the authors found that at most 1.26%
of spoofed packets exist in the darknet traﬃc. Similarly, Ohta et al. [194] propose
an approach for detecting spoofed packets using the TTL and identiﬁcation ﬁeld
frame values. The latter approach is based on time series analysis coupled with a
statistical methodology. To validate the proposed approach, the authors used two
darknet samples. They claimed that their method can extract a number of plausible
spooﬁng packets from real darknet traces.
The second group of researchers uses ICMP packets to classify and trace-back
spooﬁng activities. For example, Bi et al. [195] characterize spooﬁng attacks on the
Internet. They classify address spooﬁng into six classes based on the position of the
node being spoofed. This work also presents a trace-back mechanism to identify the
origin of DDoS source based on the ICMP packets found on darknet. The results
showed that attackers mostly use HTTP and HTTPS on top of TCP to execute
their attacks. Last but not least, Yao et al. [42] present an Internet-scale Passive IP
Trace-back mechanism that allows the tracking of the origin of anonymous traﬃc.
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A developed Internet route model is sequentially used to aid in reconstructing the
attack path. The researchers applied their technique to darknet data and found that
the proposed mechanism can construct a trace tree from at least one intermediate
router in 55.4% of the spooﬁng attacks, and can construct a tree from at least 10
routers in 23.4% of attacks.
3.2.3 Events
We list below the cyber events that are extracted through the monitoring of darknet.
Table 3.18 provides a summary of these publications. The majority of the works
leverage packet ﬁltering and analysis to extract insights on events such as network
outages, censorship, etc.
Publications Approach/Technique Contribution Tool/Project
[199] ICMP Probes Proposing an Outage Detection
Platform
Trinocular
[11] Packet Filtering - Routing Studying Darknet Events During
Natural Phenomena
CAIDA
[196] Packet Filtering - Routing Studying Internet Censorship and
Disruption
CAIDA
[197] Packet Filtering - Routing Exploring Internet Service Inter-
ruption
Custom
[198] Packet Loss Studying the Causes of Macro-
scopic Online Disruptions
CAIDA
Table 3.18: Events Research Papers - Summary
For instance, Quan et al. [199] propose Trinocular, an outage detection plat-
form that uses ICMP probes which target darknet space. This system helps in
understanding the reliability of edge networks and has the capability to provide
precised indicator on outage period in terms of time and date. The approach leads
to more accurate (fewer false conclusions) results in comparison to the best avail-
able techniques. Furthermore, Dainotti et al. [11] study darknet during two natural
phenomena: country-level censorship and two recent earthquakes. For country-level
outages, the authors note that these events are stunningly visible using darknet
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instrumentation, and in conjunction with other sources of data, this can reveal in-
formation about how censorship is being implemented over time. The authors also
examine the number of distinct source IP addresses in darknet. They further study
how the ratio of this number, before and after the earthquakes, varies by distance
from the epicenters. It is shown that some graphs illustrated signiﬁcant diﬀerences
before and after the events, while other graphs showed more subtle diﬀerences. Sim-
ilarly, the authors in [196] analyze episodes of disruptions caused by Internet cen-
sorship in two countries. Their analysis rely on multiple sources of large-scale data,
including Internet registries ﬁles, Internet routing information, and darknet data.
The authors were able to pinpoint the forms of Internet access disruptions, which
were implemented in a given region over time. Among other insights, the authors
detected Libya’s attempts to test ﬁrewall-based blocking before executing aggressive
external routing-based disconnection. The researchers claim that their methodol-
ogy can be used, in an automated fashion, to detect outages or similar macroscopic
events in other geographic or topological regions. Furthermore, Bailey et al. [197]
leverage Internet routing, backbone traﬃc and darknet data to explore diﬀerent
infrastructure-based works to interrupt Internet services. The authors focused on
the risks of this long-term Internet evolution based on several realistic events, such
as WikiLeaks DDoS, China Facebook ﬁltering, Iran elections and Egypt Internet
outages [197]. Finally, Benson et al. [198] extend their disruption of Internet con-
nectivity analysis to study the causes of macroscopic online disruptions. The authors
propose metrics for inferring loss of packets in link congestion through AS analysis.
This work listed three case studies to show how the approach can be used to identify
and characterize large-scale outages.
71
3.2.4 Summary
Section 3.2 provided a taxonomy of several elements in the analysis process of dark-
net traﬃc, namely, data, threats, and events. Proﬁling darknet data allowed re-
searchers to understand the nature of its traﬃc. Moreover, darknet was mainly
designed to infer threats and malicious activities. Therefore, the analysis of darknet
data in general and the threat analysis in particular, represented the largest part of
this survey. From this section, we can conclude the following:
• A study in 2001 shows that darknet sensors occupy 5% of the whole IPv4
address space [126]. An up-to-date study is needed to approximate the current
size of darknet.
• Various data analysis techniques are leveraging darknet traﬃc. The majority
of studies tackle the IPv4 address space whereas less than 1% investigate IPv6
darknet.
• Packet analysis, network routing, statistics and time series techniques are the
mostly used in darknet analysis.
• Filtering misconﬁguration packets is still not thoroughly investigated and is
still a gray area that requires more attention from the research community.
• Worms and scanning activities are the most common threats that can be found
on the darknet.
• Code Red and Slammer/Sapphire are the most analyzed worms on the darknet
due to their large-scale infection and propagation mechanisms.
• CAIDA data is the most widely used by researchers to investigate worms and
other malicious activities.
• Denial of Service attacks are the most severe threats that are extracted from
the analysis of darknet data.
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• Botnet investigation is considered challenging through monitoring solely dark-
net traﬃc. The reason behind this is that darknet considers passive monitoring
only. Therefore, other interactive techniques such as honeypots can be used
in parallel with darknet to enhance botnet investigation.
• Nowadays, DRDoS are the largest cyber threats reaching a peak of 400 Gbps
in 2014. DRDoS activities can also be measured by analyzing darknet data.
Less than 1% of the research tackled this promising area of study.
• Due to the nature of darknet, which is based on passive monitoring, and
the inter-activities in botnet systems, very few researchers were able to link
botnet research to darknet analysis. In addition, due to reﬂection attacks,
which have risen in the past couple years, several researchers were unaware of
the importance of darknet in investigating such reﬂection activities. Therefore,
botnet and DRDoS activities require more attention from the darknet research
community.
• Diﬀerentiating between scanning and DRDoS is still partially a diﬃcult prob-
lem due to the fact that both leverage scan-based techniques to operate. Scan-
ning activities probe the Internet to collect information, whereas reﬂection at-
tacks generate scan-based requests to redirect ampliﬁed reply traﬃc to victim.
• Scanning and spooﬁng are not threats but malicious activities that adversaries
utilize to acquire information or hide identities respectively. More research has
been done on scanning.
• Packet analysis is the only technique used on darknet data to investigate spoof-
ing activities. This method includes inspecting ICMP packets and TTL values.
Less than 2% of research has been done on spooﬁng and darknet. Therefore,
spooﬁng is still a severe malicious activity that needs more attention from the
security research community.
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• Darknet can be used to check Internet policies due to certain events such as po-
litical, or geophysical, among others. For instance, the variation in the amount
of darknet traﬃc generated, before and after a censorship policy, could allow
researchers to assess the failure-to-success ratio of initiating this policy. Dur-
ing our study, we have found that analyzing darknet traﬃc upon worldwide
events is the most recent.
The next section is the last part of our darknet taxonomy. The latter includes
a state-of-the-art study of darknet visualization tools and techniques.
3.3 Darknet Visualization
Last but not least, we survey the literature and elaborate on the usage of darknet
traﬃc in detecting malicious activities by exploiting visualization techniques and
tools. The taxonomy of the visualization-based research works is shown in Figure
3.6. Furthermore, Table 3.19 summarizes these publications.
Le et al. [213] propose a novel approach to infer malicious network traﬃc based
on graph theory concepts such as degree distribution, maximum degree and distance
measures. The authors model the network traﬃc using the traﬃc dispersion graphs
(TDG) technique [213]. As such, they analyze the diﬀerences of TDG graphs in time
series to detect malicious activities and introduce a technique to identify attack pat-
terns. The approach was validated using real network traces. Similarly, Joslyn et
al. [214] propose a new technique to facilitate and visualize large-scale data. The
graph-based approach leverages network routing databases. The authors described
and presented real use cases in two graph-oriented query languages. This hybrid
approach presents a new class of graph-relational analysis. In another visualization
contribution, Krasser et al. [215] build a network traﬃc visualization system capable



























Figure 3.6: Visualization Research Taxonomy - Overview
automated analysis of network traﬃc by applying eﬀective information visualization
techniques in order to decrease the ratio of false positives and false negatives. Using
link analysis and parallel coordinate plots with time sequence animation, the authors
examine various dimensions that provide insights into both legitimate and malicious
network activity. To validate the system operation, they used a dataset from ﬁve
large-scale botnet traﬃc collected using darknet. Their results indicated that the
system provides the capability to rapidly scan large dataset of network traﬃc for
malicious activity despite visual noise. Moreover, Fontugne et al. [222] propose an
approach for detecting traﬃc anomalies based on pattern recognition. The authors
take advantage of graphical representations to break down the dimensions of net-
work traﬃc. They further map network traﬃc data into snapshots rather than
traditional time series. Moreover, these researchers identify unusual distributions
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Publications Approach/Technique Contribution Tool/Project
[214] Graph-Based Facilitating and Visualizing
Large-scale Data
Custom












Detecting Traﬃc Anomalies Custom
[221] Hough Transform Proposing a Technique to Detect
Scanning Activities
Custom
[218,219] Game Engine Enabling Collaborative Network
Control
Custom






Detecting and Visualizing Net-
work Threats
PCAV - CAIDA
[225] Hilbert Curve Mapping Facilitating the Analysis of Large-
scale Events
CAIDA
[216,217] IDS Visualizing Various Backscat-
tered and Scanning Traﬃc
InetVis
Table 3.19: Visualization Research Papers - Summary
in the traﬃc features through simple patterns. Their technique was implemented
and its eﬃciency was demonstrated by comparing it with another statistical anal-
ysis technique. A variety of network traﬃc anomalies were detected by analyzing
traﬃc from /18 network address space. They also propose a tool for visualizing and
exploring network traﬃc on all temporal and spatial scales. Their tool aims to help
researchers inspect traﬃc with basic features [223].
Fukuda et al. [221] propose a technique to detect scanning activities in dark-
net traﬃc. They aim to estimate probing speed of change in terms of destination
addresses, source ports and destination ports. Their method is based on an image
processing technique applied to a two-dimensional image that represents unwanted
traﬃc. They employ the progressive probabilistic Hough transform algorithm to
detect edges in an image representing unwanted activities as lines. The authors ap-
ply their method on darknet traﬃc traces collected over a three-year period. They
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concluded that most of the scanning activities were characterized by intensive scans
to a speciﬁc host. Furthermore, they found that few port scanning activities take
place over a wide destination port space. Harrop and Armitage [218, 219] describe
a system where a 3D game engine technology is used to enable collaborative net-
work control. The proposed approach leverages simplistic interaction techniques by
translating network events into visual activities. Their idea is to monitor a darknet
network state that is represented in the 3D world by avatars spinning and jumping to
visually alert network operators to a network anomaly. Subsequently, the operators
can detect and shoot the alerting avatars to trigger a ﬁrewall access control list on a
border router, preventing any further attacks. In a similar work, Parry [220] describe
the L3DGEWorld project that is based on the OpenArena open source game engine
platform. The approach aims to visualize network data based on the engine of a spe-
ciﬁc game. The approach describes the input interface to the L3DGEWorld server,
which can be used to visualize and represent data in a real-time fashion. Moreover,
the proposed approach also describes the output abstraction layer, through which
data is connected from the virtual platform to the external daemon on the output
interface.
Furthermore, several contributions attempt to visualize backscatter data from
darknet. For instance, Choi et al. [224] build a model to detect and visualize net-
work threats on parallel coordinates. This parallel coordinate attack visualization
(PCAV) tool is able to detect zero-day attacks such as DDoS. PCAV operates based
on several coordinates in a packet such as source and destination IPs, ports, and av-
erage packet length. Nine signatures were developed based on a hashing algorithm.
Following the detection phase, network administrators must intuitively recognize
and respond to the threat. This ﬂow-based tool was proven to be eﬃcient when
applied to backscatter data. Furthermore, Irwin and Pilkington [225] develop a
tool for facilitating the analysis of large-scale darknet traﬃc. In particular, the tool
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focuses on the analysis of data coming from diﬀerent sources. The authors pre-
serve the concept of nearness among numerical sequential IP address blocks using
a Hilbert curve technique as a means of ordering dots within a visualization area.
The authors also visualize the evaluation of worm spread algorithms. They further
discussed the results and the importance of such tools to facilitate the analysis of big
data. Riel and Irwin [216] propose InetVis, a visualization tool for darknet traﬃc.
This tool plots TCP and UDP packets within a cube and ICMP packets within a
ﬂat plane. The authors adopt a time window to continue displaying an event after
it has occurred. The researchers capture thousands of packets to test their tool.
They observed numerous probing activities such as vertical and horizontal scans,
step up scans (scan on the same port followed by stepping up the port range) and
slow scans. Similarly, the authors in [217] demonstrate and compare InetVis with
two open source NIDSs, Snort and BRO, where the advantages of the former are
discussed. In this work, InetVis was re-implemented and enhanced. The authors
argue that their tool is eﬀective in visualizing various backscattered and scanning
traﬃc while not suﬀering from high rates of false positives and negatives as do the
other NIDSs.
It is noteworthy to mention that various tools exist on the Internet for darknet
data visualization and analysis. The aim is typically to facilitate the analysis, the
display, the collection and the presentation of the data. We list below tools from
CAIDA [226] such as Cuttleﬁsh for producing animated images that uncover the
connection between the diurnal and geographical patters of data; GTrace for graph-
ically trace-routing the destination; Geoplot for creating geographical images of data;
LibSea for representing big directed graphs in memory and on disk; Mapnet for vi-
sualizing the infrastructure of multi-backbone providers; Otter for showing arbitrary
communication information that can be presented as a group of nodes, connections
or paths; Plankton for illustrating international cache topology; Plot-latlong for ge-
ographically mapping hosts; PlotPaths for displaying reverse and forward packets
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from one to one or one to many connections; and ﬁnally Walrus for representing
large graphs in 3D.
3.3.1 Summary
In the last part of this darknet taxonomy, we have discussed several techniques and
tools for darknet visualization. From what has been discussed in the that part of
Section VI, we can conclude the following points:
• Several research works attempt to visualize darknet data by leveraging various
techniques. The majority of these visualization techniques fall into two main
areas, namely, generic-based and threat-based.
• Generic-based techniques aim at providing a graphical representation of usual
darknet data (i.e., backscatter), whereas threat-based ones visualize darknet
threats (i.e., DDoS).
• Generic-based techniques leverage mainly graph theory, whereas threat-based
ones utilize mainly pattern recognition and image processing.
• Nevertheless, graph theory and game engines methods are used in both generic-
based and threat-based techniques to model darknet network traﬃc.
• The majority (66.6%) of the visualization techniques are used to visualize
threats on darknet.
• Although darknet data is similar to any network traﬃc, CAIDA research center
is the primarily contributor to develop designated darknet visualization tools
to depict large-scale events and threats.
• The visualization of darknet data is the smallest part of our darknet taxonomy.
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3.4 Related Surveys
As previously discussed, a thin line distinguishes darknet from other trap-based
monitoring systems such as IP gray space [48, 49], greynet [24], honeytokens [227]
and darkports [228]. However, two main groups of surveys can be related to our
work. The ﬁrst group focused solely on a speciﬁc technology or threat whereas the
second elaborated on trap-based monitoring systems.
First, various surveys tackled the detection techniques in network traﬃc such
as NIDS [229], threats such as DDoS [230], botnet [231, 232] and worms [233], and
malicious activities such as scanning [234]. Compared to our work, this group of
research focused on a speciﬁc technology or a threat only whereas ours was more
comprehensive. For instance, our survey included not only a study on DDoS threats,
but also provided an overview on several darknet topics that can be leveraged to
infer various insights from the Internet, including threats, events, techniques and
tools.
Second, in regard to surveys that tackled trap-based monitoring systems,
Zhang et al. [235] were among the ﬁrst to classify honeypots in 2003. They high-
lighted data capture and data control in honeypots. Furthermore, they provided a
classiﬁcation of these traps based on security and application purposes. Further-
more, Seifert et al. [236] presented a taxonomy of honeypots. The authors described
a classiﬁcation of honeypots based on several schemes and were able to distinguish
between seven types of honeypots (i.e., low and high interactive). In 2012, Bringer et
al. [237] divided honeypot research into 5 major areas: types of honeypots, analysis
of data, conﬁguration, detection of sensors, and legal and ethical issues. The main
diﬀerence between the works in [235–237] and ours is the scope of the survey. This
group of works focused on honeypots, including active monitoring. Complementary,
our work focused solely on passive monitoring of unused IP addresses. The only
work that touched darknet research is [236] by discussing darknet and comparing it
to other monitoring systems (low and high interactive honeypots). Our work is more
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comprehensive in regard to darknet study as it covers development, data analysis,
and visualization.
Therefore, our survey is more close to the second group of contributions which
tackled trap-based monitoring systems. Our survey complements the aforemen-
tioned related research works. Furthermore, the realistic analysis and investigation
of real data provides more understanding and hands-on investigation experience
on darknet data and threat analysis. We provided a guideline to develop, analyze
and visualize real cyber insights by leveraging darknet data. The extracted darknet
knowledge in our work can help in building a cyber intelligence platform for Internet
monitoring. For more details on our survey, we refer the reader to [8].





In this chapter, we initiate our darknet data investigation. In this context, we elab-
orate on proﬁling darknet data. Such information could generate indicators of cyber
threat activity as well as providing an in-depth understanding of the nature of its
traﬃc. Particularly, we analyze darknet packets distribution, its used transport,
network and application layer protocols and pinpoint its resolved domain names.
Furthermore, we identify its IP classes and destination ports as well as geographi-
cally locate its source countries. We further investigate darknet-triggered threats.
The aim is to explore darknet embedded threats and categorize their severities. Fi-
nally, we contribute by exploring the inter-correlation of such threats, by applying
association rule mining techniques, to build threat association rules. Speciﬁcally, we
generate clusters of threats targeting a speciﬁc victim.
In this context, the aim of this chapter is to answer the following set of ques-
tions:
1. What is the nature of darknet traﬃc and its underlying content?
2. Who contributes to darknet traﬃc?
3. Are there any embedded darknet threats?
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4. Can we show that such threats are correlated and hence provide their real
world interpretation and impact?
To answer these questions, the work presented in this chapter contributes in
the following three aspects:
• Analysis accuracy: The analyzed darknet data includes packet types that were
omitted by other research works (i.e., ICMP in [111]). As such, the data set
is rich which contributes to a better accuracy of the analysis.
• Threat analysis: By adopting an analysis methodology based on the use of
network intrusion detection systems (NIDSs), our approach yields real world
threats that are embedded in darknet traﬃc. Such results will be presented in
Section 4.2.1.
• Association rule mining approach: By applying association rule mining and
correlation techniques on the threat data, we investigate clusters of threats
that co-occur. Such cyber threat intelligence proves that speciﬁc threats are
correlated in addition to providing a better understating by interpreting the
attack scenarios targeting speciﬁc network destinations.
4.1 Darknet Measurements
In order to better understand the nature of darknet data, we primarily provide an
overview of darknet traﬃc and insights on large volumes of darknet traﬃc ema-
nating from numerous organizations. Second, we discuss three case studies related
to separate events, namely, probing, botnet and DRDoS activities. Our dataset is





To understand the nature of darknet data, we provide an overview of its traﬃc. The
dataset is pure darknet data captured during a ﬁve-year period from a single unused
/8 network address block [2].
Count TCP UDP ICMP
Packet 76.6% 19.9% 2.8%
Bytes 55.82% 40.82% 2.66%
Table 4.1: Protocols Distribution - Inspired by [2]
Table 4.1 lists the distribution of darknet transport and network layer pro-
tocols. It is shown that the majority of darknet traﬃc consists of TCP packets.
Several facts can explain the TCP dominance. First, TCP provides various scan-
ning techniques (i.e., SYN, Fragmentation, SYN-ACK) [238]. Second, generating
TCP scanning is generally more feasible than UDP [239]. Finally, as noted in [108],







Table 4.2: Top TCP-based Services
We further list top application protocols found on darknet. Table 4.2 depicts
the top 5 TCP-based services that have been observed based on [2]. The results
demonstrate that the Microsoft Directory Service (microsoft-ds) is leading while the
NetBIOS is ranked second. The former service is known to be abused by malware




Base on real darknet data analysis, we provide three case studies on separate events,
namely, Conﬁcker worm in 2008 and 2009, Sality SIP scan botnet in 2011, and the
largest DRDoS attack in 2014.
Case Study 1 - Conﬁcker Worm in 2008 and 2009
In 2008, a new exploit targeted Windows services. Consequently, Microsoft an-
nounced a security update (MS08-067) to resolve the issue. The threat originated
from a malicious TCP scanning behavior by a worm named Conﬁcker [240]. The
latter is a malware designed to exploit victim machines by exploiting TCP port
445 (Microsoft Directory Services). Conﬁcker infected millions of computers in over
200 countries, which render it one of the largest known computer worms. In this
case study, we show the outcome of the darknet analysis that inferred random scans
generated by this worm. The dataset of the attack on the 20th and 21th of January




















































































































Figure 4.1: Conﬁcker Worm in 2009 - Traﬃc Distribution (1 hour interval)
Several versions of Conﬁcker (A and B) were involved in the attack. It is
noteworthy to mention that the ﬁgures depict the peak at 2 pm in the analyzed 2009
dataset. However, based on the analysis done by other researchers, the attack also
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peaked at 2 pm during the 2008 dataset [240]. This could pinpoint the orchestration
and automation of the machinery behind the attack, which is shown as a diurnal
pattern in [240,241].
Case Study 2 - Sality Botnet SIP Scan in 2011
In February 2011, the Sality botnet executed a /0 SIP scan through the whole IPv4
address space. This 12-day event involved 3 million unique IP addresses in one of the
most coordinated cyber scanning campaigns ever. The botnet generated 20 million
scans to 14.5 million addresses, which is almost 86.6% of the whole /8monitors. This
campaign targeted SIP services, which run on port 5060 and threatened the voice
communications infrastructure. The darknet observation of this event is depicted in
Figure 4.2. The campaign initiated in January and ended in February, 2011. The
attack peaked at 21,000 hosts within a 5-minute interval. More on this attack can




















Figure 4.2: Sality Botnet SIP Scan in 2011 - Traﬃc Distribution (12 days)
Case Study 3 - The Largest DRDoS Attack in 2014
In 2013, a 300-Gbps DRDoS attack targeted Spamhaus [211]. In February 2014,
the largest DRDoS attack in history, which peaked at 400 Gbps of bandwidth, hit
the Internet infrastructure. We have depicted the latter attack through the DShield
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data in Figure 4.3. This image shows the source distribution of UDP-based packets
on port 123-NTP (in yellow) with the corresponding generated reports (in blue).
The graph depicts the increase in NTP packets and reports during the attack.
Figure 4.3: The Largest NTP-based DRDoS Attack in History
Typically, in an NTP ampliﬁcation attack, the adversary generates a ﬂood of
spoofed UDP network packets. This large amount of traﬃc is sent to open Network
Time Protocol servers, which operates at port number 123. This attack abuse the
MONLIST service in NTP with an aim to send ampliﬁed traﬃc to the victim. More
on NTP ampliﬁcation DRDoS attacks in the context of darknet can be found in [242].
Similar to NTP ampliﬁcation DRDoS attacks, DNS service can also be abused to
generate ampliﬁcation/DRDoS attacks. More on DNS ampliﬁcation and DRDoS
activities through darknet analysis can be found in [31, 243].
The aforementioned darknet measurements and case studies provide a basic
understanding on what is darknet and how it is leveraged to generate cyber intel-
ligence. Next, we start characterizing darknet, but this time using our own data,
which is obtained from our trusted partner at Farsight Security.
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4.2 Darknet Proﬁling
Similarly, we have performed darknet traﬃc proﬁling on our monitored sensors. To
accomplish this task, we analyzed some darknet data collected in the period between
September 16th, 2011 and May 9th, 2012. The analyzed data feeds are retrieved in
real-time from a trusted third party framework3. The data consists of pure darknet
traﬃc collected from many countries and monitor /13 address blocks.
We initiated our analysis by diﬀerentiating darknet packets according to their
types following the method in [2]:
• Scanning traﬃc; TCP SYN packets
• Backscattering traﬃc, which commonly refers to unsolicited traﬃc that is the
result of responses to attacks with spoofed source IP address; TCP SYN+ACK,
RST, RST+ACK, and ACK packets
• The remaining traﬃc packets are classiﬁed as misconﬁguration
Scanning Traﬃc Backscattering Misconﬁguration
68.02% 2.00% 29.98%
Table 4.3: Packets Distribution - Nature of Traﬃc
Table 4.3 depicts the outcome distribution. These results reveal that scanning
or network probing constitutes the majority of darknet traﬃc. Note that, such traﬃc
could be interpreted as an indication of port scanning and/or vulnerability probing.
Such attacks, in general, are preliminary triggered before launching a targeted attack
towards a speciﬁc system. We next aim to identify the major protocols that are
used in darknet traﬃc. Table 4.4 provides the percentages of darknet transport and
network layer protocols. It is observed that TCP plays the major role.
3Farsight Security: https://www.farsightsecurity.com/
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TCP UDP ICMP Others
91.9% 5.5% 2.9% 0.3%
Table 4.4: Protocols Distribution
Figure 4.4 corroborates this fact by plotting the protocols distribution in a day
sample, which is the average of daily samples collected over a month’s period. TCP
dominance can be explained by two facts: First, the majority of scanning attacks
use TCP and second, there exist known attacks that speciﬁcally target TCP ports as
noted in [108]. TCP increase in Figure 4.4, especially after the 12th hour, indicates
that the darknet sensors record an increasing number of TCP packets after that
period.
Figure 4.4: Darknet Network and Transport Layer Protocols
Such information pinpoints the need for a thorough temporal analysis and
comparison of that phenomenon, which may uncover and explain the occurrence of
certain attacks at speciﬁc time periods and their absence during other periods at any
given day. Next, we proﬁled darknet application protocols. Figure 4.5 illustrates the
top 16 application protocols that have been found. The results demonstrate that the
Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is leading while the Domain Name Service is ranked
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second and NetBIOS is ranked third. It is worthy to note that the SIP protocol is
excessively used in DoS attacks, speciﬁcally against voice over IP (VoIP) servers
[244], and thus its appearance as a top darknet application protocol is signiﬁcant
and may be alarming.
Figure 4.5: Darknet Application Layer Protocols
We further studied the source and destination distributions of IP classes in







Table 4.5: IP Class Distribution
It is revealed that the majority of source IPs belong to class ‘A’, whereas in
the case of destination IPs, class ‘C’ plays the major role. Furthermore, Class ‘A’
proportion in the destination IPs is almost negligible, i.e., 0.017% whereas class
‘B’ contributes relatively more. It is substantial to mention that class ‘C’, being
the most destined and smallest class, could be an indication that it is as well the
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most targeted class by cyber attacks and hence further investigation in it could
yield relevant cyber intelligence. Moreover, we were interested in identifying the
resolved domain names in darknet. After performing this task, we identiﬁed that
the top-most darknet resolved domain belongs to a .cc Internet country code top-
level domain for Cocos (Keeling) Islands. Note that this domain, according to the
anti-phishing working group, constituted a signiﬁcant 7.3% of all phishing attacks
detected in 2010 [245]. Similar results could feed us, in general, with relevant in-
formation about unsolicited/malicious domains that could be used by attackers.
Another analysis has been performed on the TCP and UDP ports that are used
in the collected darknet traﬃc. Speciﬁcally, we aimed to pinpoint the destination
ports. Such insights could reveal the targeted ports used in cyber attacks. Figures
4.6 and 4.7 illustrate such results.
Figure 4.6: Darknet TCP Targeted Ports
The top three destination darknet TCP ports, namely, ports 445, 80, and 3389
are the Microsoft active directory service, the hypertext transfer protocol, and the
Microsoft terminal server respectively. These service ports have previously suﬀered
from security issues and vulnerabilities. A sample of the threats targeting such ser-
vices are pinpointed in [246], [247] and [248] respectively. Hence, it is alarming that
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Figure 4.7: Darknet UDP Targeted Ports
Figure 4.8: Darknet Sources - Heat Map
such ports appear as the top darknet destination TCP ports. On the other hand,
the top three destination darknet UDP ports, namely, ports 5060, 397, 1280 are the
SIP, the multi-protocol transport network (mptn) service, and the pictography pro-
tocol respectively. The SIP protocol, as mentioned previously, is a signiﬁcant target
of attack. This result further validates the integrity of our insights. Moreover, the
mptn and the pictography services are known to suﬀer from denial of service attacks
when a malformed request is destined to them. For the purpose of pinpointing the
sources that contribute to the darknet traﬃc, we perform darknet geo-localization.
Figure 4.8 depicts the heat map. According to our analysis, the source countries
reached 196 countries where the majority of source IPs are located in USA. It is
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as well noticeable that Brazil, China, and Russia represent the major portion of
source IPs compared to other countries. Note that, in Section 4.2.1, when we reveal
the darknet threat analysis and geo-locate the sources behind those threats, the
three aforementioned countries as well appear amongst the top contributed threat
countries.
4.2.1 Threat Analysis
In this section, we extend our proﬁling task to uncover real world threats that are
embedded in darknet traﬃc in addition to categorize their severities and geo-locate
their sources. For that purpose, we executed threat-based severity analysis. To
accomplish this task, Snort [41] and Bro [249], two open source NIDSs, combining
the beneﬁts of signature, protocol and anomaly-based inspection, were implemented
and utilized. Part of their content signature detection, Snort and Bro implement
the Boyer-Moore exact string matching detection algorithm in addition to a non-
deterministic ﬁnite automata regular expression detection algorithm. To perform
the threat analysis, we conﬁgured the NIDSs with rule sets from the Sourceﬁre
Vulnerability Research Team and The Bro Network Security Monitor. Consequently,
we fed the darknet data to the NIDSs. A partial outcome of this procedure is
summarized in Table 4.6. The results reveal 30 distinct threats. According to
Threat Type Priority
t1 Buﬀer Overﬂow Exploit
t2 Denial of Service High
t3 VPN Attempt
t4 Traceroute Utilization
t5 Service Port Discovery Medium
t6−30 Scanning Attempts Low
Table 4.6: Darknet Threats and Corresponding Severities
the NIDSs, three threats are of high priority, two are of medium severity and the
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rest are of low priority. The ﬁrst high priority threat (t1) is in fact an attempt to
possibly overﬂow a buﬀer. Speciﬁcally, a series of NOOP (no operation instructions)
were found in the data stream. Typically, most buﬀer overﬂow exploits use NOOP
commands to modify code operation [250]. Hence, this threat might indicate an
attempt to use a buﬀer overﬂow exploit. Thus, a full compromise of a system is
possible if the exploit is successful. Another high priority threat (t2) is rendered as
an attempt to cause a DoS. Particularly, a heap-based buﬀer overﬂow in Microsoft
MSN Messenger [251] is found on Windows systems. This vulnerability allows user-
assisted remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via unspeciﬁed vectors involving
video conversation handling in Web Cam and video chat sessions. As a result, DoS
and complete administrator access to a targeted system is possible. The last high
priority threat (t3) is in reality a detected virtual private network (VPN) remote
attempt on a set of darknet addresses. Although, in general, VPN is not considered a
threat, however an attempt to gain VPN access on a speciﬁc system can be alarming.
On the other hand, threats t4 and t5, and according the NIDSs, are of medium
severity. Threat (t4) represents an attempt to use a traceroute software where an
attacker can discover live hosts and routers on a target network in preparation for an
attack. Moreover, (t5) is a portmap GETPORT request to discover the port where the
Remote Procedure Call (RPC) statd is listening. An attacker can query the port
mapper to discover the port where statd runs. Consequently, this may be a precursor
to accessing statd. The remaining of the incidents are mainly scanning attempts
and are considered of low severities. Although their techniques may vary, their
end goal is to either perform port scanning or vulnerability probing in preparation
to a possible targeted attack. It is very signiﬁcant to note, for the purpose of
results integrity, that such scanning attempts, that constitute the majority of the
threats, are in accordance with our darknet proﬁling results, speciﬁcally the packets
distribution - nature of traﬃc percentages (68.02%) that was demonstrated in Table
4.3 in Section 4.2. For the purpose of accomplishing a high level attribution, we
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perform geo-location of the threat sources. Figure 4.9 depicts the heat map. Note
that the threat count metric is of the order of thousands. The results reveal that
Russia and China lead in terms of number of inferred threats.
Figure 4.9: Threats Sources - Heat Map (in thousands)
4.3 Threats Correlation
There is a crucial need to further analyze the threats that have been previously
detected and discussed. This section explores the inter-correlation of such threats,
by applying association rule mining techniques, to build threat association rules.
Such work demonstrates that speciﬁc darknet threats are in fact correlated or co-
occur when targeting speciﬁc victims. Moreover, it provides insights about threat
patterns and allows the interpretation of threat scenarios.
4.3.1 Approach
The goal of this approach is to investigate the interdependence and inter-correlation
of inferred threats. Particularly, we aim to answer the following questions: Are there
any threats targeting a speciﬁc victim that follow a certain pattern? Moreover, if
some of the co-occurring threats appear in a darknet traﬃc, how conﬁdently one
can predict the existence of other threats? To investigate this, we employed the
technique of frequent pattern mining (frequent item-set) and association rule min-
ing [252]. Another outcome of this approach, besides the ones mentioned above,
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is the generation of threat association rules that could be used as an input to a
classiﬁcation model that is able to predict and hence mitigate future threat occur-
rences. Frequent pattern and association rule mining techniques have been proven
to be very successful for identifying hidden patterns in DNA sequences, customer
purchasing habits, text categorization, and many other applications of pattern recog-
nition. The proposed threat correlation approach is a three-step process, namely,
frequent pattern mining, association rule generation from each frequent threat-set,
and rule analysis by applying various correlation techniques. Each of these steps is
detailed below.
Frequent Pattern Mining
An item-set or a pattern is a group of two or more objects that appear together.
An item-set is a frequent pattern if its members appear together for some minimum
number of times. In the context of threat analysis, an item or an object is a threat
and an item-set is the threat-set.
Time Intervals Identiﬁed Threats
τ1 {t2, t5, t7, t9}
τ2 {t2, t5, t7}
τ3 {t2, t5}
τ4 {t1, t5, t7}
τ5 {t4, t5, t7}
τ6 {t3, t6, t8}
τ7 {t4, t5, t8}
τ8 {t3, t6, t8}
τ9 {t2, t5, t8}
τ10 {t1, t5, t7, t8, t9}
Table 4.7: Vectors of Darknet Threats
Table 4.7, which is used for illustration and explanation purposes, depicts 10
threat-sets, one threat-set per row. Let T = {t1, · · · , tm} denote the universe of all
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threats detected from the given darknet feeds F . Suppose a threat-set Ti ⊆ T de-
tected at a time interval τi represents a row or an instance in the threat table (Table
4.7). This latter shows ten threat-sets captured at time intervals {τ1, · · · , τ10}. Let
Ti ⊆ T be a threat-set or a pattern in the threat table. A pattern that contains k
threats is a k− pattern. For instance, τ1 = {t2, t5, t7, t9} is a 4− pattern. Similarly,
the support of a pattern Ti is the percentage of all the instances T in the threat
table containing Ti, denoted by support(Ti|T ). Note that the probability P (ta ∪ tb),
where ta∪tb indicates that a pattern contains both ta and tb, is the union of itemsets
ta and tb. The support is deﬁned in equation 4.1:
support(ta ⇒ tb) = P (ta ∪ tb) (4.1)
A pattern Ti is a frequent pattern if the support of Ti is greater than or equal
to some user speciﬁed minimum support threshold, which is a real number in an
interval of [0, 1]. Further explanation of these terms is given in Example 4.3.1.
Example 4.3.1 Consider Table 4.7. Suppose the user-speciﬁed thresholdmin sup =
0.3, which means that a pattern Ti = {t1, · · · , tk} is frequent if at least 3 out of the
10 rows contain all threat-items in Ti. For instance, {t2, t5, t7, t9} is not a frequent
pattern because it has support 1/10 = 0.1. Similarly, {t2, t5} is a frequent 2-pattern
because it has support 4/10 = 0.4 and contains two threats. Likewise, {t5, t8} is a
frequent 2-pattern with support 3/10 = 0.3.
There are various data mining algorithms for extracting frequent patterns, such as
the Apriori [252], FP-growth [253], and ECLAT [254]. In this work, we employ
the Apriori algorithm since it has been validated in several text mining studies
[255]. Below, we provide an overview of the Apriori algorithm. Apriori is a level-
wise iterative search algorithm that uses frequent k-patterns to explore the frequent
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(k+1)-patterns. First, the set of frequent 1-pattern is found by scanning the threat
table, accumulating the support count of each threat-set, and collecting the threat
patterns containing T that also contains Ti with support(Ti|T ) ≥ min sup. The
resulting frequent 1-patterns are then used to ﬁnd frequent 2-patterns, which are
then used to ﬁnd frequent 3-patterns, and so on, until no more frequent k-patterns
can be found. The generation of frequent (k + 1)-pattern from frequent k-patterns
is based on the following Apriori property.
Property 4.3.1 (Apriori property) All nonempty subsets of a frequent pattern
must be frequent.
By deﬁnition, a pattern T ′i is not frequent if support (T
′
i |T ) < min sup. The above
property implies that adding a threat t to a non-frequent pattern T ′i will not make
it frequent. Thus, if a k-pattern T ′i is not frequent, then there is no need to generate
(k+1)-pattern T ′i∪T because T ′i∪T is also not frequent. The following example shows
how the Apriori algorithm exploits this property to eﬃciently extract all frequent
patterns or threat-sets. For a formal description, we refer the reader to [252].
Example 4.3.2 Consider Table 4.7 with min sup = 0.3. First, identify all frequent
1-patterns by scanning the threat table once to obtain the support of every threat-set.
The items having support ≥ 0.3 are frequent 1-patterns, denoted by L1 = {{t2}, {t5},
{t7}, {t8}}. Then, join L1 with itself, i.e., L1  L1, to generate the candidate set
C2 = {{t2, t5}, {t2, t7}, {t2, t8}, {t5, t7}, {t5, t8}, {t7, t8}} and scan the threat table
once to obtain the support of every pattern in C2. Identify the frequent 2-patterns,
denoted by L2 = {{t2, t5},{t5, t7}, {t5, t8}}. Similarly, perform L2  L2 to generate
C3 = {t5, t7, t8}. By scanning the threat table once, we found that {t5, t7, t8} is not
frequent, i.e., 3-pattern L3 is empty. The ﬁnding of each set of frequent k-patterns
requires one full scan of the rows in Table 4.7.
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Association Rule Mining
The selected frequent patterns or frequent threat-sets are used to investigate the
correlation and interdependence of the subsets of each frequent threat-set. This
can be achieved by applying association rule mining techniques [256]. For this,
all 1-patterns are deleted as they contain only one threat and thus can not be
associated with any other threat. The 2-patterns threat-sets are used to extract
single-dimensional association rules while the 3-patterns and higher patterns are
used to construct multi-dimensional association rules. To construct an association
rule of threats, we need to calculate the conﬁdence for each frequent threat-set. The
conﬁdence is the percentage of threat-sets containing threat Y in addition to threat
X with regard to the overall number of threat-sets containing X. Assume we have
a threat-set {ta, tb} for which the association rule would be {ta} ⇒ tb. Hence, the
association rule has a conﬁdence c in the threat table T , where P is the probability
and c is the percentage of threat-sets in T containing ta that also contains tb.
This statement is mathematically expressed in Equation 4.2.
conﬁdence(ta ⇒ tb) = P (tb|ta) = support{ta ∪ tb}
support{ta} (4.2)
Having support-count of (ta ∪ tb) and ta, we can calculate conﬁdence(ta ⇒ tb) using
Equation 4.2. Once the frequent threat-sets are extracted, the related association
rule of a frequent threat-set Ti can be constructed as follows:
• Generate all non-empty subsets of Ti






In order to investigate the interdependency of the threats, various correlation tech-
niques including χ2, cosine measure, and lift [256] can be used. In the current study,
we use lift, which is based on probabilities and its results are interpretable by non-
technical domain experts without the help of data mining experts. The correlation
technique lift measures how many times more often threats ta and tb occur together
than expected if they are statistically independent. The lift indicates whether the
identiﬁed threat patterns are correlated together. It is mathematically expressed as
follows:
lift(ta, tb) =
P (ta ∪ tb)
P (ta)P (tb)
(4.3)
If the value of Equation 4.3 is equal to 1 then threats ta and tb are independent and
therefore have no correlation; otherwise they are either negatively correlated (i.e.,







Association Rules Conﬁdence Lift Count
Destination
Network 1
w1.x1.y1.z1/24 1.{t7, t8, t9} ⇒ t10









w2.x2.y2.z2/24 3.{t10, t15, t4} ⇒ t1









w3.x3.y3.z3/24 5.{t10, t7, t8, t9, t13} ⇒ t4









w4.x4.y4.z4/24 7.{t7, t8, t9} ⇒ t10









w5.x5.y5.z5/24 9.{t10, t7, t8, t9, t13} ⇒ t11







Table 4.8: Darknet Threat Patterns
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We used Weka [257] to run the Apriori algorithm. In summary, the Apriori al-
gorithm takes the threat table in ARFF ﬁle type as input along with the user-deﬁned
parameters including minimum supportmin sup and conﬁdence c, and generates as-
sociation rules. To assess our approach, we experimented with diﬀerent threats that
were detected and mentioned in Table 4.6. The experimental results are achieved
by employing sequential rule mining techniques for correlating same set of threats.
Consequently, the generated rules can be used to build an associative classiﬁcation
model for predicting the occurrences of speciﬁc threats in real-time darknet traﬃc.
In general, the threat rules generated by the Apriori algorithm, provided the thresh-
old is kept low, is usually very large. However, we can tune and ﬁlter the results to
bring the rules to a manageable level by applying the following steps:
• Choosing a suitable value for the minimum support based on the occurrence
count of the targeted threat. Note that the choice of selecting a minimum
support threshold is inversely proportional to the number of generated threat-
sets.
• Taking into consideration the size of the association rules by specifying the
number of items per threat-set as input to the algorithm.
• Removing threats, prior to the analysis, that do not contribute in information
gain (i.e., a threat that is absent during the analyzed period).
In the current work, we selected a portion of darknet providers network blocks as
the target of attacks. Speciﬁcally, we restricted the target of the attacks to ﬁve
/24 network blocks. Table 4.8 represents our frequent pattern and association rule
mining results. For conﬁdentiality and privacy matters, we anonymized some sen-
sitive information. This table discloses the analyzed IP blocks, their corresponding
identiﬁed threat patterns or association rules, coupled with their lift, conﬁdence and
number of occurrences per day. The latter metric is an indication that the identiﬁed
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threat pattern is valid since it frequently occurs per unit of time (a day in our cur-
rent analysis). Up to this point, we have demonstrated that certain darknet threats
are in fact correlated or co-occur when targeting speciﬁc network destinations. For
example, consider association rule 1 in Table 4.8. This rule discloses that if we de-
tect threats {t7, t8, t9} in some order in the live darknet data stream, then with 63%
conﬁdence, we can as well expect to predict that threat t10 will follow or occur. Note
that these threats are correlated since the value of the lift is > 1. In the sequel,
we attempt to provide an interpretation to the identiﬁed threat patterns. Please
refer to the numbered association rules in Table 4.8 as a reference to the below in-
terpretations. It is worthy to note that such interpretations are solely derived from
the threat patterns and the NIDSs threat descriptions. Hence, we aimed to provide
the most logical and best ﬁt scenario considering the threat association rules. We
believe that one interesting outcome of this work is the ability to provide insights
about threat patterns and interpret real world threat scenarios. Future work in this
area could provide more elaborative interpretations.
The ﬁrst association rule discloses the following information. A Unix host,
running FreeBSD, attempts to ﬁngerprint a target Voice over IP (VoIP) Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP) server on port 5060. By ﬁngerprinting, the attacker hopes
to retrieve server identiﬁcation information such as operating system and installed
services. Finally, the attacker leverages the attack by sending an enormous number
of malformed ICMP packets directed towards the SIP server. The latter can be
interpreted as a denial of service attempt. The second association rule reveals the
subsequent information. An exploited Windows host ﬁrst attempts to ping a target
to check if it is alive. To retrieve more information, the adversary initiates various
traceroute commands. Moreover, the attacker attempts to connect to a certain
undisclosed port. However, he is faced with an “unable to connect” error message.
The latter eﬀort can be explained by an attempt to gain system access. The third
association rule can be interpreted as the following. A typical attacker ﬁrst performs
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port and host scanning to identify security vulnerabilities and possible ways to
get system access. Sequentially, he can trigger various traceroute commands to
retrieve more information on how to reach his target. Finally, he will attempt to
execute a high priority threat (a buﬀer overﬂow exploit) to gain elevated privilege
on the victim’s system. The fourth association rule presents a scanning attack
targeting IP version 6. Speciﬁcally, it discloses that an attacker ﬁrst attempts to
ﬁngerprint a server running IPv6. After receiving a request timed out reply, he
launches a traceroute command to further explore his target’s path. Finally, he
extends his attack by sending a series of ICMP packets. The latter can be interpreted
as a denial of service attempt against the IPv6 server. The ﬁfth association rule
discloses the following information. A Unix host, running FreeBSD as an operating
system, attempts to ﬁngerprint a target server on TCP port 80. By ﬁngerprinting,
the attacker hopes to retrieve the server’s (possibly the web server’s) identiﬁcation
information such as operating system and installed services. This can be a prelude
to discovering vulnerabilities and sequentially instrumenting a targeted attack. His
scanning request is made from a Flowpoint 2200 DSL router. However, the reply is
a message indicating that such port is unreachable. In an attempt to gather more
information about the target, the attacker consequently launches various traceroute
commands. The sixth association rule can be interpreted as the following. An
attacker aims to target a Microsoft server running as a domain controller. The
server, running Windows 2000 Server, has the Microsoft directory services installed
and running. The attacker ﬁrst tries pinging the server to see if it is operational.
After receiving a positive conﬁrmation, he elevates his attack by tracing the path to
reach the server. Finally, he leverages his attack by sending an enormous number
of malformed ICMP packets directed towards the domain controller. The seventh
association rule is a series of scanning attempts on UDP port 53, a port normally
dedicated for the domain name service (DNS). A host running Windows 9x generated
a signiﬁcant number of ICMP echo requests directed towards the server. In an
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attempt to gather more information about the target, the attacker consequently
launches traceroute commands. The eighth association rule unveils the following
information. An attacker launches various traceroute commands from a Unix host.
He leverages his scanning attempts by sequentially targeting TCP port 3389, the
Windows Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). This event is alarming since it can be
interpreted as an attempt to gain system access especially if the mentioned service
is vulnerable or if its authentication is inadequately conﬁgured. The ninth and
tenth association rules are syntactically diﬀerent, however contextually, they can be
interpreted similarly. They disclose that an exploited host is generating enormous
malformed ICMP packets towards a certain target. This is an indication of an
attempt to launch a denial of service attack against the target victims.
4.5 Related Work
Several studies explored darknet traﬃc analysis. We can classify these proposals
into two main categories. The ﬁrst category is based on designing, implementing
and managing darknet platforms, while the second focuses on the analysis of darknet
traﬃc feeds.
In the following, we describe some of the projects in the area of darknet mon-
itoring systems. In [25], the author presented Honeyd as a framework for the de-
ployment of honeypots using virtual machines. This project runs on unallocated
addresses within various operating systems. Such environments provide numerous
services which aid in detecting and mitigating worms, preventing spam distribution
and alerting about suspicious attacks. Another project is the network telescope
which was proposed in [75] to monitor cyber incidents through the dark address
space. Moreover, the Internet Motion Sensor (IMS) system, a distributed system,
described in [62], reports the network behavior originating from diﬀerent monitored
IP blocks. Furthermore, Yegneswaran et al. [52] developed Internet Sink (iSink) to
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monitor unused IP address space. The iSink approach was conceived to address
the scalability issue that is related to large address spaces. It incorporates passive
detection and monitor sensors as well as honeynet components.
In the other category, namely darknet analysis, the research in [108] elaborated
on a detailed analysis of the darknet data. Their active and passive analyses assessed
darknet samples from diﬀerent networks and over a long time period. Another
study [2] has reviewed the last mentioned work to render the state of this Internet
background radiation at that current year. The authors observed signiﬁcant changes
and pinpointed several factors that are behind these measures. Moreover, Fukuda
et al. [258] studied correlations among darknet traﬃc for estimating their behaviors
through small address blocks by analyzing a speciﬁc type of traﬃc packets (i.e.,
TCP SYN). There are other research proposals that investigated threats triggered
through darknet such as in [164] where the authors were able to study the Slammer
worm. Moreover, denial of service (DoS) attacks were as well addressed in [30] by
analyzing the replies of DoS attacks from spoofed sources in darknet feeds. Other
studies such as [259] elaborated on scanning events, misconﬁguration and other
suspicious activities.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, we investigated darknet by performing darknet characterization and
threat proﬁling. We interpreted the output of this step by providing insights as in-
dicators for cyber threat activity. Particularly, the results can be summarized in the
following: Scanning traﬃc constitutes the majority of darknet traﬃc; TCP leads
the darknet protocol distribution; SIP contributes as the major darknet applica-
tion layer protocol; IP Class ‘C’ is the most destined class of darknet traﬃc; TCP
port 445, pertaining to Microsoft active directory service, is the most targeted port.
We presented and discussed darknet-triggered threats. Distinctively, we highlighted
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various threats as well as their severities and elaborated on their nature and conse-
quences. This analysis step revealed three high severity threats, namely, denial of
service attempts, buﬀer overﬂow exploits and unsolicited VPN access. Furthermore,
we explored the inter-correlation of such threats, by applying association rule mining
techniques, to build threat association rules. Such work demonstrated that, in fact,
certain darknet threats are correlated when targeting speciﬁc network destinations.
Moreover, it provided insights about threat patterns and allowed the interpretation
of threat scenarios. Among the identiﬁed threat clusters was one leading to a high
priority buﬀer overﬂow exploit. For future work, we intend to provide more cyber
threat insights and build a classiﬁcation model from the threat association rules to
experiment its predictability features with near real time darknet traﬃc.
In the next chapter, we will be focusing on the prediction of DDoS events as
well as DDoS cyber campaigns.
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Chapter 5
Prediction Model for DDoS
Activities
After providing some analytics on darknet data and threats, in this chapter, we
generate intelligence in regards to DDoS activities. In fact, we propose a DDoS fore-
casting model to provide signiﬁcant insights to organizations, security operators and
emergency response teams during and after a targeted DDoS attack. Speciﬁcally,
the work strives to predict, within minutes, the attacks’ impact features, namely,
intensity/rate (packets/sec) and size (estimated number of used compromised ma-
chines/bots). The goal is to understand the future short term trend of the ongoing
DDoS attack in terms of those features and thus provide the capability to recognize
the current as well as future similar situations and hence appropriately respond to
the threat. Our analysis employs real darknet data to explore the feasibility of apply-
ing the forecasting model on targeted DDoS attacks and subsequently evaluate the
accuracy of the predictions. To achieve these tasks, our proposed approach leverages
a number of time series ﬂuctuation analysis and forecasting methods. The extracted
inferences from various DDoS case studies exhibit promising accuracy with very low
error rate. Further, our model could lead to a better understanding of the scale and
speed of DDoS attacks and should generate inferences that could be adopted for
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immediate response and hence mitigation as well as accumulated for the purpose of
long-term large-scale DDoS analysis.
When an organization is subject to a DDoS attack, it becomes essential for its
IT security staﬀ to answer the following questions:
• What are the characteristics of a DDoS attack?
• During a DDoS attack, what is the future short term trend (i.e., within min-
utes) of the attack in terms of intensity/rate and size?
• After a DDoS attack, in terms of those impact features, what was the impact
of the attack and what are the lessons learned?
• Is it an isolated DDoS attempt or a campaign of attacks against multiple
victims?
The answers to these questions greatly inﬂuence the actions and the resources
that the organization will choose to employ in responding to such malicious activity
for the current incident as well as for future occurrences. For instance, the orga-
nization would often care more about high impact DDoS attacks, those that can
cause serious disruption of a service in a relatively timely manner. If the latter is
observed, the organization can immediately respond and tweak its mitigation meth-
ods to gauge the threat (i.e., forward the attack ﬂow to a speciﬁc number of servers
and/or dynamically assign speciﬁc ﬁrewall rules to handle the ﬂood). This can re-
duce the response time and cost for an organization. Note that, low-rate DDoS
attacks could be as worrisome as high impact ones, which might indicate that the
DDoS attack is attempting to evade detection and at the same time exhaust the vic-
tim with long-lived ﬂows [260]. Moreover, having knowledge about the short term
(i.e., in terms of minutes) predicted impact features of the ongoing DDoS would
provide various inferences to the organization and aid in answering the following
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questions: Will the DDoS increase or decrease in its intensity? Will the attack rate
ﬂuctuates? Will the botnet targeting that speciﬁc organization increase? Will the
DDoS cease after few minutes or will it persist for a longer period of time? Further,
the insights extracted from such an analysis on numerous DDoS occurrences target-
ing that organization could generate attack patterns that could be useful for future
mitigation. For example, if the organization observes 5 distinct DDoS attacks in
diﬀerent time periods where they all possess similar rates, size and prediction pa-
rameters, then it can be inferred that the attacks originate from a single (or at least
similar) botnet and hence point to a suspicious DDoS campaign. At a larger scale,
such analysis aims at providing computer emergency response teams and observers
of cyber events with DDoS trends, taking into consideration the botnet size and
the bots geographic distribution, the victims geographic location, types of DDoS
and bots that could be inferred from rate and intensity distributions, as well as
future short term DDoS trends targeting various global-scale organizational sites.
The latter outcome could be used for immediate response and alerting for mitigation
purposes as well as for long term large-scale DDoS analysis.
In this context, this chapter’s contributions are as follows:
• Proposing and adopting a systematic approach for inferring DDoS activities,
testing for predictability of DDoS traﬃc and applying prediction models.
• Leveraging various time series analysis and forecasting methods, including,
detrended ﬂuctuation analysis, moving average, weighted moving average, ex-
ponential smoothing and linear regression.
• Characterizing and predicting DDoS attacks’ impact features, namely, inten-
sity/rate and size.
• Proposing a clustering approach to infer similarities among attack traces for
DDoS campaign detection.
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• Evaluating the proposed approach using real DDoS traﬃc.
5.1 Attack Prediction
This section presents and discusses various aspects of our forecasting model. The
main components of our proposed approach is depicted in Figure 5.1.
Read Time Series Data
of DDoS Attack














Test Attack Time Series Data for 
Predictabil ity
Fingerprint Botnet 
Figure 5.1: Flow Chart of the Proposed Approach
In short, the approach is rendered by extracting backscattered data and ses-
sion ﬂows from darknet traﬃc. Subsequently, DDoS activities are inferred and
consequently tested for predictability. Finally, prediction techniques are applied on
DDoS traﬃc, when applicable. The proposed approach is detailed next.
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5.1.1 Extracting Backscattered Packets
In order to extract backscattered packets, we adopt the technique from [2] that
relies on ﬂags in packet headers, such as TCP SYN+ACK, RST, RST+ACK, and
ACK. However, this technique might cause misconﬁguration as well as scanning
probes (i.e., SYN/ACK Scan) to co-occur within the backscattered packets. In
order to ﬁlter out the misconﬁguration, we use a simple metric that records the
average number of sources per destination darknet address. This metric should be
signiﬁcantly larger for misconﬁguration than scanning traﬃc [261]. The scanning
packets are ﬁltered out in the next step.
5.1.2 Extracting Session Flows
In order to ﬁlter out the scanning activities, we split the connections into separate
session ﬂows, each of which consists of a unique source and destination IP/port
pair. The rationale for this is that DDoS attempts possess a much greater number
of packets sent to one destination (i.e., ﬂood) whereas portsweeps scanners have one
or few attempts towards one destination (i.e., probe).
5.1.3 Inferring DDoS Activities
We next aim to conﬁrm that all the extracted sessions in fact reﬂect real DDoS
attempts. To accomplish this, we employ a modiﬁed version of the DDoS detection
parameters from [262] to label a session as a single DoS attack. Algorithm 1 lists
our detection mechanism.
We decided to leverage the latter work since it is directly applicable to our
work, which is based on a ﬂow-based approach and leverages backscattered traﬃc
to infer DoS attacks from darknet traﬃc. We proceed by merging all the previously
extracted sessions that have the same source IP (i.e., victim) to extract the DDoS
attack.
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Algorithm 1 DDoS Detection Engine
1: In the algorithm:
2: Each ﬂow f contains packet count (pkt cnt) and rate (rate)
Tw : Time Window
p th: Packet Threshold
r th: Rate Threshold
Tn: Time of packet number n in a ﬂow
pkt : Packet
3: Input: A set of darknet ﬂows F where each f in F is composed of a pair of
<source IP, destination IP> leveraging a series of consecutive packets that share
the same source IP address.
4: Output: DDoS attack ﬂows
5:
6: for each f in F do
7: attack ﬂag = 0
8: pkt cnt = 0
9: T1 = pkt gettime(1)
10: Tf = T1 + Tw
11: while pkt in f do
12: Tn= pkt gettime()




17: rate = pkt cnt
Tw
18: if pkt cnt > p th & rate > r th then




5.1.4 Testing for Predictability
A time series is a sequence of data values that are measured at successive points in
time and spaced at uniform time intervals [263]. In order to predict DoS features,
we aim to test if the time series of DDoS ﬂows are ﬁrst correlated. Otherwise, our
prediction model would be irrelevant. In order to accomplish this, we statistically
test for predictability in such time series using the Detrended Fluctuation Analysis
(DFA) technique. DFA was ﬁrst proposed in [264] and has since been used in many
research areas to study signals correlation. The DFA technique is summarized next.
The DFA method of characterizing a non-stationary time series is based on the
root mean square analysis of a random walk. DFA is advantageous in comparison
with other methods such as spectral analysis [265] and Hurst analysis [266] since
it permits the detection of long range correlations embedded in a seemingly non-
stationary time series. It avoids as well the spurious detection of apparent long-range
correlations that are an artifact of non-stationarity. Another advantage of DFA is
that it produces results that are independent of the eﬀect of the trend [267]. Last
but not least, this technique is applicable to darknet traﬃc [111].
Given a traﬃc time series, the following steps need to be applied to implement
DFA:





where B(i) is the ith interval and Bave is the average interval.
• Divide the time series into “boxes” (i.e., bin size) of length n.
• In each box, perform a least-squares polynomial ﬁt of order p. The y coordinate
of the straight line segments is denoted by yn(k).
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• In each box, detrend the integrated time series, y(k), by subtracting the local
trend, yn(k). The root-mean-square ﬂuctuation of this integrated and de-







• Repeat this procedure for diﬀerent box sizes (i.e., time scales) n
The output of the DFA procedure is a relationship F (n), the average ﬂuctuation as a
function of box size, and the box size n. Typically, F (n) will increase with box size n.
A linear relationship on a log-log graph indicates the presence of scaling; statistical
self-aﬃnity expressed as F (n) ∼ nα. Under such conditions, the ﬂuctuations can
be characterized by a scaling exponent α, which is the slope of the line relating
logF (n) to log(n). The scaling exponent α can take the following values, disclosing
the “correlation status” of the traﬃc time series:
• α < 0.5: anti-correlated
• α ≈ 0.5: uncorrelated or white noise
• α > 0.5: correlated
• α ≈ 1: 1/f -noise or pink noise
• α > 1: non-stationary, random walk like, unbounded
• α ≈ 1.5: Brownian noise
In our work, if the application of DFA on the DDoS traﬃc time series outputs a
“correlated” status, then we assert that it is predictable; else, we extract another
DDoS ﬂow and re-test it for predictability.
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5.1.5 Predicting DDoS Attacks
Finally, to perform the predictions, we apply diﬀerent types of forecasting tech-
niques, namely, moving average, weighted moving average, exponential smoothing
and linear regression. We have selected to leverage these techniques instead of other
complex well-known models such as ARIMA and GARCH [268] since the latter re-
quire long-term (weekly, monthly, yearly, etc.) seasonal time series data, which is
not true in our case that deals with short-term DDoS traﬃc. The selected methods
are briefed next.
Moving Average (MA)
The single parameter of the model is estimated as the average of the previous x data




∗ (xt + xt−1 + ...+ xt−k−1) (5.3)
where k is the smoothing window or period. Note that the forecast in this
technique should not begin until the speciﬁed previous data are available.
Weighted Moving Average (WMA)
This technique is based on a numeric value known as the weight. In general, a
WMA is more responsive to change in the time series data than a simple MA. The
computation of the WMA estimated temporal average is given by [269]:
x̂t+1 =
wt−kxt−k + ...+ wtxt
h
(5.4)
where k is the chosen window size and h is the sum of the temporal weight,
h = wt−k + ...+ wt. In general, to obtain better results, the highest weight is given
to the most recent periods.
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Exponential Smoothing (ES)
This technique calculates the parameter of the estimated prediction value b as the
weighted average of the last observation and the last estimate. The estimated value
is given by:
x̂t+1 = αxt + (1− α)x̂t (5.5)
where α is the smoothing factor and has a value between [0,1].
Linear Regression (LR)
This technique performs statistical analysis that assesses the association between two
variables. This method is used to pinpoint the relationship among these variables.
A simple LR is given by:
LR(y) = a+ bx (5.6)
where x and y are the variables, b is the slope of the regression line, a is the
intercept point of the regression line and the y-axis.














where N is the number of values or elements, X is the ﬁrst score and Y is
the second score. The slope describes the incline or grade of the line whereas the
intercept is the point where the graph of a function intersects with the y-axis of the
coordinate scheme.
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Finally, to evaluate the performance of the prediction methods, we compute






This error metric is deﬁned as the absolute diﬀerence of the predicted value
from the actual value divided by the actual value. The latter is a de-facto metric
when computing the performance of a prediction model [270, 271].
Note that in our prediction, for the MA and the WMA algorithms, we run
a solver [272] to automatically obtain the weight values that produces a relatively
better prediction results. Furthermore, we adopt a time window that is equivalent
to three data points in the time series. We believe this provides a good estimate for
such models as also demonstrated in [273]. Future work would extend such analysis
by experimenting with diﬀerent time window sizes. Furthermore, as far as the ES
algorithm is concerned, we again run a solver [272] to automatically choose the
best value of α that optimizes the prediction error rate. We refer interested readers
to [270,274] for more details on the above mentioned prediction techniques.
5.1.6 Empirical Evaluation
We abide and closely follow the steps of our proposed approach that were discussed in
Section 5.1 to present three real case studies targeting three diﬀerent servers. The
case studies respectively consist of TCP SYN ﬂooding targeting an HTTP (web)
server, TCP SYN ﬂooding targeting a Domain Name System (DNS) and an ICMP
(ping) ﬂooding. The three case studies are summarized in Table 5.1.
The table shows the analyzed duration of the attack (in seconds), the attack’s
intensity in terms of number of generated packets, its average rate (packets/sec), its















TCP SYN Flooding (HTTP) 3194 1799228 563.31 0.91 24
TCP SYN Flooding (DNS) 3550 29016 8.17 0.93 206
ICMP Flooding 3599 3577 1.00 0.67 1
Table 5.1: Summary of the Analyzed DDoS Case Studies
regards to our dataset, we leverage the same source of darknet data from our trusted
third party. In terms of DFA computation, we utilize the DFA MATLAB code
found in [275] and used 1ms as the bin size. Further, when applying the forecasting
techniques, for the purpose of error calculation, we use two thirds (66.66%) of the
DDoS traﬃc time series for training and one third (33.33%) for testing. It is also
noteworthy to mention that when performing the prediction analysis, we chose a
time series with bin size equal to one minute. We argue that such a choice is
rational and should provide enough resources (i.e., time) to the organization under
attack to act upon the observed values. The case studies are elaborated next.
TCP SYN Flooding on an HTTP Server
This case study refers to a DDoS TCP SYN ﬂooding targeting an HTTP web server.
From Table 5.1, we notice that this attack lasted 53 minutes, generated around 1.8
million TCP SYN packets, with an average of 560 packets per second from 24 unique
spoofed IPs (i.e., bots). The value of the rate of the attack demonstrates the severity
of this DDoS attack. Moreover, Figures 5.2 and 5.3 demonstrates the application of
the forecasting techniques.
Note that, we attempt to predict this DDoS since its corresponding DFA result
was shown to be “correlated” with a value equals to 0.91 as stated in Section 5.1.4).
Figure 5.2 illustrates the attack’s intensity distribution with its corresponding fore-
































































Figure 5.3: TCP SYN Flooding on an HTTP Server - Size Prediction
packets at the 46th minute. The predicted values (within the future 3 minutes) of
such distribution reveal that the attack will decrease in intensity and ﬂuctuates be-
tween 9000 and 3500 packets. On the other hand, Figure 5.3 illustrates the attack’s
size in terms of number of used spoofed IPs. It is shown that the number of spoofed
IPs peak to 16 in the 48th minute. Similar to the intensity, it is shown from the pre-
diction techniques that the size will as well decrease, hinting that the DDoS might
soon diminish in size. The absolute prediction error of the forecasting techniques
for this DDoS case study is summarized in Table 5.2.
We can notice that several techniques for both impact features recorded low
error rates. Further, the exponential smoothing algorithm was best in predicting
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Prediction Techniques
MA WMA ES LR
Intensity 0.57 0.39 0.19 0.86
Size 0.70 0.53 1.34 0.22
Table 5.2: HTTP-based TCP SYN Flooding - Absolute Prediction Error (%)
the intensity while the linear regression was best in predicting the size of the attack.
This case study allows the organization whose web server is under a targeted DDoS
to gain insight in terms of the current and future short term trend of the ongoing
attack in terms of the deﬁned attack impact features. Moreover, assuming that the
organization modiﬁed its mitigation methods before predicting the future impact
distributions, we reveal that such modiﬁcations are eﬀective.
TCP SYN Flooding on a DNS Server
This case study refers to a DDoS TCP SYN ﬂooding targeting a DNS server. From
Table 5.1, we notice that this attack lasted 59 minutes, generated around 29 thou-
sand TCP SYN packets, with an average of 8 packets per second from 206 unique
spoofed IPs (i.e., bots). Although the size of this DDoS attack is larger than the
ﬁrst case study, however, its intensity in terms of the generated packets and hence
rate is signiﬁcantly lower.
Figures 5.4 and 5.5 depict the characterization in addition to demonstrating
the application of the forecasting techniques. We also predicted this DDoS attack
since its corresponding DFA result was shown to be “correlated” with a value equals
to 0.93. Figure 5.4 illustrates the attack’s intensity and prediction distributions. It is
shown that the attack peaks around 1600 packets at the 19th minute. The predicted
values of such distribution shows insights of increase in the attacks intensity. On
the other hand, Figure 5.5 reveals the attack’s size in terms of number of used



























































Figure 5.5: TCP SYN Flooding on a DNS Server - Size Prediction
12 in the 45th minute. Furthermore, it is shown from the prediction models that the
attack size will either stay constant or slightly decrease.
The absolute prediction error of the forecasting techniques for this DDoS case
study is summarized in Table 5.3.
We notice that the linear regression poorly performs with regards to this case
study. Moreover, the exponential smoothing algorithm was best in predicting both
the intensity and the size. This case study allows the organization whose DNS server
is under a DDoS attack to be alerted that the attack’s intensity might increase. This
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Prediction Techniques
MA WMA ES LR
Intensity 12.46 5.24 2.75 35.71
Size 0.51 0.37 0.16 0.72
Table 5.3: DNS-based TCP SYN Flooding - Absolute Prediction Error (%)
provides the organization the capability to comprehend the situation and hence
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Figure 5.6: ICMP (ping) Flooding - Intensity Prediction
ICMP (ping) Flooding
This case study refers to a DoS ICMP (ping) ﬂooding targeting a server. The major
diﬀerence between this attack and the former case studies is that this attack is
generated from only one machine ( i.e., not distributed) and it could be attempting
to evade detection by using a relatively low attack rate. Further, its DFA result
shows signs of strong correlation (the DFA scaling exponent α = 0.67) in its attack
signal.
This is conﬁrmed in Figure 5.6 where the intensity distribution ﬂuctuates
around 60 packets. From the prediction techniques, we can observe that the attack’s
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Prediction Techniques
MA WMA ES LR
Intensity 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.13
Table 5.4: ICMP (ping) Flooding - Absolute Prediction Error (%)
intensity will continue to be close to 60 packets or slightly increase. The summary
of the result is shown in Table 5.4. Moreover, the attack’s correlation and intensity
features allow the organization whose server is under this type of DoS attack to infer
that the attack is relatively of low impact and non-distributed and hence current
mitigation methods will be suﬃcient.
5.2 Predicting Campaigns Targeting Multi-victims
In the previous sections, we elaborated on the components of the systematic ap-
proach for inferring DDoS activities targeting a unique organization, testing for
predictability of such DDoS traﬃc and subsequently applying the prediction meth-
ods. In this section, we extend the model by proposing a clustering approach to infer
DDoS campaigns that target multiple victims. The aim is to predict DDoS cam-
paigns. Moreover, this permits the ﬁngerprinting of the nature of such campaigns.
For example, it could be identiﬁed that a speciﬁc DDoS campaign is specialized
in targeting ﬁnancial institutions while another campaign is focused on targeting
various information communication technology infrastructures. Further, such clus-
tering approach allows the elaboration on the actual scope of the DDoS campaign to
provide cyber security situational awareness; how large is the campaign and what is
its employed rates, when attacking the various victims. Additionally, the proposed
approach could be leveraged to predict the campaign’s features in terms of rate and
number of involved machines.
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5.2.1 Clustering of DDoS Campaigns
In this section, our approach employs the following statistical-based mechanism.
First, backscattered sessions are extracted as previously discussed in Section 5.1.
Second, the notion of fuzzy hashing [276] between the diﬀerent sessions is applied.
Fuzzy hashing is advantageous in comparison with typical hashing as it can provide
a percentage of similarity between two traﬃc samples rather than producing a null
value if the samples are diﬀerent. This popular technique is derived from the digital
forensics research ﬁeld and is typically applied on ﬁles or images [276, 277]. Our
approach explores the capabilities of this technique on backscattered DDoS traﬃc.
We select the sessions that demonstrate at least 20% similarity. We concur that this
threshold is a reasonable starting point and aids in reducing false negatives. Third,
from those sessions, we employ two statistical tests, namely, the Euclidean and the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests [278] to measure the distance between the latter selected
sessions. We select those sessions that minimize the statistical distance and overlap
after executing both tests. The rationale of the latter approach stems from the
need to cluster the sessions belonging to multiple victims that share similar traﬃc
behavior while minimizing the false positives by conﬁrming such similarity using
both tests. Note that, we hereafter refer to the use of the previous two techniques
as the fusion technique. The outcome of the proposed approach are clustered diverse
victims that are inferred to be the target of the same DDoS campaign.
5.2.2 Empirical Evaluation
In this section, we present the empirical evaluation results. We employ the DDoS
campaign clustering model as discussed in the previous section to demonstrate how
multiple victims could be modeled as being the target of the same campaign.
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TCP SYN Flooding on Multiple HTTP Servers
To demonstrate the eﬀectiveness of the approach, we experiment with a one day
sample retrieved from our darknet data set. We extract 680 backscattered DDoS
sessions and apply fuzzy hashing between the sessions, by leveraging deeptoad1, a
fuzzy hashing implementation. The outcome of this operation is depicted in Fig-
ure 5.7, where the victims are represented by round circles while directed arrows
illustrate how the various victims were shown to be statistically close to other tar-
geted victims. It is important to note that we anonymize the real identity of the
victims due to sensitivity and legal reasons. Subsequently, the Euclidean and the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests are executed to exactly pinpoint and cluster the victims
that demonstrate signiﬁcant traﬃc similarity. Figure 5.8 shows such result while
Table 5.5 summarizes the outcome of the proposed DDoS campaign clustering ap-
proach. From Figure 5.8, one can notice the formation of root nodes, advocating
that the approach is successful in clustering various victims that are the target of
the same DDoS campaign.
Figure 5.7: Clustered Victims Through Fuzzy Hashing
1https://code.google.com/p/deeptoad/
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Euclidean 16 6 2 3 3 1 1
KS 16 6 2 3 2 2 1
Fusion 13 6 1 2 2 1 1
Table 5.5: Summary of the DDoS Campaign Clustering Approach
In general, the approach yielded, for one day data set, 13 unique campaigns
where each campaign clusters a number of victims ranging from 2 to 125 targets.
Recall that the fusion technique resembles the execution and overlap of the Euclidean
and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistical tests.
We proceed by attempting to predict the impact features, namely, intensity
and size, of one of the previously inferred DDoS campaigns. We select the last
campaign of Table 5.5 since it targeted the most victims.
This case study refers to a campaign of DDoS TCP SYN ﬂooding targeting
various HTTP servers related to 16 victim organizations. From Table 5.6, we notice
that this campaign lasted almost one day and generated around 650 thousand TCP





















125 85322 649299 7.61 0.81 92296
Table 5.6: Summary of the Analyzed DDoS Campaign Case Study
(i.e., bots). Further, Figures 5.9 and 5.10 depict the characterization and demon-
strate the application of the forecasting techniques. We also predicted this DDoS
attack since its corresponding DFA result was shown to be “correlated” with a value
of 0.81. Figure 5.9 illustrates the attack’s intensity and prediction distributions. It
is shown that the attack peaks around 8000 packets at the 47th minute. The pre-
dicted values of such distribution shows insights of decrease in the attacks intensity.
On the other hand, Figure 5.10 reveals the attack’s size in terms of number of used
compromised machines/bots. It is shown that the number of spoofed IPs peaks to
3100 in the 10th minute. Furthermore, it is shown from the prediction models that
the attack size will stay constant for some time and then decreases. The absolute
prediction error of the forecasting techniques for this DDoS campaign case study is
summarized in Table 5.7.
Notice that the linear regression poorly performs with regards to this case
study. Moreover, the exponential smoothing algorithm was best in predicting both
the intensity and the size.
Prediction Techniques
MA WMA ES LR
Intensity 1.27 1.51 0.09 2.16
Size 1.26 1.11 0.09 2.14















































Figure 5.10: TCP SYN Flooding on Multiple HTTP Servers - Size Prediction
It should be noted that the generated inferences from the above case studies
aim to better understand the scale and rate of DDoS attacks that could be adopted
by organizations for immediate response and hence mitigation as well as accumu-
lated by security operators, emergency response teams and observers of large-scale




In this section, we provide a review of some relevant literature work in the area of
threat prediction. In [279], the authors propose a method for threat prediction based
on security events using a security monitoring system. Their approach consists of
methods to collect and pre-treat security monitoring events, extract threads and
sessions, create attack scenarios through correlation analysis, predict intrusions and
express the analytical results. The authors evaluate the eﬀectiveness of their predic-
tion model by leveraging real security monitoring events. Dagon et al. [179] adopt
a model to accurately predict botnet population growth. The authors use diurnal
shaping functions to capture regional variations in online vulnerable populations.
They state that since response times for malware outbreaks is measured in hours,
the ability to predict short-term propagation dynamics permit resource allocation
in a more eﬀective and a suitable manner. The authors use empirical data from bot-
nets collected at a sinkhole to evaluate their analytical model. Moreover, Fachkha et
al. [142] present and discuss various darknet-triggered threats and their correspond-
ing severity level. Furthermore, they explore the inter-correlation of such threats,
by applying association rule mining techniques, to build threat association rules.
Their work demonstrate that in fact certain darknet threats are correlated when
targeting speciﬁc network destinations. Moreover, it provides insights about threat
patterns and allows the building of a classiﬁcation model for prediction purposes.
In another work, Qibo et al. [280] propose an approach to detect and predict DoS
SYN ﬂooding attacks using non-parametric cumulative sum algorithm along with
an ARIMA model. Instead of managing all real-time ongoing traﬃc on the network,
the approach only monitors SYN packets to predict the attack in the near future. To
perform the prediction, the authors propose the auto-regressive integrated moving
average model. The authors also run some simulations to validate the eﬀectiveness
of the approach. In [281], the authors propose a forecasting mechanism called FORE
(FOrecasting using REgression analysis) through a real-time analysis of randomness
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in network traﬃc. According to the authors, FORE can respond against unknown
worms 1.8 times faster than other detection mechanisms. Evaluation results using
real malware traﬃc demonstrate the eﬃciency of the proposed mechanism, including
its ability to predict worm behaviors starting from 0.03% infection rate.
Most of the above discussed related work assumes that the threat traﬃc that
needs to be predicted is in fact predictable. We argue that such assumption, with-
out essential validation, might result in erroneous forecasting results, regardless of
which forecasting approach has been employed. In contrary, in our work, we ﬁrst
statistically test for predictability before attempting to forecast. Additionally, we
state that our work in terms of DDoS impact features characterization and predic-
tion is distinctive since the leveraged DDoS inference algorithm is highly accurate
and established [262] and does not depend solely on SYN packets. Moreover, our
work has wide-scope beneﬁts for security operators, security response teams as well
as speciﬁc organizations for the short term as well as for the long term large-scale
DDoS analysis. Moreover, our proposed approach is designed to eﬀectively work on
near real time data. Last but not least, for empirical evaluation purposes, we utilize
a signiﬁcant amount of real network traﬃc.
5.4 Summary
In Chapter 5, we primarily proposed an approach that is rendered by a DDoS in-
ference and forecasting model. The aim was to provide the organization under
attack the capability to comprehend the situation and hence adaptively respond
to the threat. Second, the work proposed a DDoS campaign clustering approach
that captures the similarity between backscattered sessions. The goal was to cluster
various victims that are targeted by the same DDoS campaign. We characterized
and predicted, within minutes, the attacks’ impact features, namely, intensity/rate
(packets/sec) and size (number of used compromised machines/bots). Our proposed
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approaches leveraged real darknet data to infer DDoS activities, test for predictabil-
ity of DDoS traﬃc and apply prediction techniques, when applicable. Empirical
evaluations presented several attack case studies to demonstrate possible extracted
insights and inferences. For future work, we intend to experiment with more complex
forecasting methods that can operate on probability or graph theory and long-term
bases as well as implementing our proposed approach in a real-time fashion.




Analysis of Reﬂection (DRDoS)
Attacks
In this chapter, we describe the design and implementation of a novel approach to
infer reﬂection attacks through darknet. In order to facilitate the understanding of
our approach, we primarily provide some basic concepts related to the mechanism
of reﬂection DDoS attacks, and inferred darknet queries.
DRDoS Attacks: DNS Scenario
Ampliﬁcation is a well known practice of a DDoS attack, in which malicious users
abuse open ampliﬁers to bombard a victim with reply traﬃc [282]. The ampliﬁcation
technique consists of an invader directing queries to an ampliﬁer having the source
IP spoofed to be the victim’s address. Subsequently, all server responses will be sent
to the targeted victim. Ampliﬁcation DRDoS attacks can abuse several services [32].
For instance, in a DNS scenario, malicious users will request domains that cover a
large zone to increase the ampliﬁcation factor. In this context, in order to have a
high impact on the victim, the attackers use DNS requests of type ANY to return all
possible known information to the victim, and hence increase the ampliﬁcation of
the attack. Moreover, in order to increase the size of the attack with little eﬀort,
attackers use botnets (i.e., campaigns) [283] to synchronize an army of bots and
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order them to send requests. Based on such concepts, Figure 6.1 depicts a basic
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Figure 6.1: DNS-based DRDoS Scenario
uses a botnet to generate spoofed DNS lookup requests to the Internet. In steps 3 to
7, the internal and external DNS servers collaborate in order to provide an answer
to the requester. Finally, in steps 8 and 9, the ampliﬁed replies congest the victim’s
computer and network resources with a large ﬂood of traﬃc.
Queries Found on Darknet
On darknet, we can observe a signiﬁcant number of queries that could be sent by
the following sources:
• Attacker Spooﬁng the Victim’s IP: In this case, the attacker sends spoofed
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queries on the Internet address space using the victim’s IP address. All replies
from the open resolvers will bounce back towards the victim.
• Compromised Victim: In this case, the attacker uses the victim’s machine to
send queries. The attacker might use several techniques to control the victim’s
machine, including malware infection and/or vulnerability exploitation. This
scenario does not involve spoofed queries.
• Scanner: In this scenario, the attacker scans the Internet to infer the locations
of open ampliﬁers. This task requires collecting information from the reply
packets and hence, a non-spoofed address is used by the scanners.
• Others: Other hosts may include ﬁrewalls to reduce the impact of the attack
or misconﬁgured devices, etc.
In our work, we assert that high speed queries [282] will be sent from an attacker
spooﬁng the victim’s IP and/or compromised victim but not from a scanner. In
other words, scanners might send queries to the Internet but with a low-speed rate
to avoid receiving the ampliﬁed ﬂood of replies. It is noteworthy to mention that our
investigation in the next section includes DNS ampliﬁcation analysis only. However,
our approach identiﬁes various attack types.
6.1 Inferring Internet Reﬂection Activities
After providing a background information on some reﬂection attacks found on dark-
net, we elaborate in this section on our novel approach to infer and characterize
Internet-scale DNS DRDoS attacks by leveraging the darknet space. Complemen-
tary to the pioneer work on inferring DDoS activities using darknet [262], this work
shows that we can extract DDoS activities without relying on backscattered anal-
ysis. The aim of this work is to extract cyber security intelligence related to DR-
DoS activities such as intensity, rate and geographic location in addition to various
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network-layer and ﬂow-based insights. To achieve this task, the proposed approach
exploits certain DDoS parameters to detect the attacks, and the expectation maxi-
mization and k-means clustering techniques to identify campaigns of DRDoS attacks.
We empirically evaluate the proposed approach using 1.44 TB of real darknet data
collected from a /13 address space during a recent period of several months. Our
analysis reveals that the approach was successful in inferring signiﬁcant DNS am-
pliﬁcation DRDoS activities, including the recent prominent attack that targeted
one of the largest anti-spam organizations [211]. Moreover, the analysis disclosed
the mechanism of such DNS ampliﬁcation attacks. Further, the results uncover
high-speed and stealthy attempts that were never previously documented. The ex-
tracted insights from various validated DNS DRDoS case studies lead to a better
understanding of the nature and scale of this threat and can generate inferences that
could contribute in detecting, preventing, assessing, mitigating and even attributing
DRDoS activities.
In this context, we tackle the following questions:
1. How to infer large-scale DNS-based DRDoS activities?
2. What are the characteristics of DNS ampliﬁcation DRDoS attacks?
3. What inferences can we extract from analyzing DNS DRDoS traces?
Answering those questions would aid computer security response teams, law
enforcement agencies and governments to build a darknet-based central infrastruc-
ture to scrutinize DNS-based ampliﬁcation traﬃc in order to contribute in under-
standing, detecting, preventing, assessing, mitigating and even attributing DRDoS
attacks.
In this work, we frame our contributions as follows:
• Proposing a systematic ﬂow-based approach for inferring DNS ampliﬁcation
DDoS activities by leveraging DNS queries to darknet.
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• Characterizing the inferred DDoS threats during several months period.
• Applying clustering and similarity algorithms in an attempt to identify cam-
paigns of DNS reﬂection DDoS attacks.
Next, we elaborate on our proposed approach.
6.1.1 Proposed Approach
This section presents our proposed approach that aims at generating darknet ﬂows
and inferring DNS-based DRDoS activities by leveraging darknet data. The ap-
proach exploits the idea of analyzing DNS queries that target the darknet that were
originally intended by the attacker to reach Internet open DNS resolvers [31, 32].
The approach takes as input darknet traﬃc and outputs inferred DNS ampliﬁcation
DRDoS insights. It is based on several components, namely, the ﬂows generation,
the detection, the rate classiﬁcation and the clustering components. We discuss
these components in what follows.
Flow Generation
The ﬂow generation component takes as input darknet traﬃc to produce ﬂows of
traﬃc on a daily basis. A ﬂow is deﬁned as a series of consecutive packets sharing the
same source IP address targeting darknet addresses. In order to generate such ﬂow,
we primarily collect network traces that consist of a unique source and destination
IP pair, and then merge all ﬂows that belong to the same source IP.
Detection Component
The detection component takes as input darknet traﬃc and outputs DNS-based
DRDoS ﬂows. To achieve the detection task, we base our detection component on
analyzing DNS queries targeting darknet addresses. These DNS queries are attempts
towards port 53. In order to detect DNS ampliﬁcation DDoS, we built our approach
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in accordance with the parameters of Table 6.1. We describe below each of those
parameters.
Parameter Value
Packet Count > 21 (experimental)
> 29 (practical)
Targeted IPs > 29
DNS Query Type ANY
Requested Domain Found in Root DNS DB
Table 6.1: DNS DRDoS Attacks Identiﬁcation Parameters
• Packet Count: The packet count parameter deﬁnes the minimum number of
packets sent per one source to our /13 darknet space. This parameter is useful
to extract DDoS attacks with high impact in addition to providing an estimate
of its scale. For instance, a ﬂow that possesses thousands of packets sent to
darknet is larger and more eﬀective than a ﬂow with 50 packets. In order to
estimate a suitable packet count parameter for the attack ﬂows, we execute
an experiment, as shown in Figure 6.2. The experiment is based on inferred
darknet DDoS attacks and the investigation of their corresponding number of
packets. For such attack ﬂows, we ﬁx the number of packets as perceived by
the telescope and compute the number of attack ﬂows that have at least such
a number of packets. It is evident that below 21 packets, the attack ﬂows will
dramatically increase, while above that number, such ﬂows will not decrease
sharply. Thus, in this work, we decided to choose 21 packets as the packet
count parameter for a DDoS attack ﬂow. We assert that this threshold is a
conservative number between false positives and false negatives. It is very
signiﬁcant to note that in [262], the authors also perform such experiment to
extract DDoS attack ﬂows; they found that 25 packets are suitable in their
case, which was in 2006. We postulate that the slight decrease in packet
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threshold that we found is due to the recent rise of stealthy attacks that
employ a lower number of packets per unit of time to achieve their attack




















Figure 6.2: Packet Count Parameter Estimation
• Targeted IPs: Inspecting the number of targeted IPs veriﬁes that the packets
sent are not targeting only one IP address but distinct ones. Moreover, this
permits the ﬁltering of misconﬁguration traﬃc (i.e., a host sending packets
to only 1 unused IP address) and identiﬁes the scanning mechanism for open
DNS resolvers. To approximate a threshold for the number of targeted IPs,
we semi-automatically (i.e., using a script and manual analysis and observa-
tion) investigated 1000 random DDoS attacks that were inferred by analyzing
darknet using the open source network intrusion detection system Snort. The
average of all those attacks were shown to target at least 29 diﬀerent IPs.
Thus, in this work, we assert that the inferred DDoS attempts involve at least
29 distinct open DNS resolvers. This is based on the realistic assumption that
an attempt of contacting at least 29 unused IP addresses out of half a million
darknet IP addresses in order to amplify an attack has a similar intention to
contacting at least 29 distinct open resolvers on the Internet space. Please note
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that imposed by the latter, and in practice, one should adopt the minimum
packet count to be at least 29 packets.
• DNS Query Type: One of the major strengths of DNS DDoS attacks is
rendered by their ampliﬁcation factor. In the majority of DNS ampliﬁcation
DDoS attacks, DNS query type ANY is used [282]. This type of DNS query
returns all known information about a DNS zone in a single request to the
victim. This technique is an attempt to amplify the attack. In this work, we
impose that all DNS ampliﬁcation DDoS traces have ANY as the DNS query
type.
• Requested Domain: DNS ampliﬁcation attempts are known to request
root and Top Level Domain (TLD) name server operators [284]. We built
a database containing a list of all known root and TLD domains. In gen-
eral, these domains contain several DNS records. Therefore, DNS ANY queries
targeting these servers trigger a large (ampliﬁed) reply. In this work, we cor-
roborate that all DNS ampliﬁcation DDoS activities request domains from the
assembled database.
Note that we could have also added other parameters such as attack-duration
and packet-rate to our detection component. However, we avoid using time-based
constraints; we have detected some ﬂash attempts [166] that targeted thousands of
distinct unused IPs within seconds and other stealthy scanning activities [285] that
persisted for several weeks.
In a nutshell, our detection component labels a ﬂow of traﬃc as a DNS ampli-
ﬁcation DDoS attack if it has sent at least 21 DNS queries of type ANY to at least 29
distinct unused dark IP addresses. Further, the ﬂow must have requested domains
that exist in root and TLD database.
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Rate Classiﬁcation Component
The rate of the attack is one of the major characteristics of DDoS activities [262].
After inferring DNS ampliﬁcation ﬂows, we noticed the existence of a large deviation
among DNS ampliﬁcation DDoS attack rates. For example, some ﬂow rates reached
more than 50 thousand packets per second (pps) whereas others were below 1 pps.
Therefore, in order to better understand this large deviation and to group attacks
per attack rates, we executed a rate classiﬁcation exercise based on the values found
in Table 6.2. Please note that in order to compute the rate as well as the other
parameters in Table 6.1, we employ a time-out metric, which is the case when a
source in a particular ﬂow ceases to send packets towards the network telescope.
Attack Rate Category Value (pps)
Low rate ≤ 0.5
Medium 0.5 < rate < 4700
High rate ≥ 4700
Table 6.2: Classiﬁcation per Attack Rate
Going back to the rate classiﬁcation procedure, the three attack rate categories
are explained as follows:
• Low Attack Rate: To diﬀerentiate between low and medium attacks, we have
executed an experiment with a number of conﬁrmed attack ﬂows as depicted in
Figure 6.3. We also follow a conservative approach by choosing 0.5 pps as the
threshold. Please note that the latter is only used to cluster the attacks per
rate and thus is not employed in the detection component that was discussed
in the previous section.
• High Attack Rate: This category contains high rate attempts that are com-

















Figure 6.3: Rate Threshold
pps, which is the average rate of the Slammer worm propagation [166], to dif-
ferentiate between medium and high rate attacks. In this exercise, we assume
that the average rate of the fastest worm propagation in 2003 will have, at
least, similar rates as ﬂash attacks in 2014. Please note that in general, on
one hand, worm propagation performs scans for vulnerabilities on hosts in an
attempt to exploit or infect the victims. On the other hand, in relation to
DNS ampliﬁcation DDoS attempts, the attackers generate, in only one step,
similar attempts to infer open DNS resolvers and execute the ampliﬁcation
attack. Recall, that the latter technique does not aim at searching for a vul-
nerability to exploit, but instead sends benign DNS ANY queries to abuse open
DNS resolvers in order to amplify the replies on the victims.
• Medium Attack Rate: Intuitively, this class captures those attacks that are
in between the low and high rate categories.
Clustering Component
We resort to data mining clustering approaches in an attempt to uncover and cluster
similar DNS ampliﬁcation DDoS traces that might be executed by similar authors,
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code, botnet or campaign. This exercise can aid in detecting patterns, trends and
links among attack traces. To achieve this task, we have selected and extracted a




ip.len Total IP Length
ip.ttl Time to live
udp.len UDP Length
dns.count.add.rr DNS Additional RRs
dns.qry.name DNS Query Name
ﬂow.avg.pkt.size Average Packet Size
ﬂow.attack.duration Attack Duration
high.asn.numb Autonomous System #
Table 6.3: Chosen Clustering Attributes
Indeed, we have initially analyzed hundreds of attributes from diﬀerent net-
work layers (i.e., IP/UDP/DNS) in addition to numerous ﬂow-based features (i.e.,
attack duration, average packet size, etc.). However, we have leveraged a ranker [286]
to evaluate the information gain of all the attributes and have chosen the top 10
as shown in Table 6.3. This allowed us to ﬁlter out those attributes that were not
applicable or have no or low information gain.
In order to perform the clustering, we have leveraged two algorithms, namely,
the Expectation Maximization (EM) [287] and the k-means [288].
The EM algorithm: This popular iterative reﬁnement algorithm is a stan-
dard procedure for maximum likelihood estimation. This procedure has two stages;
the ﬁrst, which is the expectation step, is used to mine the association between
current estimates of the parameters and the latent variables by calculating subse-
quent probabilities. The second step, which is the maximization step, is employed
to update the parameters based on an expected complete data log-likelihood [289].
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The k-means algorithm: One of the most well-known and commonly used
clustering technique is the k-means. First, the algorithm randomly selects k of the
objects (i.e., values of extracted attributes), each of which initially represents a
cluster mean or center. As for the remaining objects, based on the cluster mean,
they are allocated to the closest cluster. Consequently, the algorithm calculates the
new mean for every cluster. This process continues through other iterations until
the criterion function converges.
We have chosen the above mentioned algorithms for several reasons. In addi-
tion to being well-known in tackling the data clustering problem, the k-means algo-
rithm has been successfully used to detect anomalies [290] and DDoS [291]. On the
other side, the Expectation Maximization, which extends the k-means paradigm us-
ing a probabilistic approach, has also been leveraged in clustering attacks [292,293]
and has been shown to yield promising results. For more information regarding
the inner workings of the aforementioned clustering algorithms, we kindly refer the
reader to [256].
6.1.2 Empirical Evaluation
The evaluation is based on a real darknet dataset during a 6-month period between
January and June, 2013. Our proposed ampliﬁcation inference approach is capable
of processing and inferring attacks in around 90 seconds per 20 GB of darknet
traﬃc. The latter advocates that the proposed approach is practically viable in
operational environments. In regards to our data mining exercises, our analysis is
based on Weka [257], which is a data mining tool implemented in Java. We abide
and closely follow the steps of our proposed approach that was discussed in Section
6.1.1 to elaborate on our analysis, which is based on three main elements, namely,
the characterization, the insights generation and a case study. In total, our approach
identiﬁed 134 DNS ampliﬁcation DDoS attacks, including high-speed, medium and
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Figure 6.5: DNS Queries Distribution - March 2013 Data
DNS Ampliﬁcation DDoS Characterization
In this section, we present the overall DNS ampliﬁcation DDoS statistics related to
our analyzed dataset. The semiannual DNS queries distribution is shown in Figure
6.4. The outcome clearly demonstrates the eﬀectiveness of the proposed detection
approach by ﬁngerprinting large-scale reﬂection DDoS attacks including the famous
reported event, which occurred in March 2013 [211]. On the other hand, in order
to have a closer look at the latter attack, we depict Figure 6.5 that illustrates the
distribution of the queries for the month of March. Please note that the other peaks
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which resemble various unreported reﬂection attacks, as shown in Figure 6.4, will be
analyzed and elaborated in future work. The average DNS queries arrival time per
hour is approximately 58050 packets. Obviously, several large-scale DNS reﬂection
DDoS attacks caused some peaks at some periods such as at hours 340, 400 and
517, in which the distribution of packets was raised to 503995, 686774 and 798192
packets, respectively. More explanation on these peaks are discussed in Section 6.1.2.
Query Type Distribution: In order to understand the types of DNS queries
received on the monitored dark space, we list in Table 6.4 the DNS query type
distribution of the analyzed dataset. As expected, the vast majority of these requests
are ANY queries. Note that the top 4 records are the same for the entire 6 months
period. Further, in contrast with the results obtained in 2007 by [113] that found
that ANY records scored only 0.0199% of the entire perceived records, we record
59.64% as observed on the darknet space. As a result, we can arguably assume that
the recent trend of DNS ampliﬁcation attacks are behind the increase of ANY records















































































Table 6.4: Top 5 DNS Query Type - 2013 Semiannual Darknet Data
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Top Countries: Figure 6.6 and Figure 6.7 respectively show the top 5 source
countries of DNS ampliﬁcation DDoS attacks and their corresponding generated
traﬃc. In what follows, we focus our analysis during the three months of February,





































Figure 6.7: Top 5 Source Countries (Generated Traﬃc)
Note that Netherlands was ranked ﬁrst in terms of both traﬃc sent and at-
tack counts. Our results cross validate with the investigation in [294] and the news
in [295]. Since Netherlands was mainly involved in the attack, it is normal to see
victims and even scanners located in Netherlands. The United States was also found
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in our result as one of the top most involved countries. For Canada, notice the low
number of attacks but the large amount of generated traﬃc. The reason behind
this diﬀerence is that, although few of the Canadian IPs were involved, yet they
generated a huge amount of traﬃc. This corroborates the fact that DNS reﬂection
attacks are very powerful since they allow attackers to create an immense amount of
traﬃc (i.e., the ampliﬁcation factor) with very little eﬀort (i.e., very small number
of leveraged bots). After manual inspection, some of these Canadian IPs were found























Figure 6.8: Top Requested Domains
Requested Domains: Last but not least, we illustrate the top requested DNS
domains as shown in Figure 6.8. We anonymize TLDs for sensitivity issues. Figure
6.8 shows that Root is the most requested domain name as perceived by the moni-
tored darknet. Recall that attackers will typically submit a request for as much zone
information as possible to maximize the ampliﬁcation eﬀect. Hence, the use of Root
as the requested domain name. Note that, from our data, the second top requested
domain (labeled as A) is a TLD that belongs to a large Internet-scale DNS operator.
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Clustering Insights
This section highlights our clustering results. Recall that the aim is to cluster similar
DNS ampliﬁcation DDoS traces that might be executed by similar authors, code,
botnet or campaign.
Since we had no prior knowledge on the number of clusters, we ﬁrst run the EM
algorithm to only infer the number of clusters by cross validation [296]. We executed
the algorithm in several cluster modes, using a training set and several percentage
split tasks. We compared all the results and chose the model with the highest
log likelihood for the best ﬁt. After retrieving the number of clusters, we run the
k-means with that number of clusters for further analysis. Again, we run several
experiments (40%, 50%, 60%, 70% and 80% split) using the k-means algorithms
and chose the model with 60% training data and 40% for testing as it achieved the
minimum cluster sum of squared errors.
Cluster k-means Instances
0 31 ( 57%)
1 4 ( 7%)
2 12 (22%)
3 5 ( 9%)
4 2 ( 4%)
Table 6.5: k-means Clustered Instances
Based on our testing data, Table 6.5 lists our summarized instances per clusters
while Figure 6.9 visualizes the ﬁnal k-means output. Next, we disclose the attributes
that formed the clusters. Table 6.6 shows the cluster centroids of the k-means
algorithm. This table is based on the training set of the data.
It is shown that our model clustered the traces based on 4 diﬀerent ASNs
with some speciﬁc attributes. For instance, in regards to cluster 0, all the DDoS
attacks have source IPs within ASN-V and have the DF ﬂag not set in the IP header.
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high.asn.numb ASN-V ASN-W ASN-X ASN-Y ASN-Y
ip.ﬂag 0x02 0x00 0x02 0x00 0x02
ip.ﬂags.df 0 1 0 1 0
ip.len 56 45 64 64 64
ip.ttl <60 <60 <60 >100 <60
udp.length 36 34 44 44 44
dns.qry.name Root B A A A
ﬂow.avg.pkt.size 70 68 78 78 78
ﬂow.attack.duration <1day <1day <1day <1day btw-day-1week
Table 6.6: k-means Training Cluster Centroids
Moreover, the same ﬂow must have an IP length of 56 bytes and a TTL value less
than 60. In addition, the UDP length must be 36 bytes while the requested domain
is Root. Additionally, all the attacks that belong to cluster 0 should be launched
within a one-day period and possess an entire encapsulated DNS ﬂow of an average
packet size of 70 bytes. Through manual inspection, we found that the majority of
IPs that fall within cluster 0 are originating from Netherlands, which is coherent
with the investigation in [294]. A similar concept applies for other clusters. Note the
similarities between clusters 2, 3 and 4 which could be the result of one campaign
using diﬀerent ASNs from diﬀerent locations.
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After the clustering exercise, in order to evaluate our model, we run the cluster
evaluation algorithm in Weka [257]. First the algorithm ignores the class attribute
and generates the clustering. Then it assigns classes to the clusters during the
testing mode, based on the majority of values within each cluster. Afterwards, it
calculates the classiﬁcation error. Based on this technique, we have achieved a 82%
accuracy. In other words, our model incorrectly classiﬁed 18% of the traces to their
corresponding clusters. We aim, in our future work, to analyze more data and run
more complex algorithms to improve our clustering result.
Please note that, although we do not have a decisive proof of whether each
cluster represents a campaign or a botnet of DNS ampliﬁcation DDoS, we rela-
tively succeeded in this task by pinpointing similarities of features among the DNS
ampliﬁcation DDoS traces.
Similarity Insights
Next, we infer insights related to the used darknet address space. The aim is to
provide a more core element to our clustering approach. The rationale behind this
task states that since bots in the same campaign typically utilize the same list of
IPs when launching their attacks, it would be interesting to capture the similarity
related to the use of these IP lists. By accomplishing this task, we can possibly
infer campaigns or at least detect similarities in attack mechanisms. To achieve
the intended goal, we executed an experiment to represent attacks that exchange
at least 90% of dark IPs. Figure 6.10 depicts an IP map1 that satisﬁes the latter
condition.
It is disclosed that two groups of IPs share at least 90% of dark IPs. Please refer
to tables 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3 in the appendix for attack references. The smaller group
consists of 2 IPs from diﬀerent months (March and April). Our analysis identiﬁed
that these two sources share not just dark IP usage, but also country, ASN number,
1The map was generated using Gephi [297], an open source visualization tool.
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Figure 6.10: IPs Sharing at least 90% Darknet Space
speed range, requested domain, and many other attributes as previously identiﬁed
in Section 6.1.2 in cluster 0. As for the second group, 7 out of 8 IPs originate from
the same ASN number. All of the attacks in this group are initiated from Europe,
speciﬁcally from Netherlands; this ﬁnding is corroborated in [294]. Similar to the
ﬁrst group, these attacks share similarities in clustering attributes and 55.56% of
these traces are found also in cluster 0. One of the interesting point uncovered by
analyzing this group is that all its members are sharing a speciﬁc address space
range, possibly highlighting a DDoS campaign.
Case Studies
We discuss below some major case studies that belong to three diﬀerent attack rates.
The ﬁrst case study represents high-speed (i.e., ﬂash) DNS ampliﬁcation DDoS
detected attacks. In our dataset, we have found 3 attacks that fall within this
category, namely, ID F1, M1 and A1. These are shown in the ﬁrst rows of Tables 7.1,
7.2 and 7.3, respectively. These attacks are found to be focused; intensity is equal
to the contacted unique dark IPs or, in other words, the host/attacker sends only
1 packet per open DNS resolver. First, attack F1 is the fastest detected attack. It
was launched from the United States, California on February 19th. The detected
attack has a rate of 79565.67 pps. This propagation speed is 17 times faster than
the Slammer worm [166]. This attack targeted 6.5% of our darknet in less than 1
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second. Assuming the intent of the attacker is to send one packet for each IP, a
malware with this speed can target the whole IPv4 Internet address space in less
than a week (6 days and few hours). In order to validate the occurrence of this
ﬂash DNS reﬂection DDoS attack, we resorted to publicly accessible DShield [100]
data and inspected port 53 for the 3 days before and after the 19th of February. We
have noticed a signiﬁcant increase at this speciﬁc date. According to DShield data,
the average incident reports measured on port 53 was 14.28% for the surrounded 7
days of this attack. However, on February 19th, the average reached 38.19% with a
10347879 increase in reports from the previous day. Second, attack M1 was launched
from Taiwan on March 18th. This date is the same for the largest DDoS attack
as declared in [211]. This ﬂash attack sent probes to 50257 unique dark IPs (9.5%
of our /13 darkspace) within 1 second with an average rate of 46677.36 pps. This
speed is almost 10 times faster than the Slammer worm. With this speed, this DDoS
can target 16 millions IPv4 hosts (/8) on the Internet in less than 6 minutes. Third,
attack A1 was also launched from the United States, California on April 15th. The
attack possesses a rate of 21672.18 pps. This attack targeted 11.7% of our darknet
address space.
The second case study, which involves medium speed attacks, is one of the
major inferred DNS ampliﬁcation DDoS in terms of size and impact. Compared
to the previous case study, this attack is not focused (intensity is not equal to the
contacted unique dark IP or sending at least 1 packet per open DNS resolver). This
attack targeted one victim using 2 hosts (ID M5 and M10 of Table 7.2). This attack
targeted around 360000 unique dark IPs (68% of the monitored /13 darknet), and
hence could be considered the most comprehensive compared to all other threats.
Our analysis linked these traces to the largest DNS ampliﬁcation DDoS [18] for the
following reasons: 1) In addition to the use of the ANY DNS query, the traces of this
attack targeted the “ripe.net” domain, which was used in the largest DDoS attack
as declared in a blog posted by the victim [211]; 2) the timing of the traces from the
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host with ID M10 started on March 15th, whereas those of the host with ID M5 started
on March 17th. The two mentioned dates could be found in the media [298,299] and
were posted on Twitter on March 17th by a company support personnel [300]. In
order to depict this distributed attack, in Figure 5.6, we highlight the threat using
a colored dashed-line. The ﬁrst and/or second peaks are likely performed as testing
before actually executing the largest DDoS as demonstrated by the third peak. Our
result matches the ascending order of peaks as discussed by the victims [211]. In
order to predict or provide an approximation of the number of machines that were
involved in the aforementioned largest DNS ampliﬁcation attack, we assume the
following: Consider M5 as a victim sample (spoofed IP or compromised machine).
The average attempts sent on the darknet is 14464427 packets over 360705 open
DNS resolvers which is around 40 requests per unique dark IP address. Recall that
each dark IP might be considered as an open DNS resolver. Also, assume that the
ampliﬁcation factor is 75 [211] and each request has a size of 68 Bytes. Moreover,
assuming only 1% (3607) of the 360705 requests reached successfully open DNS
resolvers2, then using a regular machine with a dedicated Internet service, only 1
host can generate ampliﬁed reply of 5.482 gigabits (Gb) through 3607 open DNS
resolvers within 1 second. Therefore, to generate a 75 or 300 Gb DNS reﬂection
DDoS attack, only 14 or 55 synchronized machines (bots) are needed, respectively.
The above two mentioned case studies are probably executed by an attacker
using spoofed IP addresses of the victims or using compromised machines (recall
Figures 2.2 and 2.3). We unlikely consider these activities as scanning events that
are using legitimate addresses (i.e., the intention is not to attack themselves but
other targeted victims).
The third case study involves slow rate attacks such as hosts with ID M51 to
M54 in Table 7.2. This analysis targets stealthy focused attempts. These attacks
have low sending rate and are typically hard to detect using a ﬁrewall and/or a
2As of November 2013, this is very probable as there is around 32 million open DNS servers on
the entire Internet [301]
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typical intrusion detection system [285]. From Table 7.2, all information regarding
these 4 hosts appears very similar or the same. Therefore, such stealthy activities are
mostly generated by the same author/code/campaign. Although we cannot claim
the orchestration among these hosts, our data highlights some shared characteristics
among such stealthy threats. Note that the requested domain names within these
attacks belong to a well-known organization that deals with securing online trans-
actions. Another group of stealthy attempts that are of interest are IDs A48 and
A51 that are shown in Table 7.3. The hosts behind these activities scan slowly with
an unprecedented average packet rate. For instance, ID A48 remains online for al-
most 3 weeks. Future analysis on this group of stealthy attempts might pinpoint to
certain suspicious unknown activities. Unfortunately, it is very hard to validate our
stealthy scanning activities with other security repositories or media as their impact
is in the information gain rather than the maliciousness of their acts. In contrast
to the previous two case studies, the attackers in such stealthy scenarios can use
their legitimate addresses. The reason behind this assumption is that it is almost
impossible to execute a powerful DNS reﬂection DDoS attack through a low-speed
propagation. However, in these attacks, we reason that attackers will attempt to
locate open DNS resolvers and/or build a DNS hierarchy table retrieved from the
ANY replies before executing their attacks.
In addition to performing several validations of our results through DShield
and the media, we execute a renowned Network Intrusion and Detection System
(NIDS) (i.e., Snort [41]) on the whole traces to see if we can detect such malicious
activities. The NIDS labeled 129 out of the inferred 134 (96%) threats as executing
ﬁltered portsweep probes. We have found that the 5 undetected attacks refer to
the third case study (i.e., slow rate attacks, namely, IDs M51 to M54 and A51) that
was previously discussed. After manual inspection, the M51 and A51 attacks turned
out to be originating from the same source that is executing stealthy scans but in
diﬀerent time periods. Moreover, all these attacks are requesting one organization’s
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domain. In summary, we can claim that our approach that aims at inferring DNS
reﬂection attacks yielded a zero false negative in comparison with a leading NIDS.
Further, our approach, leveraging the darknet space, can infer DNS ampliﬁcation
DDoS activities while a NIDS is limited to pinpointing scanning activities.
6.2 Related Work
Cyber security experts and researchers employ darknet analysis for several purposes,
namely, monitoring and inferring large-scale Internet events, including, DDoS [30],
probing activities [9, 28], worm propagation [46], analyzing events [196], measuring
misconﬁguration [1] and implementing monitoring sensors [57]. Since this part of the
thesis deals with cyber threats characterization in general and ampliﬁcation DDoS
in particular, we subsequently pinpoint the relevant related work in the areas of
darknet proﬁling, DDoS attacks and darknet analysis, and ampliﬁcation analysis.
Proﬁling darknet data: Pang et al. [108] elaborated on a detailed analysis of
darknet data. Their active and passive analysis assessed darknet samples from dif-
ferent networks over a long period of time. Four years later, Wustrow et al. [2]
reviewed the last mentioned work to update the state of this Internet background
radiation. The authors observed signiﬁcant changes and pinpointed several factors
that are behind these measures. Moreover, Fukuda et al. [258] studied correlations
among darknet traﬃc for estimating their behaviors through small address blocks by
analyzing a speciﬁc type of traﬃc packets (i.e., TCP SYN). Furthermore, Oberheide
et al. [113] analyzed speciﬁc services on darknet such DNS. The authors character-
ized these traces and proposed a mechanism to implement a secure DNS service
on darknet sensors. In another work, Dagon et al. [284] analyzed corrupted DNS
resolution paths and pinpointed an increase in malware that modiﬁed these paths
and threatened DNS authorities.
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DDoS attacks and darknet analysis: The use of darknet to infer DDoS ac-
tivities owes much to the pioneer work carried out by Moore et al. [30] that was
revisited in [262]. The key observation behind the authors’ technique is that at-
tackers, before executing a DDoS attack, spoof their addresses using random IP
addresses. As such, all victims’ replies (i.e., backscattered packets) are bounced
back to the fake IP addresses, which could be in the monitored darknet. Their
work is operated by CAIDA [302], which provide backscattered data for researchers.
Numerous research works have been performed on such data to analyze DDoS activ-
ities. The majority focus on implementing new detection techniques to infer DDoS
attacks [120,154,155,213], tracing-back the sources of attacks [42,303], investigating
spoofed attacks [195] and visualizing attacks [225, 304, 305]. Further, very recently,
Wang et al. [306] have executed a large empirical study on Botnet-based DDoS
activities. Their work investigated data generated through active and passive mea-
surements from several countries. Some of their ﬁndings include insights on the
geo-spatial distribution and co-occurrence of orchestrated attacks against similar
victims.
Ampliﬁcation analysis: Paxson [209] was among the ﬁrst to pinpoint the threats
of DNS reﬂectors. The author discussed various defenses against reﬂector attacks
and indicated three types of threats abusing network services, namely, DNS, Gnutella
and web servers via TCP. Rossow et al. [32] revisited UDP-based protocols that can
be abused for reﬂection attacks. The authors identiﬁed 14 protocols that are suscep-
tible to DRDoS ampliﬁcation. Similarly, Kuhrer et al. [210] demonstrated that even
TCP protocols can be abused for ampliﬁcation. In an another work, Anagnostopou-
los et al. [283] introduced a new technique to execute DNS ampliﬁcation attacks
through DNSSEC-powered servers. Moreover, Czyz et al. [242] characterized NTP
traﬃc and reﬂection attacks on darknet and showed the rise and decline of NTP
DRDoS attacks using a large empirical study.
156
Our work is complementary and extends the aforementioned research works
by exploiting requests (i.e., query) packets targeting the darknet to eﬀectively infer
DRDoS ampliﬁcation activities. In this work, we do not only focus on the measure-
ment and characterization of ampliﬁcation attacks, but also uncover their attack
meachnisms throughout darknet analysis.
6.3 Summary
In this chapter, we presented a novel approach to infer Internet DRDoS activities
by leveraging the darknet space. The approach corroborated the fact that one can
infer DDoS attacks without relying on backscattered analysis. The detection module
was based on certain parameters to ﬁngerprint network ﬂows as DNS ampliﬁcation
DDoS-related. The classiﬁcation module amalgamated the attacks based on their
possessed rate while the clustering component attempted to identify ﬂows that share
similarity features to disclose campaigns of DRDoS. The analysis was based on 1.44
TB of real darknet traﬃc collected during a several month period. The results dis-
closed 134 DNS reﬂection DDoS activities, including ﬂash and stealthy attacks. The
clustering and similarity exercises provided insights and inferences that permit the
detection of DNS ampliﬁcation DDoS campaign activities. Moreover, the discussed
case studies elaborated on three attack categories and provided signiﬁcant related
cyber security intelligence.
Lessons Learned and Future Work
From this work, we can extract the following insights related to DNS ampliﬁcation
attacks. First, when compared to previous years, we have found that DNS ampliﬁ-
cation attacks are behind the increase of DNS queries of type ANY on the Internet.
Second, we have pinpointed that the majority of the attacks target the root domain.
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Third, we have inferred that DNS reﬂection attack rates can range from very low to
high speeds. High speed attacks pinpoint victims of spoofed attacks and compro-
mised machines whereas the very slow attacks reﬂect stealthy scans. Last but not
least, we have unexpectedly uncovered a UDP-based mechanism used by attackers
to execute DNS ampliﬁcation attacks in a highly rapid manner without collecting
information about open DNS resolvers. In other words, we have inferred that unlike
typical DDoS attempts that scan for vulnerable machines and then execute the at-
tack, the largest DNS ampliﬁcation analyzed was executed in only one step through
a small number of machines; benign DNS queries are sent to the Internet with the
intention to reach open DNS resolvers, which subsequently trigger a reﬂection reply
to the victim.
As for future work, we aim to execute our model on a larger data set and ex-




Technology has emerged in all aspects of our lives. Regrettably, adversaries are
abusing technology for their own beneﬁts. As a result, Internet services have be-
come a cheap tool for attackers to generate malicious activities such as infecting
victims’ machines, taking control, exhausting resources and stealing information.
Recent events demonstrated that individuals, corporations and governmental
organizations could be subjected, at the speed of light and in full anonymity, to am-
pliﬁed, large-scale and disrupting attacks that might lead to severe privacy/security
and economic consequences, and even to the endangerment and loss of human lives.
DoS attacks are perhaps the most prominent and severe types of such large-scale
cyber attacks. These attacks might be carried out by a spectrum of individuals
such as criminals, cyber-terrorists and foreign government spies. Moreover, as the
closest approximation of perfect anarchy, the Internet becomes an attractive tool to
terrorists for spreading messages, recruiting supporters, planning and coordinating
attacks. In this context, it is a national duty of paramount importance to monitor
and protect Internet services.
In this thesis, we tackled the increasing cyber security concern rendered by
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DoS activities. To achieve this task, we successfully monitored darknet, also known
as network telescope. In particular, we primarily reviewed the literature in terms of
darknet deployment approaches, analysis techniques and visualization of its data.
Darknet projects were found to monitor various cyber threat activities and were
distributed in one third of the global Internet. We further identiﬁed that Honeyd
is probably the most practical tool to implement darknet sensors, and future de-
ployment of darknet will include mobile-based VOIP technology. In addition, as
far as darknet analysis is considered, computer worms and scanning activities were
found to be the most common threats that can be investigated throughout dark-
net. Code Red and Slammer/Sapphire are the most analyzed worms. Furthermore,
our study uncovered various lacks in darknet research. For instance, less than 1%
of the contributions tackled DRDoS ampliﬁcation investigations and at most 2%
of research works pinpointed spooﬁng activities. Second, we studied the nature of
darknet data and the correlation among inferred threats. Such work proved that
speciﬁc darknet threats are correlated. Moreover, it provided insights about threat
patterns and allowed the interpretation of threat scenarios. Third, we attempted
to predict DoS events by proposing a forecasting model. The extracted inferences
from various DDoS case studies exhibited a promising accuracy with low error rate.
Further, our prediction model could lead to a better understanding of the scale,
speed and size of DDoS attacks and generates inferences that could be adopted for
immediate response and mitigation. Moreover, the accumulated insights could be
used for the purpose of long term large-scale DDoS analysis. Finally, we concen-
trated our research work towards the detection of large-scale DDoS activities. While
inferring such malicious activities, we uncovered traces from the largest DNS ampli-
ﬁcation attack in history, and consequently proposed a novel approach to ﬁngerprint
and estimate the size of ampliﬁcation attacks. Complementary to the pioneer work
on inferring DDoS activities using darknet, this work proved that we can extract
DDoS activities without relying on backscattered analysis. The results uncovered
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high-speed and stealthy attempts that were never previously documented. The ex-
tracted insights from various validated DNS DRDoS case studies led to a better
understanding of the nature and scale of this threat and generated inferences that
could contribute in detecting, preventing, assessing, mitigating and even attributing
DRDoS activities.
From the conducted research, we have extracted the following points:
• Compared with other trap-based monitoring systems, darknet is considered as
a practical and easy-to-implement tool in passive monitoring the cyber space.
Darknet setup can be developed using basic routing techniques and can be
monitored through IDSs.
• Mobile darknet is a new trend that has a promising future in passive monitor-
ing research. The future deployment will include mobile-based VoIP darknet.
• A study in 2001 [126] shows that darknet sensors occupy 5% of the whole IPv4
address space. An up-to-date study is needed to approximate the current size
of darknet.
• Filtering darknet misconﬁguration is still not thoroughly investigated in the
literature and hence requires more attention from the research community.
• Inferring and attributing botnet or malicious campaigns by solely monitoring
darknet is challenging due to the passive nature of such IP space. Therefore,
other interactive techniques such as honeypots could be used in conjunction
with darknet analysis to enhance botnet investigation.
• IPv6 darknet, event monitoring and game engine visualization methods require
a signiﬁcantly greater amount of attention from the research community.
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• Diﬀerentiating between scanning and DRDoS is still partially a diﬃcult prob-
lem due to the fact that both leverage scan-based techniques to operate. Scan-
ning activities probe the Internet to collect information, whereas reﬂection
activities generate scan-based requests to redirect ampliﬁed reply traﬃc to
victim.
• Packet analysis is the only technique used on darknet data to investigate spoof-
ing activities. This method includes inspecting ICMP packets and TTL values.
Based on our survey, less than 2% of research has been done on spooﬁng and
darknet. Therefore, spooﬁng is still a severe malicious activity that needs more
attention from the security research community.
• Despite the existence of some collaborative darknet projects, more darknet re-
sources and information sharing must emerge to infer and attribute large-scale
cyber activities. Dealing with a worldwide darknet information exchange is
a capability that requires collaboration and trust; however, this collaboration
raises security policies and privacy concerns.
7.1 Discussions
We list below some of the most relevant topics for discussion.
• Analysis of IPv4 & IPv6 Darknet Data: A major element that distin-
guishes IPv4 from IPv6 is the size of the address space. In a nutshell, IPv6
is designed to provide signiﬁcantly more address space to handle the Internet
growth in a more secure and eﬃcient manner. The migration and integration
between these two technologies have already started [307]. For instance, sev-
eral techniques are being leveraged to handle this migration such as tunneling
and address translation. This shift will obviously aﬀect network monitoring
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systems such as darknet. As such, both defense and attack mechanisms will be
aﬀected. For instance, in regard to security, IPv6 packets might have higher
encryption. The latter will make it harder for defense teams to analyze and
interpret suspicious traﬃc and easier for attackers to obfuscate. Furthermore,
since IPv6 is larger in address space, this will make it harder to monitor huge
amounts of traﬃc. It is also diﬃcult for attackers to probe the large address
space to look for vulnerabilities. Regardless of the aforementioned impacts, it
is only a matter of time for IPv6 darknet to become more involved in the era
of trap-based monitoring system. This requires attention from the security
community.
• Deployment and Technology Development: Nowadays, technology has
become a part of our daily life. Basic electronic devices such as phones,
watches, and glasses have evolved into smart equipment and become easily
accessible through the Internet. This new shift has obviously increased the
opportunity for malicious users to abuse such services. The latter threat can
have a direct impact on our lives. For instance, attackers are abusing the In-
ternet to generate ﬂood of Voice over IP phone calls to attack 911 emergency
phone services or spam mobiles with anonymous call or SMS messages [50].
Therefore, deploying darknet and honeypot sensors that operate on phone
and mobile numbers is highly needed. The latter techniques are considered
signiﬁcantly important and require enormous attention from the research com-
munity.
• Visualization and Learning: Today’s revolutionary technology is putting
emphasis on visualization for the simple and friendly use of machines and in-
formation. In fact, researchers have found that, in a learning environment,
the majority of people need to see information before learning [308]. As such,
visualization and gaming have emerged largely in technologies such as social
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media, mobile and web services. In regard to cyber security, our vision is
coherent with some of the aforementioned research works in [218–220], which
emphasize on building monitoring systems based on game engines and visual-
ization techniques. Therefore, we believe that the future generation of tools
and technologies in cyber security will include more visual eﬀects and game-
based services. Such technologies already exist. For instance, the LOIC [309]
is a well-known network stress testing and DDoS attack tool used by malicious
and benign users in a game-friendly manner. We predict that, in the upcoming
years, similar technologies will become a new trend for the cyber space.
• Cyber Capabilities: One of today’s challenges is to build cyber capabilities
with the ability to provide a generic technique to automate the inference of
botnet and orchestrated campaigns (i.e., DDoS and Spamming). The NICTER
project [77] is a typical scenario of such cyber capability. Moreover, another
challenge is to build a trusted centralized repository of darknet data that can
be used for worldwide monitoring and intelligence sharing. Such a worldwide
project requires a thorough understanding of the challenges behind the privacy
and legal issues.
• Cyber Awareness: Enforcing cyber laws has escalated the intensity of at-
tacks [310]. Therefore, cyber law enforcement and its related security tech-
nologies are not the ultimate solution to mitigate and defend against cyber
attacks. As such, other techniques like learning and education are needed to
increase the awareness and help in applying best practices for ethically using
the cyber space as a service instead of abusing its enormous capabilities.
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7.2 Considerations
In general, our overall proposed approaches leverage darknet to infer and extrapo-
late attacks. Therefore, there are three assumptions that underlie our analysis:
• Attackers’ IP Address Selection: Although our monitored sensors are
relatively large (i.e., /13), the approach is unable to monitor events that do
not target such sensors. The latter can occur when attackers use an already
published hit list or test speciﬁc and known ampliﬁers. Although such meth-
ods will allow attacks to avoid being detected or assessed by our approach,
adversaries in general prefer to employ an up-to-date and various hit lists of
ampliﬁers to decrease their chances of being detected and to increase their
chances of launching ampliﬁcation attacks [32]. To achieve the latter, at least
one global scan is ﬁrst needed to assess the impact of the ampliﬁcation factor;
a scan that would probably hit our sensors. We concur that we are not aware
of any worldwide reported attacks that were not (at least partially) inferred
by our proposed approach.
• Detection Avoidance: Our proposed detection algorithm leverages several
attack parameters. As such, attackers can tune their attacks to avoid being
detected. For instance, adversaries can craft raw IP packets or inject random
delays to reduce the ﬂow to a rate below the employed threshold parameter.
However, we argue that crafting raw IP packets and injecting random delay in
the attack ﬂows are relatively time consuming operations, especially given that
one of the major ampliﬁcation attack parameters is the rate. Thus, attackers
adopting these methods will decrease their eﬃciency or at least reduce the
impact of their generated attacks.
165
7.3 Future Work
The investigation of DRDoS activities has seen increasing attention from the security
community in terms of measurement and analysis [32]. However, the issue of how to
systematically assess the impact of such attacks on the Internet infrastructure has
not yet been dealt with. The latter task becomes even more imperative, given that
current practices rely on manual and reactive analysis. For instance, the largest
Domain Name System (DNS) DRDoS attack that occurred in 2013 required more
than few days to be analyzed [211], where its actual impact was speculated to range
between 75 Gbps [40] and 300 Gbps [211]. Further, the analysis of the largest
Network Time Protocol (NTP) DRDoS attack of 2014 took more than 3 days [5],
where its actual rate and impact were postulated a week later. Additionally, while
investigating thousands of DDoS and DRDoS activities for several years, we have
discovered that labeling some large-scale DDoS attacks as severe, based solely on the
number of packets, could lead to inaccurate results or even false positives. Therefore,
as future work, we aim at tackling the design and implementation of a prediction
model for ampliﬁcation attacks.
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APPENDIX
The summary of the Analyzed DNS Ampliﬁcation DDoS Traces of February, March





























F1 A Feb 19 0 34410 34410 78 79565.67 High
F2 G Feb 14 4477 129206 129206 85 28.86 Medium
F3 A Feb 21 29174 690219 305544 78 23.66 Medium
F4 Root Feb 26 17084 351617 351617 70 20.58 Medium
F5 Root Feb 19 16245 290590 290590 70 17.89 Medium
F6 Root Feb 26 9389 162513 162513 70 17.31 Medium
F7 Root Feb 11-12 25052 349692 349692 70 13.96 Medium
F8 Root Feb 20 15215 187886 187886 70 12.35 Medium
F9 Root Feb 13 61591 660473 356162 70 10.72 Medium
F10 Root Feb 16-17 33602 355188 355188 70 10.57 Medium
F11 Root Feb 3 6625 64726 64726 70 9.8 Medium
F12 Root Feb 23 11412 96216 96216 70 8.4 Medium
F13 Root Feb 2-3 93268 633886 357497 70 6.8 Medium
F14 A Feb 3 19872 128297 128297 78 6.46 Medium
F15 Root Feb 7 2107 12965 12965 70 6.15 Medium
F16 Root Feb 23-27 401266 804348 359868 70 2 Medium
F17 Root Feb 11-15 311301 316425 316425 70 1.02 Medium
F18 Root Feb 4-19 1322119 869395 360666 70 0.66 Medium
F19 Root Feb 4-14 853983 540412 356117 70 0.63 Medium
F20 A Feb 3 10634 6632 6632 78 0.62 Medium
F21 A Feb 3-16 1138804 683321 359470 78 0.6 Medium
F22 Root Feb 20-28 766810 378289 319668 70 0.49 Low
F23 Root Feb 5 27832 9645 8123 70 0.35 Low
F24 A Feb 19 50374 16393 16393 78 0.33 Low
F25 A Feb 4 16353 5306 5306 78 0.32 Low
F26 Root Feb 6-26 1706728 191562 191329 70 0.11 Low
F27 Root Feb 15-26 970150 19636 19636 70 0.02 Low
F28 A Feb 9-28 1691139 16845 16845 78 0.01 Low
F29 A Feb 15-22 640165 966 966 78 0 Low





























M1 A March 18 1 50257 50257 78.00 46677.36 High
M2 A March 31 26 63543 63543 78.00 2419.83 Medium
M3 E & F March 22 620 798192 65025 73.00 1287.41 Medium
M4 A March 20 402 91042 91042 67.00 226.21 Medium
M5 B March 17-18 93508 14464427 360705 68.00 154.69 Medium
M6 Root March 3 572 64956 64956 70.00 113.53 Medium
M7 Root March 23 662 64230 64230 70.00 97.00 Medium
M8 Root March 30 610 58104 58104 70.00 95.19 Medium
M9 Root March 24 665 63139 63139 70.00 94.99 Medium
M10 B March 15 34605 3176785 360683 68.00 91.80 Medium
M11 Root March 1 769 63342 63342 70.00 82.33 Medium
M12 A March 25 985 79333 54632 78.00 80.52 Medium
M13 Root March 12 581 40364 37160 70.00 69.46 Medium
M14 Root March 1-2 2685 161847 154905 70.00 60.28 Medium
M15 C March 25 1 60 60 77.00 58.69 Medium
M16 A March 9 8884 504794 270352 78.00 56.82 Medium
M17 A March 30 1963 63623 63623 78.00 32.41 Medium
M18 Root March 21 10255 254285 254285 70.00 24.80 Medium
M19 Root March 7 13572 247483 247483 70.00 18.23 Medium
M20 Root March 2 25314 355675 355675 70.00 14.05 Medium
M21 Root March 13 9796 128147 128147 70.00 13.08 Medium
M22 Root March 27 24391 286664 286664 70.00 11.75 Medium
M23 Root March 8 33354 346244 346244 70.00 10.38 Medium
M24 Root March 28-29 33280 342941 342941 70.00 10.30 Medium
M25 A March 17-18 71943 358931 267826 78.00 4.99 Medium
M26 A March 30 13667 61269 51999 78.00 4.48 Medium
M27 Root March 14-17 342024 1396535 360701 70.00 4.08 Medium
M28 Root March 28-29 56305 224327 224327 70.00 3.98 Medium
M29 Root March 11 73864 248582 129708 70.00 3.37 Medium
M30 A March 24 213 663 663 78.00 3.12 Medium
M31 Root March 28-29 85385 221213 221213 70.00 2.59 Medium
M32 A March 30 163 397 396 78.00 2.43 Medium
M33 A March 29-30 82278 159295 159295 78.00 1.94 Medium
M34 A March 30 330 640 639 78.00 1.94 Medium
M35 Root March 24-25 69590 127214 127214 70.00 1.83 Medium
M36 A March 31 38596 63553 63311 78.00 1.65 Medium
M37 Root March 21-24 182116 254529 130964 60.00 1.40 Medium
M38 Root March 4-5 140455 184555 159959 70.00 1.31 Medium
M39 Root March 22-25 276510 352012 352011 70.00 1.27 Medium
M40 Root March 22-23 116870 118871 65213 70.00 1.02 Medium
M41 Root March 15-29 1207792 1171393 360697 70.00 0.97 Medium
M42 Root March 22-29 563031 404882 351862 70.00 0.72 Medium
M43 A March 1 21616 7107 7107 78.00 0.33 Low
M44 A March 15 52584 17013 17013 78.00 0.32 Low
M45 A March 1-7 466136 92176 89073 78.00 0.20 Low
M46 A March 15-31 1393227 152254 134270 78.00 0.11 Low
M47 A March 6-30 2119713 194209 65792 78.00 0.09 Low
M48 A March 13 24521 2297 2117 78.00 0.09 Low
M49 Root March 6-24 1570323 64062 63698 70.00 0.04 Low
M50 A March 18-28 642350 278 236 78.00 0.00 Low
M51 D March 27-28 41548 44 44 70.00 0.00 Low
M52 D March 27-28 75803 42 42 70.00 0.00 Low
M53 D March 27-28 90128 39 39 70.00 0.00 Low
M54 D March 27-28 56874 37 37 70.00 0.00 Low





























A1 A Apr 15 3 61859 61859 78 21672.18 High
A2 H Apr 13 136 64485 64485 70 472.64 Medium
A3 Root Apr 10 70 18718 18718 70 266.8 Medium
A4 A Apr 21 4463 479863 264283 78 107.51 Medium
A5 Root Apr 25 4023 151894 151894 70 37.76 Medium
A6 Root Apr 20 325 11068 11068 70 34.05 Medium
A7 C Apr 28 1274 40903 40903 77 32.11 Medium
A8 Root Apr 4 6927 218917 218917 70 31.6 Medium
A9 Root Apr 25 3171 57837 42578 70 18.24 Medium
A10 A Apr 4 3791 68039 56211 78 17.95 Medium
A11 Root Apr 16 8723 154154 154154 70 17.67 Medium
A12 Root Apr 11 24015 350275 350275 70 14.59 Medium
A13 I Apr 1 23608 340905 340905 92 14.44 Medium
A14 Root Apr 25 39305 408596 408596 70 10.4 Medium
A15 Root Apr 16-17 27760 284387 284386 70 10.24 Medium
A16 Root Apr 12 6821 64299 64299 70 9.43 Medium
A17 Root Apr 16-17 65224 610166 355290 70 9.35 Medium
A18 Root Apr 13-14 11834 95117 95117 70 8.04 Medium
A19 B Apr 5-6 73456 345133 343652 79 4.7 Medium
A20 Root Apr 14-15 42560 182836 182834 60 4.3 Medium
A21 A Apr 20-21 55680 237640 190915 67 4.27 Medium
A22 Root Apr 6-8 179271 695695 360267 60 3.88 Medium
A23 A Apr 15-16 89471 346554 346554 78 3.87 Medium
A24 Root Apr 1-2 135389 507427 291844 70 3.75 Medium
A25 A Apr 18 23 85 85 78 3.75 Medium
A26 A Apr 24-30 568658 1601134 357930 78 2.82 Medium
A27 Root Apr 1-2 120727 316718 224789 70 2.62 Medium
A28 A Apr 21 46328 116129 65563 78 2.51 Medium
A29 Root Apr 2-3 90532 222416 222416 70 2.46 Medium
A30 Root Apr 13-15 184882 408581 228422 70 2.21 Medium
A31 Root Apr 22-23 145929 321446 257906 70 2.2 Medium
A32 A Apr 3-4 56113 120662 120662 78 2.15 Medium
A33 Root Apr 1-29 2463203 3495104 360705 70 1.42 Medium
A34 Root Apr 13-22 777630 1049946 360690 70 1.35 Medium
A35 Root Apr 3-8 463324 593142 357414 70 1.28 Medium
A36 Root Apr 7-11 295595 316685 225376 70 1.07 Medium
A37 A Apr 10-20 839737 746958 297831 78 0.89 Medium
A38 Root Apr 27-28 91306 64338 64338 70 0.7 Medium
A39 A Apr 12 18587 6049 6049 78 0.33 Low
A40 A Apr 5-20 1312707 385495 65792 78 0.29 Low
A41 A Apr 25-30 431330 119938 65642 78 0.28 Low
A42 C Apr 17-19 158580 40362 40362 77 0.25 Low
A43 Root Apr 13-20 543326 129962 95477 70 0.24 Low
A44 A Apr 1-4 288469 60878 60878 78 0.21 Low
A45 A Apr 17-26 831476 131106 109673 78 0.16 Low
A46 Root Apr 14-20 496168 63559 40901 70 0.13 Low
A47 Root Apr 5-10 426625 35125 35125 70 0.08 Low
A48 J Apr 2-23 1828890 81868 3744 75.49 0.04 Low
A49 H Apr 9-10 96970 1077 1074 70 0.01 Low
A50 K Apr 23-30 640451 8964 7871 68 0.01 Low
A51 D Apr 15-17 156226 63 47 71.02 0 Low
Table 7.3: Summary of DNS Ampliﬁcation DDoS Traces (April 2013)
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